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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated the capital structure variability of firms listed on the Dar es 
Salaam Stock Exchange by assessing the role of product diversification. It was led 
by four objectives and tested ten hypotheses. The objectives were; to assess the 
levels of capital structure variability, product diversification variability, effect of 
conventional factors on capital structure variability and effects of product 
diversification on capital structure variability of firms listed in Tanzania. The study 
employed an unbalanced panel data of 11 listed campanies from 1997 to 2014, 
making a total of 128 firm years. It used both static and dynamic regression analyses. 
The results indicated that capital structures of companies in the sample varied over 
time and across companies. Product diversification in its various types indicated 
variability over time and across companies. Both total product diversification and 
unrelated product diversifications were significantly positively related to capital 
structure. Related product diversification was significantly negatively related to 
capital structure. Asset tangibility, growth opportunity and non-debt tax shield were 
positively and significantly related to capital structure. Company size, risk of 
bankruptcy and going concern were either positively or negatively related to capital 
structure depending on the group of analysis involved. Profitability was negatively 
related to capital structure. Firms in Tanzania need to take into accounts product 
diversification among other capital structure determinants when planning for capital 
structure of their firms. The type of product diversification undertaken by a firm 
matters in capital structure decisions. Thus, managers need to consider their potential 
effects in managing the firms’ capital structure. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Research Problem 
Capital structure is a particular combination of debt and equity financing of a firm 
(Myers, 1984). Capital structure is basically an enduring long term financing of a 
company, including ordinary shares and preferred shares, retain earning and debt. 
Capital structure variability has been a focus of many studies by various researchers 
around the world. Some significant studies are Myers (1984), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Booth et al. (2001), Alonso (2003), Hall et al. (2004), Ilyas (2008), La Rocca 
et al. (2009), Hernádi (2014) and Talebnia et al. (2014). In Africa some studies are 
Abor (2008), Hove and Chidoko (2012), Nyamora (2012), Aremu et al. (2013), 
Gweyi et al. (2013), Gathogo and Ragui (2014), Mbulawa (2014) and Tarus et al. 
(2014). In Tanzania are Bundala (2012) and Bundala and Machogu (2012). 
 
Several factors affecting capital structure have been identified in previous studies. 
These include firm size, profitability, going concern, asset tangibility, growth 
opportunities and business risk; just to mention a few. Product diversification has 
emerged in the literature on capital structure determinants in firms in the developed 
economies.  See for example, Alonso (2003), La Rocca et al. (2009), Apostu (2010), 
Qian et al. (2010) and Quresh (2012). Little or none of similar studies exist in 
developing or underdeveloped economies. 
 
Product diversification refers to an involvement of a firm in multiple businesses, 
products or segments (La Rocca, et al. 2009). Such businesses, products or segments 
may be related in some ways (related diversification) or not related at all (unrelated 
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diversification). Therefore total product diversification can be decomposed into 
related and unrelated product diversifications. The degree of relatedness is normally 
based on the level of resources sharing used in production or services.  
 
Related product diversification refers to an involvement of a firm in similar but not 
same products based on the extent of sharing of resources in their production and 
services, for instance all beverage manufacturers produce related products. Their 
products, such as manufacture of wine, beer, malt and soft drinks are considered to 
be similar and therefore a production and services mixture among these products 
would be considered as related product diversification. On the other hand, unrelated 
product diversification refers to an involvement of a firm in dissimilar or diverse 
products production and services that do not share resources in their production and 
services. For instance, the manufacture of beverages, tobacco, textiles and timber 
would be a mixture of four different manufacturing processes that do not share 
resources in their production and therefore a production mixture among these 
products would be considered as unrelated product diversification (Alonso, 2003; La 
Rocca et al., 2009).  
 
Another distinction is normally made between diversity, which measures the extent 
to which firms are simultaneously active in many distinct businesses, products or 
segments at a point of time and diversification which measures diversity across both 
time and industry simultaneously. (La Rocca et al., 2009). There have been 
concerted efforts to research on diversification as it relates to and affect capital 
structure of businesses. Recognition of the distinction between related and unrelated 
product diversifications has been vital. Empirical evidence, however, is mixed in 
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terms of how each of the two types of diversification affects the firms’ capital 
structure (Alonso, 2003; La Rocca, et al, 2009; Apostu, 2010). This situation offers 
more problems to research than it tries to solve.  
 
Although related product diversification gives the impression to be superior to 
unrelated product diversification in some settings and vice versa, an important 
question that arises is whether it really matters which product diversification strategy 
a firm undertakes (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012). Such a question has inevitably 
motivated studies on related and unrelated product diversification as well as non-
diversification choices to determine whether the choice affects the firm capital 
structure decisions. Thus, this study is yet another attempt to contribute to the debate 
whether the type of product diversification matters in capital structure decisions 
(Singh et al., 2003; Klein & Lien., 2009). 
 
Firms have historically practiced diversification strategy for different motives. Some 
of these motives are; to oppose the ill effects of decline in sales and earnings, mostly 
in the maturity stage of the business cycle, to defeat competition pressures, to lessen 
business risk, to evade takeovers by growing 'big' and maintain control, to regulate to 
the tastes of customers and to satisfy power. All these reasons for diversification are 
not without a sacrifice from the firm. Since, the choices to finance such 
diversification stems from either equity or debt finance, that in itself begs the 
question, to what extent companies should use debt to accomplish such a strategy 
(Klein & Lien, 2009)? 
 
There is scanty research, so far, in this area in Tanzania. A study by Bundala & 
Machogu (2012) analysed factors affecting capital structure of listed firms but did 
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not include product diversification. Their paper was based on Bundala (2012) cross-
sectional research study, in which six determinants of capital structure were used, 
namely size of the firm, profitability of the firm, growth rate, assets tangibility, 
liquidity of the firm, and dividend pay-out. Profitability and assets tangibility were 
found to be key factors determining the capital structure decisions in Tanzania. The 
size of the firm and liquidity of the firm were observed to be indicative determinants. 
Based on these findings the study recommended that internal financing should be 
preferred to external financing.  
 
There are wide spread indications for product diversification among companies in 
Tanzania and these have motivated this present study with the aim of determining 
whether product diversification has any effect on the firm capital structure decisions. 
This present study extends beyond the six determinants and a simple cross-sectional 
approach used by Bundala (2012) by considering a total of ten determinants and uses 
both the static and the dynamic panel data approaches. This study contributes to the 
understanding of reasons behind firms financing choices based on diversification 
choices. 
  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Capital structure has proved to be a perennial puzzle in finance (Myers, 1984). 
Companies normally determine their individual optimal capital structure in the long 
term financing. Capital structure trade-offs involve a balance between cost and risk 
among other factors. There has been plenty of research focusing on the primary 
determinants of capital structure as cited earlier in section 1.1. There are still 
differing opinions regarding which factors significantly affect a firm capital structure 
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and under which situations. On the other hand, more factors are being introduced and 
tested. Such added factors include but not limited to the following; corporate 
diversification, international diversification and product diversification. Although 
there is empirical evidence on these new factors, the inclusion and exclusion of such 
factors in the various studies has been dictated and limited by feasibility of such 
studies (Ilyas, 2008, Rocca et al. 2009; Apostu, 2010). 
 
Ilyas (2008) for instance based on a study of 364 non-financial firms on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange found that 24% of variation in the level of capital structure depends 
upon such factors as; profitability, firm size, tangibility of assets, firm growth, non-
debt tax shields and taxes, while the rest (76%) is explained by other factors that are 
still unknown. These determinant factors however tend to differ by approaches used 
by researchers and by focus of researches, whereas some other factors tend to differ 
from one economic region to the other. So which composition of factors explains a 
greater extent of the firms’ capital structure variability? This has remained an 
empirical issue. 
 
The findings advanced so far, on what combination of factors influence capital 
structure variability are difficult to generalize to other countries such as Tanzania, 
because of differing contexts, methods used, financial and economic environments. 
For instance, comparable studies in Europe, such as; Green et al. (2002), Esperança 
et al. (2003), Hall et al. (2004), La Rocca et al. (2009), Apostu(2010) and in Africa, 
such as; Ogbulu and Emeni (2012) in Nigeria, Moyo (2013) in South Africa, and 
Tarus et al. (2014) in Kenya report mixed results in terms of directions and 
magnitudes of effects of these factors on capital structure variability. A few studies 
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in developed economies (Rocca et al. 2009; Apostu, 2010), have introduced product 
diversification as a factor that affect capital structure. In examining the role of 
product diversification in capital structure decision, these studies have emphasised 
on the need to separate between related and unrelated product diversification La 
Rocca, et al. (2009) for example states:- 
“…while an assessment of capital-structure choices must take into 
account diversification…, it is equally important that it differentiates 
between related and unrelated product diversification. This conclusion 
implies that diversification strategy is a feature that differentiates firms 
with respect to their financial behaviours.” (p.28). 
 
 
However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there are no such similar studies 
conducted in Africa and Tanzania in particular, that attempted to incorporate product 
diversification as a factor that affects capital structure of firms. Thus, this present 
study focused on product diversification, as a whole and it decomposed it into 
related and unrelated product diversifications in determining their effects on capital 
structure of companies listed in Tanzania.  This study aims to contribute to the 
understanding of reasons behind firms financing choices based on product 
diversification choices.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1 Broad Objective of the Study 
The objective of this study is to investigate variability in the capital structure of 
firms listed in the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange in Tanzania by assessing the role 
of product diversification amidst the conventional determinants. 
 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
i. To assess capital structure variability of firms listed in Tanzania. 
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ii. To assess product diversification variability of firms listed in Tanzania. 
iii. To assess effects of conventional factors such as assets tangibility, firm size, 
firm profitability, growth opportunity, going concern, bankruptcy risk and 
non-debt tax shields on capital structure variability of firms listed in 
Tanzania. 
iv. To analyse the effects of product diversification on capital structure 
variability of firms listed in Tanzania. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
The study contributes additional evidence to the existing body of knowledge on 
capital structure determinants by presenting empirical evidences from Tanzania 
based on an extended range of determinants. These are namely; product 
diversification which is further decomposed into related and unrelated product 
diversifications. Other factors are; asset tangibility, growth opportunity, non-debt tax 
shield, company size, risk of bankruptcy, going concern and firm profitability. 
 
The empirical evidence thus obtained helps management of companies listed in 
Tanzania to plan for their capital structure financing choices after knowing which 
factors are critical in influence it. The empirical evidences for product diversification 
among Tanzanian companies help management to plan for the nature and type of 
product diversifications that are beneficial to optimal capital structure. The choices 
of product diversification are facilitated by availability of both financial and non-
financial resources to the firms. Particularly financial resources can only be raised 
internally or externally. 
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The choice between related and unrelated product diversifications underscores the 
role each type of diversification plays in influencing choices of financing. This is so 
because unrelated product diversification is associated to low risk of bankruptcy. 
This in turn attracts debt financing. Lenders would be more willing to supply funds 
to companies with unrelated than to companies with related product diversification. 
Therefore, findings on the type of product diversification which has significant effect 
to capital structure provide managers with crucial knowledge to manage debt 
financing. 
 
Related product diversification attracts internal financing because of increased risk 
from producing similar products. Unrelated product diversification is more related to 
external financing due to reduced risk, as a result of uncorrelated cash flows from 
these unrelated products. On the other hand, presence of tangible assets such as 
plants, property and equipment dictate the ability for a firm to finance externally and 
hence adjust its capital structure both in the short run and long run. Presence of large 
amounts of retained profits facilitated by big firm size and high growth opportunities 
help firms resort to internal financing. Thus, this knowledge is crucial to 
management in their quest for excellent capital structure strategies, policies and 
plans. These strategies, policies and plans ultimately have consequential effects on 
liquidity, risks and costs attributable to capital structure decisions. 
 
The knowledge of these factors help management to balance risks and costs of 
capital structure involved. This can be achieved by managing those factors which the 
firm can easily manipulate or control such as profitability and product diversification 
or by learning from factors which the firms cannot easily manipulate or control but 
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can take advantages of, especially in the short run, such factors as, firm size, firm 
age, asset tangibility and bankruptcy risk. 
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: chapter two presents results of a 
review of related literature. Chapter three presents the research methodology used in 
the study. Chapter four presents findings of the study while chapter five discusses 
them. Finally chapter six concludes and draws implications and offers 
recommendations. Areas of future research are also provided. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter presents results of a review of literature related to capital structure 
determinants. It provides the conceptual definitions, reviews relevant theories and 
previous empirical works on product diversification, capital structure variability and 
its conventional determinants of capital structure. It then presents the research gap 
and the resultant conceptual framework. 
 
2.2 Conceptual Definitions 
2.2.1 Capital Structure Variability 
The capital structure of a company is a particular combination of debt and equity 
capital that it uses to finance its assets. The proportion of debt to equity or total 
capital is termed financial gearing. Capital structure is basically an enduring long 
term financing of a company including ordinary shares and preferred shares, retained 
earnings and debt. On the other hand capital structure variability refers to the level of 
changeability or volatility or instability on the combination of debt and equity capital 
(capital structure) of firms. This level is assessed across industries and along years. 
 
2.2.2 Product Diversification 
Product diversification refers to the extent to which a firm participates in more than 
one business products or segments, as a proxy of core product type based on 
different business classification approaches, particularly the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) (Prosser, 2009). For instance, a firm that produces only one type 
of products which belongs to the same business class based on SIC would be 
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considered as product undiversified firm or focused firms. For examples; a firm 
selling furniture, household goods, hardware and ironmongery would be considered 
as selling same products belonging to the same SIC class only (SIC code 46.15). A 
firm manufacturing games and toys only (SIC code 32.40) or manufacturing of 
electric motors, generators and transformers only (SIC code 27.11), or a firm selling 
a single range of products in only one out of these SIC codes, would also be 
considered undiversified in its products. But, a firm that has a combination of 
products or services across these SIC classes, such as SIC codes 46.15, 32.40 and 
27.11 would be considered product diversified (Alonso, 2003; La Rocca et al., 2009; 
Prosser, 2009). 
 
Related product diversification refers to an involvement of a firm in similar but not 
same products that are within four digits of the SIC codes, that is the classes vary 
only by at most the last two digits. For example wholesale of sugar and chocolate 
and sugar confectionery (SIC code 46.36) and Wholesale of coffee, tea, cocoa and 
spices (SIC code 46.37) are considered as products within four digits of the SIC 
codes (i.e. 46.36 to 46.37). These two ranges of products whole sales are considered 
similar but not same, hence related products. 
 
The relatedness of a product is based on the degree of resources sharing (such as 
technology, materials, labour and equipment) in the products’ production or 
processing or sale. Since firms involved in the sale of product classified based on 
SIC classes in the preceding example (46.36 to 46.37) share selling resources in such 
firms their diversification is considered to be related. Note that, the preceding 
example does not refer to production or manufacturing of such same products, 
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because that would be in other SIC classes. For example, the manufacture of cocoa, 
cocoa butter, cocoa fat, cocoa oil is in SIC class 10.82, while manufacture of ground 
coffee, soluble coffee, extracts, concentrates of coffee, tea and mate is in SIC class 
10.83. In these later manufacturing examples the SIC classes grouping are not based 
on sales or sharing of selling resources but they are based on sharing of 
manufacturing resources. Thus the two SIC codes (i.e. 10.82 and 10.83) are 
considered to be related because they are within four digits of SIC codes which vary 
only by at most the two last digits (Alonso, 2003; La Rocca et al., 2009; Prosser, 
2009). 
 
Unrelated product diversification refers to an involvement of a firm in dissimilar or 
diverse products that are within two digits of the SIC codes, that is they vary by the 
first two codes which represent a wide range of variations in which case the 
production, services or sale of such products requires independent resources. Such 
products do not share resources in their production or services or sales. For example, 
a firm that is involved in manufacture of distilled, potable, alcoholic beverages such 
as whisky, brandy, gin and liqueurs (SIC codes 11) and manufacture of tobacco 
products and products of tobacco substitutes such as cigarettes, fine cut tobacco, 
cigars, pipe tobacco, chewing tobacco and snuff (SIC codes 12). These two ranges of 
products vary by the first two digits.  
 
On the other hand, total product diversification is normally composed of both related 
and unrelated product diversifications. While product diversification considers 
product mixture across industry and time (years) product diversity considers product 
mixture across industry only; that is at a particular point in time only (Alonso, 2003; 
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La Rocca et al., 2009; Prosser, 2009). 
 
2.3 Review of Relevant Theories 
2.3.1 Theories of Diversification on Capital Structure 
The effects of product diversification on capital structure choices have been 
explained mostly through the co-insurance effects, the agency cost and the 
transaction cost theories, which are explained in detail in the following sub sections. 
 
2.3.1.1 The Co-Insurance Effect Theory 
The idea of a co-insurance effect for corporate debt was first advanced by Lewellen 
(1971). Lewellen argued that the joining-together of two or more firms whose 
earning streams were less-than-perfectly correlated would reduce the risk of default 
of the merged firms (i.e., the co-insurance effect) and thereby increase the "debt 
capacity" or "borrowing ability" of the combined enterprise (Lewellen, 1971; Kim & 
McConnell, 1977; Monteforte & Stagliano, 2014).  
 
Singh et al., (2003) argued that, the level of capital structure ratios depends on the 
level of the co-insurance effect. The coinsurance effect deals with the reduction of 
operating risk, which is due to the imperfect correlation between the different cash 
flows of a firm running diverse businesses (Lewellen, 1971; Kim & McConnell, 
1977; La Rocca et al., 2009). This effect is more relevant for firms that develop 
unrelated product diversification approaches. It is caused by the low correlation 
between products returns under the diversification mix. The low correlations 
between products in turn lead to low cash flow risk. Therefore, these firms should be 
able to assume more debt (Kim & McConnell, 1977; La Rocca et al., 2009). 
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The co-insurance effect advocates that firms can decrease risk by means of 
diversifying their businesses and, thereby the reduced risk can raise the debt capacity 
for the firm. The co-insurance effect has a positive effect on the firm debt capacity 
as a result of the reduction in the volatility of firm revenues and profits. It is 
expected that this effect would be more intense in firms that develop unrelated 
product diversification strategies. Co-insurance effect predicts a positive relationship 
between the degree of the firms’ product diversification and capital structure 
variability. Consequently, it increases debt capacity and results in increased debt 
usage for unrelated product-diversified firms (Singh et al., 2003; Apostu, 2010). 
 
2.3.1.2 The Agency Cost Theory 
The agency costs theory was introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) building on 
former works of Fama and Miller (1972). Agency cost theory has its roots in the 
existence of conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers. Debt 
financing is considered as an essential mechanism to alleviate conflicts between 
managers and equity holders. Shareholders can use it as a tool to reduce the 
availability of “free cash flows” at the disposal of firm managers. Debt financing, if 
used, decreases free cash flow, agency costs and turn away managers from 
undertaking value-decreasing decisions in the firm, due to increased debt 
obligations.  
 
At times, shareholders endorse borrowing as a tool to regulate managerial behaviour, 
limiting unhealthy diversification decisions. As a result, product diversification can 
be endorsed by shareholders as a tool to promote debt usage. This agency effect is 
accounted for in two ways; first, based on conflicts of interest between shareholders 
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and managers, the optimal capital structure is obtained by trading off the benefits of 
debts against the cost of debt, by encouraging the use of debt in value increasing 
product diversification investments against value decreasing investments. Secondly, 
once debt is introduced into capital structure another type of conflict of interest 
arises, i.e. the conflict between equity and debt holders. In highly geared firms, the 
incentives for shareholders to push managers to pursue riskier product diversification 
projects can result in “an asset substitution effect”, where equity instruments are 
substituted for debt instruments thus a disincentive from shareholders to promote 
managers to use debt financing happens based on the need to protect ownership 
control (Chen et al., 1998). 
 
Agency cost arguments indicate that product diversification at times can be 
considered as an unhealthy corporate strategy, because it may give executives either 
too much or little financing choices flexibility. Based on this situation, shareholders 
may use product diversification as a tool to discipline executives by promoting debt 
financing through product diversification investments in order to keep managers 
busy servicing debts (Li & Li, 1996; Apostu, 2010). Thus, the agency costs theory 
predicts that, if agency conflicts and cost exists, shareholders may endorse product 
diversification investments in order to promote debt usage, so that they may control 
managers from investing in unhealthy investments. This eventually leads to high 
capital structure ratios due to increased debt finance in the capital structure (Apostu, 
2010).  
 
2.3.1.3 The Transaction Cost Theory 
The transaction cost theory emerged from transaction cost economics. Transaction 
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cost economics has a stretched history. It was known properly as ‘transaction costs’ 
for centuries. The precedent of transaction cost economics was not tied up in a 
particular research model or theory, but rather in uncoordinated attempts to give the 
elementary idea of “costly exchange” an operational counterpart. In 1940, Tibor 
Scitovsky introduced the label of ‘transaction costs’ into the economic vocabulary. 
In the meantime, Ronald Coase published his 1937 paper in which he attributed the 
existence of the firm to the cost of using the price mechanism. But, as a theory it 
began with the work of Oliver Williamson in 1979 (Hardt, 2009). 
 
Williamson (1988) argues that debt and equity are substitute forms of governance 
and that the optimal financing choice depends on the characteristics of the assets, 
particularly the re-usability of these assets in a given case in point. Debt, which 
represents a market mode of organization, is favoured when asset specificity is low 
while equity, the equivalent of internal organization, is favoured when relationship-
specific investments are more prominent. So, according to the transaction costs 
theory, the type of diversification adopted by a firm depends on the nature of the 
unutilized resources that lead firms to diversify.  
 
Since the type of assets employed by a firm influences the financial decisions it is 
possible to establish a relationship between capital structure and the product 
diversification approach of a firm, through the transaction costs theory. This theory 
examines a firm financial decision in terms of the degree of specificity 
(“inflexibility”) of firm assets. When asset specificity is high, firms will prefer 
equity as a financing instrument because, in case of liquidation, these assets have 
low values as they cannot be easily reemployed. In contrast, debt is the preferred 
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financing tool in the presence of general purpose (“flexible”) assets which are more 
valuable as collateral and are able to retain their value in the event of 
liquidation/default (Apostu, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, as noted previously, firms diversify their activity in response to 
the presence of an excess of unutilized assets. Firms are more prone to adopt related 
product diversification strategies when they have an excess of highly specific 
(“inflexible”) assets because these assets can only be transferred across similar 
business products. Excess physical resources, most knowledge based resources and 
external financial resources are more associated with unrelated product 
diversification, while intangible resources and internal financial resources are more 
associated with related product diversification. So, transaction cost explanations 
suggest that firms that are diversified across many business segments have a lower 
employment of specific assets and, hence, can support more debt (Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt, 1991; Apostu, 2010). 
 
Excess inflexible resources have low collateral values because they are less reusable 
or cannot be redeployed to other uses. As a result they have less liquidation values. 
They tend to discourage lenders because of their low liquidation values. Related 
product diversification is possible with highly similar resources which are 
characteristically inflexible. Thus related product diversification investments are 
possible with and considered related to internal financial resources, such as retained 
earnings and equity, because lenders perceive high costs associated with using low 
value collaterals. Thus borrowing to finance related product diversification 
investments is costly due to low collateral values availed by assets used in related 
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product diversification investments. The only comparatively less costly option for 
such investments is internal financing. Thus, related product diversification will be 
related to internal financing.  
 
On the other hand, excess flexible resources have high collateral values. They tend to 
encourage lenders because of their high liquidation values. Unrelated product 
diversification is possible with non-specific resources which are characteristically 
flexible. Unrelated product diversification investments are possible with and 
considered related to external financial resources, such as loans and bonds, because 
lenders perceive low cost associated with using high valued collaterals. Borrowing to 
finance unrelated product diversification investments is less costly dues to high 
collateral values available from unrelated product investments. Thus unrelated 
product diversification is related to external financing. 
 
2.3.2 Product Diversification Hypotheses 
2.3.2.1 Related Product Diversification Hypothesis 
Based on the transaction cost hypothesis, the type of diversification adopted by a 
firm depends on the nature of the unutilized resources that led it to diversify. 
Inflexible resources and internal finances are considered to be associated with related 
product diversification, because, investments in similar or related product 
diversification is hampered by high debt transaction costs. Lenders perceive such 
investments collaterals to be less valuable. Managers will have to pay more for less 
debt resulting in costly exchanges. Consequently, managers are left with only one 
option which is: internal financing. Accordingly, the co-insurance effects theory 
suggests that, product diversification in related business segments results into 
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correlated returns which do not lower returns volatility, which in turn discourages 
lenders from offering loans to finance related product diversification investments. 
Thus, internal financing is the only possible way for these firms to use in financing 
investments in related product diversification. A negative relationship between 
related product diversification and capital structure ratio is expected; hence our first 
hypothesis states;   
H1: Related product diversification negatively affects capital structure of companies 
listed in Tanzania 
 
2.3.2.2 Unrelated Product Diversification Hypothesis 
Based on the co-insurance effect hypothesis, unrelated product diversification 
produces uncorrelated returns from diverse business products or segments, which 
reduces business risk and creates greater debt capacities. Thus lender will prefer to 
offer debts to businesses operating in unrelated products or segments. Similarly, 
based on the transaction cost hypothesis, unrelated product diversification implies 
less debt transaction costs and thus managers pay less for debts procured resulting in 
un-costly exchanges. It follows that, a positive relationship would be expected 
between unrelated product diversification and capital structure ratios. Hence, the 
second hypothesis states; 
H2: Unrelated product diversification positively affects capital structure of 
companies listed in Tanzania 
 
2.3.2.3 Total Product Diversification Hypothesis 
Based on the agency theory total product diversification is arguably positively related 
to capital structure ratios, as a result of shareholders trying to control managerial 
opportunistic practices by encouraging debt use through product diversification 
investments. The agency costs theory predicts that debt will be used to reduce the 
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ability of a manager to undertake detrimental investments by promoting healthy 
investments, which would be financed by debt.  
 
Consequently, shareholders will promote the use of debt as a device to discipline 
managerial behaviour up to the point when their objective is realised. One of the 
ways to do this is to endorse investments in profitable product diversification 
projects. Hence, a positive relationship would be expected between total product 
diversification and capital structure ratios up to that realization. The relationship may 
be reversed if such an objective is not pursued. Hence, the third hypothesis stated in 
null statement states; 
H3: Total product diversification does not affect capital structure of companies listed 
in Tanzania 
 
 
2.3.3 Conventional Determinants of Capital Structure 
2.3.3.1 Assets Tangibility 
Tangibility refers to the degree to which firm assets are tangible, physical or material 
in nature. Assets such as property plants and equipment are considered to be more 
tangible while goodwill, brand names and skills or expertise are less tangible (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Kochhar & Hitt, 1988). Tangible assets are less subject to 
informational asymmetries and usually they have greater values than intangible 
assets in case of bankruptcy. So, tangible assets provide better collateral for loans 
and thus are positively associated with higher debt levels (Titman & Wessels, 1988; 
Rajan 1995; Apostu, 2010). It is therefore expected that asset tangibility will have a 
positive relationship with debt financing. Hence, the fourth hypothesis states; 
H4: Tangibility of the firm assets positively affects capital structure of companies 
listed in Tanzania. 
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2.3.3.2 Firm Size 
It refers to the currency value of assets. It tells how big a firm is, and captures the 
idea of capacity (Rajan & Zingale, 1995; Ogbulu & Emeni, 2012; Oh et al., 2014). 
Firm size is a proxy for the inverse probability of default. It is assumed to be 
positively correlated with capital structure ratios.  As a result, large firms easily 
access financial markets and are capable of borrowing at better conditions (Titman 
and Wessels, 1988; Harris & Raviv 1991; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Frank & Goyal, 
2002; Apostu, 2010). 
 
Firm size can also affect capital structure negatively. For example, due to “control 
rights” effects, small firms are not ready to surrender their rights for control to 
outside investors and consequently, they prefer debt as a financing option (Vries, 
2010). Also, Firm size is a sign of ability to eliminate information asymmetry. Less 
asymmetric information leads to more appetite to finance with equity than debt, 
hence a negative relationship with debt levels would be expected. Thus, it is 
expected that asset size and capital structure ratios will be either positively or 
negatively related. Hence, the fifth hypothesis is stated in a null form as follows: 
H5: Size of the firm does not affect capital structure of companies listed in 
Tanzania 
 
2.3.3.3 Firm Profitability 
Profitability refers to the level of profit generation over years in relation to its assets 
values (La Rocca et al., 2009; Apostu, 2010; Tarus et al., 2014). The relationship 
between capital structure and profitability of a firm is theoretically and empirically 
in two ways. First, as firms prefer to obtain financing through internally generated 
fund, because of its relatively low costs, capital structure ratios will be negatively 
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related to profitability (Apostu, 2010). The more profitable a firm is the lesser it is 
going to depend on external finance. Firm profitability will be negatively related to 
capital structure. Conversely, at times, profitable firms can borrow more because the 
likelihood of paying back the loan is greater; assuming that past profitability is a 
good proxy for future profitability. Thus, debt will be positively related to capital 
structure ratios. Due to expected mixed results, the sixth hypothesis is stated in a null 
form as follows: 
H6: Profitability of the firm does affect capital structure of companies listed in 
Tanzania 
 
 
2.3.3.4 Growth Opportunity 
Growth opportunity refers to potential for a firm to grow in value, size and 
profitability. It ultimately captures the scalability and potentiality of the firm (Jairo, 
2006; Nyamora, 2012; Oh, et al, 2014). High growth opportunity firms have high 
information asymmetry. Therefore one would expect these firms to have less debt in 
their capital structures, because lenders will shy away from these firms. 
Additionally, firms with high growth opportunities will retain financial flexibility 
through a low leverage in order to be able to exercise those opportunities in 
subsequent years.  
 
Market-to-book value ratio is usually used as a proxy for growth opportunities. A 
higher market-to-book ratio indicates the extent to which the market is willing to pay 
for the firms’ shares relative to their book values. Firm managers tend to explore this 
difference as an opportunity to issue equity more cheaply. Stated differently, it is an 
opportunity for firms to raise the target funding from equity shares without having to 
dilute shareholders’ control too much. Therefore, firms with high growth 
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opportunities i.e. higher market-to-book ratio firms would prefer to finance by 
equity, hence less debt. This, leads to a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and debt ratios. 
 
A positive relationship between growth opportunities and capital structure ratios has 
also been widely assessed (Doku, et al., 2011; Hove & Chidoko, 2012; Nyamora, 
2012; Ogbulu & Emeni, 2012; Bundala & Machogu, 2012; Latridis & Zaghmour, 
2013; Gweyi et al., 2013; Nyanamba et al., 2013). It is observed that, such a 
relationship is due to the fact that, small size firms have higher needs of funds to be 
used in acquiring more of non-current assets, because they need to grow. Higher 
growth firms are normally relatively young (Vries, 2010). Due to their limited size, 
they have small internal funds; consequently, they rely on external funds to be able 
to acquire the required assets for growth despite the fact that such funds are 
expensive to them. 
 
Furthermore, with equity and debt, firms are further dictated by ownership control 
rights effects. Firm ownership is not easily shared-out. Consequently these firms rely 
on debt financing since equity issues infringe control rights. Thus a positive 
relationship between growth and capital structure ratios is supported in the 
developing economies (Vries, 2010). Therefore, growth opportunities are expected 
to be either positively or negatively related to capital structure ratios. Hence, the 
seventh hypothesis is stated in a null form as follows: 
H7: Growth opportunities of the firm do not affect capital structure of 
companies listed in Tanzania 
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2.3.3.5 Going Concern 
Going concern refers to the degree to which a firm will continue to exist in a 
foreseeable future. The length of time in operation normally determines the going 
concern of the firm (Alonso, 2003; Apostu 2010; Nyanamba et al., 2013). Abor 
(2008) argues that age of the firm is a typical measure of reputation in capital 
structure models. As a firm continues longer in operation, it initiates itself as a 
continuing business concern and therefore increases its debt capacity. Thus a sound 
going concern is positively related to debt. Hence, the eight hypothesis states: 
H8: Going concern of the firm positively affects capital structure of companies 
listed in Tanzania 
 
 
2.3.3.6 Bankruptcy Risk 
Bankruptcy risk refers to the degree to which a firm level of debt usage attracts 
bankruptcy proceedings. Higher use of debt leads to higher level of bankruptcy risk 
(Kremp et al., 1999; Booth et al., 2001). Firms with high debt levels have higher 
volatility of net profit and implicitly higher bankruptcy risk. High bankruptcy risk 
leads to less use of debt, as a mechanism to avoid bankruptcy. Consequently, one 
would expect a negative effect of bankruptcy risk to debt finance (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Kremp et al., 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Alonso, 2003). Hence, the 
ninth hypothesis states; 
H9: Bankruptcy risk of the firm negatively affects capital structure of 
companies listed in Tanzania  
 
 
2.3.3.7 Non-debt Tax Shield 
Non-debt tax shield refers to the profit size consequences that results from tax 
savings that are caused by deducting items such as depreciation costs and finance 
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costs in determining taxable income (Myers, 1984; La Rocca et al., 2009). Unlike in 
the case of debt tax shields, De Angelo and Masulis (1980) make a case for non-debt 
tax shield arguing that, firms that are capable of decreasing taxes by means other 
than interest expense deductions will employ less debt in their financing structures.  
For that reason, if a firm has a huge amount of non-debt tax shields, such as 
depreciation, its likelihood of negative taxable income is higher and it is expected 
that its amount of debt will not be increased for tax reasons.  
 
Thus, debt level should be negatively related to the level of non-debt tax shields (La 
Rocca et al., 2009). A negative effect of no-debt tax shield on capital structure ratios 
will be expected. Hence, the tenth hypothesis states: 
H10: Non-debt Tax shield of the firm negatively affects capital structure of 
companies listed in Tanzania  
 
2.4 Empirical Literature Review 
2.4.1 Diversification and Capital Structure 
There is scanty empirical evidence on the relationships between product 
diversification and capital structure. Some of the studies that have looked at the 
diversification-capital structure relationship are surveyed here; Kochhar and Hitt 
(1998) found that equity financing was associated with related product 
diversification, while debt financing was associated with unrelated product 
diversification. Their justification was that, related product diversification brings in 
more specialized assets whereas unrelated diversification put in assets less 
specialized to the firm, since less specialized assets have high liquidation value, and 
as a result, they attract more debt financing than specialized assets. 
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Alonso (2003) employed panel data from 480 firms from 1991 to 1994 to study 
product diversification in Spain. Total debt ratio, a logistic transformation of total 
debt ratio, short term debt ratio, long term debt ratio, were used as measures of 
capital structure. Also two dissimilar proxies of product diversification strategies 
were used, namely; the Barry-Herfindahl index and the Entropy index of total 
product diversification. Alonso further controlled for firm specific characteristics 
such as; business risk, growth opportunities, firm size, intangible assets and firm 
profitability. An insignificant negative relationship between product diversification 
and capital structure ratios was found.  
 
La Rocca et al. (2009) analytically studied the relationship between product 
diversification and capital structure using a panel data approach among 190 Italian 
firms in which 76 were listed in stock markets from 1980 to 2006. They further used 
a target adjustment model, estimated using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
approach. They found that total product diversification was negatively related to 
capital structure ratios. In addition, they found that the extent of product relatedness 
between business products is vital in the relationship between product diversification 
and capital structure ratios.  
 
They were able to show that related product diversification based on business 
synergies and resource sharing, was negatively related to capital structure ratios. 
They also found that, unrelated product diversification based on financial synergies 
was positively related to capital structure ratios. Additionally, they found that type of 
product diversification causes different speeds of influence on capital structure ratios 
towards optimum ones. That is, firms pursuing related product diversification and 
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firms that are undiversified moves toward their optimum capital structure ratios more 
slowly while firms pursuing unrelated product diversification move toward their 
optimum capital structure ratios more quickly. 
 
They additionally found that, the preceding year’s capital structure ratio has a 
positive influence on the current debt financing level, significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient of the lagged capital structure ratios level variable, (1 - α), interpreted 
according to the direction was in the range of 0.29–0.65. As a result, the parameter α, 
which measures a firm rate of adjustment of the existing debt ratio on the way to a 
target debt ratio, was in the range 0.35-0.71.   
 
Consistent with the postulation of the transaction cost hypothesis, the adjustment 
process was shown to be a trade-off between the adjustment (transaction) costs 
involved in moving towards a target ratio and the costs of being in disequilibrium. 
Thus, firms that have adopted related product diversification have greater transaction 
costs as a result they slowly adjust their capital structure ratios to the optimum ones, 
while unrelated product diversified firms have lesser transition costs as a result they 
quickly adjust their capital structure ratios to the optimum ones.  
 
Other empirical studies (Rumelt, 1974; Barton & Gordon, 1988; Taylor & Lowe, 
1995; Kochhar & Hitt, 1998; La Rocca et al., 2009) showed that firms following 
unrelated product diversifications have higher capital structure ratios while those 
following related product diversifications have lower capital structure ratios. Their 
findings are consistent with the co-insurance effect and the transaction cost 
suggestions. That is, capital structure ratios increase with the degree
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unrelated level of product diversification, thus projecting a positive relationship 
between product diversification and capital structure ratios. 
 
These findings are consistent with agency-cost theory. It predicts that capital 
structure ratios decrease with the degree of related-unrelated level of product 
diversification. This happens especially when the level of investments in product 
diversification detriments increases with the degree of related-unrelated product 
diversification. However, previously noted studies by other researchers produced 
contrary results; Alonso (2003) and Singh et al., (2003) established a negative but 
insignificant relationship between capital structure ratios and total diversification; 
and La Rocca et al. (2009) established a negative but significant relationship 
between total product diversification and capital structure ratios. 
 
By studying a sample of 2,286 firms that were involved in product diversification 
from 1960 to 1973, Kim and McConnell (1977) cited in Apostu (2010), found that 
product diversified firms make greater use of debt-equity mixtures than the blend of 
independent firms did before product diversification was implemented. Consistent 
with these results, Apostu (2010) confirms that product-diversified firms are 
significantly using debt financing than product-focused firms. Conversely, when 
geographic diversification, size, growth, tangibility, profitability and risk were 
controlled for, Apostu’s analysis confirms the results of Alonso (2003) and Singh et 
al. (2003) which had reported a negative but insignificant relationship between 
capital structure ratios and product diversification. 
 
While controlling for geographic diversification, asset turnover, firm size, past firm 
growth, expected firm growth, and profitability, Singh et al. (2003) found that 
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product diversity individually is on average unrelated to debt ratios. Their findings 
confirmed that firms following a strategy of dual diversification, that is product 
diversification and international diversification concurrently, appear to use more 
debt. Thus, due to existence of the co-insurance effect there is increased debt 
capacity that in turn attracts more debt financing. Therefore, although individually 
each type of diversification may be negatively related to firm capital structure ratios, 
the two types of diversification complement each other in promoting debt financing. 
 
Quresh et al. (2012) empirically confirmed both, the co-insurance effect theory and 
the transaction cost theory. Firms having both product and geographic 
diversification have greater amount of debt as compared to the non-diversified firms. 
The diversified firms; manufacturing and exporting several products; have a bigger 
capacity to take on debt due to their strength in difficult circumstances which may 
cripple the entire firm if it is specialized.  
 
Therefore, the nature of firms’ resources and possibility of resources sharing dictate 
a type of diversification to be employed. The type of diversification matters in the 
analysis, and in studying effects of diversification on capital structure. Empirical 
evidences are mixed on the way types of product diversification affect capital 
structure, due to various reasons such as types of industries, methods of analysis 
used and focus of a given study. The direction of relationships between product 
diversifications and capital structure depends on the structure of product 
diversification itself. But significantly as well is that the type of product 
diversification dictates the speed at which firms adjust their capital structure ratios 
towards optimum ones. 
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2.4.2 Conventional Determinants of Capital Structure 
Empirical studies have shown that profitability, asset tangibility, firm size, 
bankruptcy risk, growth opportunities and tax shields affect capital structure (Oh et 
al., 2014). The evidences on these factors vary across countries, sectors and firms 
within a given industry due to attributes specific to a firm (Vries, 2010).  
 
2.4.2.1 Assets Tangibility 
From a theoretical point of view a contributing factor of capital structure is the type 
of assets of the firm, because costs of financial distress depend on the type of asset 
structure of a firm (Vries, 2010, p. 59).  Most empirical studies report a positive 
relationship between the proportion of tangible assets and the level of debt (Apostu, 
2010). Consistent with empirical evidences from most researches such as Titman & 
Wessels (1988) and Apostu (2010) in developed countries, some researchers in 
Africa have found a positive relationship between asset tangibility (asset structure) 
and capital structure ratios (Abor , 2008; Khediri & Daadaa, 2011; Hove & Chidoko, 
2012; Gweyi et al., 2013; Umer, 2014).  
 
The reasons for a positive relationship were based on arguments that, tangible assets 
are less subject to information asymmetry and have larger liquidation values than 
intangible assets in case of bankruptcy (Apostu, 2010, p. 35; Vries, 2010, p. 59). A 
large number of tangible assets increase the ability of a firm to issue secured debt 
(Booth et al., 2001). So, such assets provide better collaterals for debt, as a result 
they are positively related to capital structure ratios. On the other hand, based on 
agency conflicts, firms with assets that are less qualifying as collaterals may as well 
opt for higher debt levels to limit managerial privileges from being enjoyed (Titman 
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& Wessels, 1988; Apostu, 2010). 
 
Consistent with the evidence of Booth et al. (2001), a few researchers in Africa (such 
as Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania) found a 
negative relationship between asset tangibility and capital structure ratios (Vries, 
2010; Doku, et al., 2011; Aremu et al., 2013; Bundala & Machogu, 2012; Chechet et 
al., 2013; Latridis & Zaghmour, 2013; Moyo, 2013). The justification that has been 
put forward is that agency costs of debt increase when assets cannot be collateralized 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Apostu, 2010; Vries, 2010). Thus, creditors place 
stringent terms, consequently leading firms to use equity rather than debt. 
 
2.4.2.2 Firm Size 
Empirical results on the relationship between the size of a firm and its capital 
structure are mixed (Vries, 2010, p. 69).  Most empirical studies in Europe, Australia 
and America report a positive relationship between size and capital structure ratios 
(Rajan & Zingales 1995; Frank & Goyal 2002; Apostu, 2010). Despite the differing 
industries, sample size, sample composition, capital structure ratios, firm size 
measures and regression techniques, the positive and significant relationship has 
been persistent in most studies in Africa (such as Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania)  have indicated a positive and significant relationship 
between size of the firm and capital structure ratios  (Abor, 2008; Doku, et al., 2011; 
Khediri & Daadaa, 2011; Hove & Chidoko, 2012; Nyamora, 2012; Ogbulu & 
Emeni, 2012; Bundala & Machogu, 2012; Aremu, et al.,2013; Latridis & Zaghmour, 
2013; Gweyi et al., 2013; Nyanamba et al.,2013; Umer, 2014; Gathogo & Ragui, 
2014).  
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This relationship was attributed to the fact that asset size attracts lenders. Assets are 
used as collateral for loans because they project lower risk of bankruptcy and distress 
costs.  Size effects trigger higher firm reputation and result into high credit ratings 
for larger firms. As a result, financial institutions are more willing to offer loans to 
larger firms and at a lower rate than to smaller ones.  
 
However, a few exceptions are there that find a negative relationship between firm 
size and capital structure ratios. For instance, Vries (2010) studied a large sample of 
280 listed and delisted South African firms, with 2,684 observations. Unlike the 
previous studies that used asset values, Vries used natural logarithm of sales as a 
measure of firm size. Vries found a negative relationship between firm size and 
capital structure ratios. The negative relationship was attributed to low information 
asymmetry presented by large firms. Vries argues that, larger firms provide more 
information than smaller ones, especially on their equity issues. Thus, the public 
investors are more informed about the firm, therefore the chances that the shares are 
undervalued are very low, and as such investors are more willing to buy equity. As a 
result, such firms, at time may prefer equity relative to borrowing, which means their 
equity are more attractive to investors than debt.  
 
Further, Achy (2009) employed a panel of 550 non-listed Moroccan firms, with 
2,859 observations; used various measures for size, for a robust analysis; natural 
logarithms of sales, natural logarithms of assets and natural logarithms of 
employment. All the three measures for firm size were found to be negatively related 
to long term capital structure ratios. Archy attributed the results to a number of 
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possible explanations. Small firms are constrained by “control rights” effects. They 
are not ready to surrender their rights for control to outside investors. As a result, 
they prefer debt as a financing option. Second, firms with large amounts of tangible 
assets already have a stable income that pushes them to resort to internal financing 
rather than debt financing. The two attributes viewed concurrently, presents a 
negative relationship between firm size and capital structure ratios. 
 
2.4.2.3 Firm Profitability 
Empirical evidence from previous studies supported both negative and positive 
relationships between profitability and capital structure ratios (Apostu, 2010). 
Evidences for a negative relationship are extensive (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Booth, 
et al., 2001; Fama & Frech, 2002; Abor, 2008; Vries, 2010; Khediri & Daadaa, 
2011; Hove & Chidoko, 2012; Aremu et al., 2013; Latridis & Zaghmour, 2013; 
Umer, 2014; Tarus et al., 2014). The rationale for the negative relationship is that if 
the firm is following a perking order financing behaviour then firms would prefer 
internal financing to external ones (debt) (Apostu, 2010; Vries, 2010). Additionally, 
profitable firms may avoid debt if there are non-debt tax shields (for example 
depreciation) large enough to be an inducement against using debt financing for debt 
tax shields. 
 
Research findings for a positive relationship are as well persistent (Achy, 2009; 
Doku, et al., 2011; Nyamora, 2012; Gweyi et al., 2013; Moyo, 2013; Gathogo & 
Ragui, 2014). The justifications for the positive relationship are that first, if a firm is 
influenced by cost-benefit trade-offs behaviour in its financing, then more profitable 
firms will prefer debt financing in order to benefit from debt tax shields (Apostu, 
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2010; Vries, 2010). Secondly, if past profitability acts as a proxy for future 
profitability, more profitable firms are capable of borrowing more because of their 
increased likelihood of ability to pay back the loans (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Vries, 
2010). Thirdly, debt financing can be used by profitable firms as a means to reduce 
agency costs (Vries, 2010). The use of debt triggers debt obligations such as interest 
payments in order to limit management freedom. Particularly, debt is used in this 
respect to discipline managers from misusing free cash flows. Thus, due to high debt 
capacity, lower agency costs and tax shields advantage, firms with higher 
profitability have higher capital structure ratios (Apostu, 2010; Vries, 2010). 
 
2.4.2.4 Growth Opportunity 
Empirical evidences on growth opportunity are mixed. Studies in Africa (such as 
Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania), which are 
largely represented by developing economies indicate a positive relationship 
between growth opportunity and capital structure ratios (Doku, et al., 2011; Hove & 
Chidoko, 2012; Nyamora, 2012; Ogbulu & Emeni, 2012; Bundala & Machogu, 
2012; Latridis & Zaghmour, 2013; Gweyi et al., 2013; Nyanamba et al.,2013). It is 
observed that, such a relationship is due to the fact that, small size firms have higher 
needs of funds to be used in acquiring more of non-current assets, because they need 
to grow.  
 
Higher growth firms are normally relatively young (Vries, 2010). Due to their 
limited size, they have small internal funds; consequently, they rely on external 
funds to be able to acquire the required assets for growth. With the two options, 
equity and debt, they are further constrained by ownership control rights effects 
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preferences. They are not willing to share-out firm ownership, as a result they have 
to rely on debt financing because equity issues violate control rights. Thus, positive 
relationships between growth and capital structure ratios were evidenced in the 
developing economies (Vries, 2010). 
 
However, many studies, particularly from developed economies, support a negative 
relationship between growth opportunity and capital structure ratios (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995; Chen, 2004; La Rocca et al., 2009; Aremu, et al., 2013). Several 
explanations have been provided. Firms with high growth opportunities should use 
less debt and more equity thereby projecting a negative relationship. Based on 
agency cost arguments, improvements in growth opportunities lead to higher agency 
costs for debt. The lenders will impose higher costs on debt for growing firms, 
because they fear such firms may engage in risky projects in future, thus increasing 
their bankruptcy risk and costs. Thus lenders will shy away from these firms (Booth 
et al., 2001).  
 
Similarly, when firm leverage is high, management have incentives to engage in 
“asset substitution” (share-bond exchange process), exchanging bonds for shares, 
which transfers wealth from shareholders to bondholders. Thus, due to this 
phenomenon and the agency conflict between shareholders and lenders, high growth 
firms, tend to keep their debt ratios low, because they have a stronger incentive to 
avoid underinvestment and asset substitution, which arise due to agency conflicts 
between shareholders and lenders. Therefore, such situation would project a negative 
relationship between growth opportunity and capital structure ratios. 
  
 
 
36 
2.4.2.5 Going Concern 
The proxy for going concern (GOCO) is a firm age and has traditionally been 
included among the factors that determine capital structure. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) found that aged firms maintain higher capital structure ratios, because of 
accumulated reputation. Hall et al. (2004) established that age is positively related to 
long-term capital structure ratios but negatively related to short-term capital structure 
ratios. Green et al. (2002) also established that age has a negative weight on the 
possibility of incurring debt in the initial capital mix and no impact in the additional 
capital mix. The reason for this relationship was that, the older the firm the more 
they are exposed to information; consequently, they project less information 
asymmetry to lenders. They are able to present a good credit history and thus are 
good candidates for loans (Abor, 2007).  
 
As firms mature, they become more reputable and are able to raise debt much easily 
because the bond markets recognise their names. Mature firms have higher debt 
ratios because they are considered higher quality firms based on experience and 
reputation accumulated over the years (Peterson & Rajan, 1994; Umer, 2014). But, 
notably Esperança et al. (2003) found that age is negatively related to both long-term 
and short-term capital structure ratios, the reasons for this relationship were probably 
due to young age and information asymmetry presented by young firms. 
 
2.4.2.6 Bankruptcy Risk 
The level of risk is said to be one of the primary determinant of capital structure 
(Abor, 2007). Research evidences indicate that firms tend to shy away from 
excessive debts in order to reduce their bankruptcy risk. Findings from both 
  
 
 
37 
developed and developing economies indicate that bankruptcy risk is negatively 
related to capital structure ratios (Alonso, 2003; Abor, 2008; Moyo, 2013; Umer, 
2014; Gathogo & Ragui, 2014). The rationalization put forward was that, bankruptcy 
risks emanate from both increases in direct and indirect financial distress costs. The 
direct costs include all the costs of bankruptcy which are cash outflows of legal and 
administrative fees. Indirect costs are non-cash firms’ economic losses resulting 
from bankruptcy. Firms that increase significantly their debt financing increase their 
financial distress costs (Vries, 2010).  
 
Firms increase their debt level as a result of tax benefits, their ability to meet fixed 
interest payments decreases (Abor, 2007). Such a situation increases the risk and 
cost of bankruptcy for such firms. Firms that adjust their capital structure away from 
excessive debt reduce the risk and cost of bankruptcy. Firms with high profitability 
and risk averse tend to avoid debt usage by relying on internal financing in order to 
reduce bankruptcy risk. The tax shelter-bankruptcy cost theory of capital structure 
determines a firm optimal capital structure ratio as a function of business risk. In 
presence of agency and bankruptcy costs there are no incentives for the firm to 
utilise the tax benefit of 100% debt within the static framework model (Abor, 2007). 
 
2.4.2.7 Non-debt Tax Shield 
Studies have found that debt tax shield is positively related to capital structure ratios 
while non-debt tax shields such as depreciation are negatively related to capital 
structure ratios (La Rocca et al., 2009). Empirical evidences both in developed and 
developing economies have persistently indicated a negative relationship between 
non-debt tax shields and capital structure ratios (Abor, 2008; La Rocca, et al., 2009; 
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Khediri & Daadaa, 2011; Hove & Chidoko, 2012).   
 
The rationalizations for a negative relationship are that; when corporate taxes 
increases are high, firms which are able to reduce taxes by means other than; 
deducting interest expenses will employ less debt in their capital structure (Vries, 
2010). Non-debt tax shields may be regarded as substitute for debt tax shields (La 
Rocca et al., 2009). Thus, non-debt tax shield and debt tax shield are inversely 
related. So, if non-debt tax shields, such as depreciations are higher, the probability 
of negative taxable income increases, it is less likely that the amount of debt will be 
increased for tax reasons. When non-debt tax shields are larger firms have less 
incentive to use debt tax shields to benefit from interest deductibility. Thus, non-debt 
tax shields are negatively related to capital structure ratios, while debt tax shields 
will be positively related to capital structure ratios. 
 
On the contrary, but consistent with the findings of Titman and Wessel (1988), Umer 
(2014), found a positive relationship between non-debt tax shields and capital 
structure ratios, in Ethiopian companies. The possible explanation put forward was 
that non-debt tax shields (tax deduction for depreciations) were not a substitute for 
debt tax shield. 
 
2.5 Synthesis and Research Gap 
The research gap is the missing element in the existing literature. The following are 
the elements that are missing and need to be addressed on “Product diversification 
effects on Capital structure ratios”; 
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Contextual elements: - The Tanzanian context provides a fresh ground for 
substantiation of research. Presence of mixed previous empirical results on how 
related, unrelated and total product diversifications affect capital structure ratios is a 
knowledge gap (La Rocca, et al, 2009). This study incorporated product 
diversification as a new variable within the African context and decomposes it into 
related and unrelated product diversifications. To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
this factor has not been studied in Tanzania and Africa in general. The need to 
validate firm characteristics such as tangibility, size, profitability, going concern, 
growth opportunity, bankruptcy risk and tax shield effects on capital structure ratios 
is a gap that need needs to be filled as well in a Tanzanian setting where this related 
study has been at least once done (Bundala, 2012). 
 
The presence of mixed results on the magnitude and direction of effects (positive or 
negative) to capital structure ratios is yet another gap, but also presence of mixed 
results in terms of whether the effects are significant or not; because some study find 
positive or negative significant or insignificant relationships, some examples are; 
(Esperança et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Apostu, 2010; Hassan, 2011; Ogbulu & 
Emeni, 2012). 
 
Methodological elements; the presence of various empirical approach to the topic 
provides several knowledge gaps, some studies employ static regression models 
(Bundala, 2012; Kariuki & Kamau, 2014) others dynamic models (Abor, 2008; La 
Rocca et al., 2009; Apostu, 2010; Moyo, 2013; Mbulawa, 2014) with inconsistent 
results. Unlike the study by Bundala (2012) which used cross-sectional data, this 
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study went further by using panel data which is more informative and rich in data 
than a mere cross-sectional or longitudinal study. This study used both the static and 
dynamic methods, namely the fixed effects regressions models and the General 
methods of Moments regression model and compared them to better fit the data and 
produce more reliable results. 
 
The difference in variable measurement methods is yet another gap; for instance, 
some have used debt to equity ratios to measure capital structure (Kochhar & Hitt, 
1998; Alonso, 2003). Others long term debt to total assets ratios (La Rocca et al, 
2009; Apostu, 2010) that yielded conflicting results. Similarly, in measuring various 
product diversification strategies others have used Entropy Index (Palepu, 1985; La 
Rocca et al., 2009) while, others Barry-Herfindal Index (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; 
Kranenburg et al., 2004) or Categorical measures (Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 
1987). Lack of consensus in methods provides avenues for more studies in this area. 
This study particularly used the entropy index to measure product diversification and 
further decomposed it into related and unrelated product diversifications. 
 
Theoretical elements:-  The presence of alternative theoretical postulation on the 
effects of product diversification strategies on capital structure calls for theory 
validation and testing; there are at least three theories that attempt to explain, from 
different angles, the effects of product diversification on capital structure:- These are 
the transaction cost hypothesis (Penrose, 1959; Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991), co-
insurance hypothesis (Singh et al., 2003; Apostu, 2010), and agency theory 
arguments (Li & Li, 1996; Apostu, 2010). Some studies support the theories while 
some studies do not. The mixed results necessitate research in this area (La Rocca et 
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al., 2009; Apostu, 2010), and the quest is to assess which theory is supported in 
Tanzania. 
 
Therefore, the knowledge gaps that this research attempted to fill were to contribute 
to the efforts to explain the capital structure ratios variability by providing empirical 
evidence on related, unrelated and total product diversifications when controlling for 
conventional capital structure determinants and lagged debt ratios through panel data 
models. This was done in an effort to find better ways to explain capital structure 
variability in Tanzania. Thus, this research used an empirical approach, based on 
panel data regression analysis, and data from companies operating in Tanzania, 
based mainly on the transaction cost theory arguments, co-insurance effects 
hypothesis and agency cost theory. The study was led by ten hypotheses that test 
these knowledge gaps. The methods and hypotheses on how these research gaps 
were addressed are summarized in the conceptual framework and detailed in the 
methodology chapter. 
 
2.6 Conceptual Framework 
To envisage theoretical relationships between independent variable and dependent 
variables the following general formulation is employed in mapping the conceptual 
framework. GEAR = f (L.GEAR, RDIVE, UDIVE, TDIVE, TANG, SIZE, PROF, 
GROP, GOCO,
 
RISK, NDTS, U). Where GEAR is capital structure, L.GEAR is a 
lagged capital structure variable, RDIVE is related diversification, UDIVE is 
unrelated diversification, TDIVE is total diversification, TANG is asset tangibility, 
SIZE is firm size, PROF is firm profitability, GROP is growth opportunity, GOCO is 
going concern,
 
RISK is risk of bankruptcy, NDTS is non-debt tax shields and U as 
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the error term. 
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework 
Source: Researcher’s own Design (2015). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the research philosophy, paradigm, strategy and design used in 
the study. It covers the research study area and population, sampling procedures, 
data collection methods, variable measurements and data analysis procedures and 
techniques used in the study. 
 
3.2 Research Philosophy, Approach and Strategy 
According to Greener (2008), research philosophy or paradigm refers to a set of 
beliefs which guides researchers on what to be researched and how the findings 
should be interpreted. These paradigms are crucial in deriving logic and reconciling 
differences on researchers’ varying perception of the same phenomenon. This study 
employed a post-positivist paradigm which is a sibling of the positivist paradigm. 
This research philosophy is also known as realism (Saunders, et al. 2012). The 
positivist paradigm is strictly empirical in nature. It tends to ignore all logical 
reasoning which may not be tapped by strictly empirical analysis. The Post-positivist 
paradigm takes a position from which one can make reasonable inferences about a 
phenomenon by combining empirical observations with logical reasoning. Post-
positivists view business phenomenon as being probabilistic, based on many 
contingencies, and habitually seek to discover these contingencies as a way of 
comprehending reality better (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
 
The study employed a deductive research approach. It starts with a theory and testing 
theoretical postulates using empirical data (Saunders, et al. 2012; Bhattacherjee, 
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2012). In deductive research, the objective of the researcher is to test concepts and 
patterns modelled into hypotheses, identified from theory by means of new empirical 
data. Thus deductive research is said to be theory-testing research. Deductive 
(theory-testing) research is more productive when there are many competing theories 
of the same phenomenon and researchers are interested in knowing which theory 
works best and under what circumstances (Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
 
Deductive research is often derived from a set of first principles or axioms. 
Deduction is the process of drawing conclusions about a phenomenon or behaviour 
based on theoretical or logical reasons based on an initial set of premises. Since 
deductive research involves theory-testing, the next step was to identify one or more 
theories that were relevant to addressing the research objectives. These theories 
identified were namely the agency theory, the co-insurance hypothesis and the 
transaction cost theory. 
 
The study adopted mono quantitative methodology. It used secondary data in which 
panel data technique was employed. The study used an archival research strategy. 
This strategy uses records and documents as the principal sources of data. It allows 
for researches studies that focus upon the past and changes over time to be answered 
(Saunders, et al., 2012). The study used research techniques and procedures is 
similar to those used by other studies in the field, for instance to cite some in Europe 
(Alonso, 2003; La Rocca et al., 2009; Apostu, 2010), and others in Africa (Aremu et 
al., 2013; Gathogo & Ragui, 2014; Mbulawa, 2014). It adopted a deductive 
approach, because it starts from established theories.  
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The study used regression analysis with panel data techniques. The main advantage 
of panel data technique is its objectivity in methods and outputs, others are: 
“….because of the several data points, degrees of freedom are increased and co-
linearity among the explanatory variables is reduced, thus the efficiency of economic 
estimates is improved” (Abor, 2008, p. 13). Furthermore, “A panel data set also 
allows us to control for unobserved cross section heterogeneity” (Woodridge, 2002, 
p. 169), other advantages are; control for individual heterogeneity, provides more 
informative data, more variability and more efficiency. In using panel data methods 
“Micro panel data gathered on individuals, firms and households may be more 
accurately measured ….Biases resulting from aggregation over firms or individuals 
may be reduced or eliminated” (Baltagi, 2005, p. 7).  
 
3.3 Study Population 
The study is based on a population of registered companies in the Dar es Salaam 
Stock Exchange (DSE). The exchange was incorporated on September 1996 and 
trading started in April, 1998. It is located in Dar es Salaam Tanzania and is 
organised into two segments; one, the Main Investment Market Segment (MIMS) 
which is the main exchange and; two, the Enterprise Growth Market (EGM) (Dar es 
Salaam Stock exchange, 2014). The exchange is monitored by the Capital Market 
and Securities Authority (CMSA) (Norman, 2010).  
 
The Dar es Salaam Stock exchange since its establishment in 1994 and its 
incorporation in 1996 to 29/12/2015 has listed a total of 23 companies. These are 
listed on both segments. One company, National Investment Company Limited 
(NICOL) was delisted in 2011. The MIMS had listed a total of 19 companies 
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namely: (Precision Air Limited, Tanga Cement Limited, Swissport Tanzania Public 
Limited Company, Tanzania Tea Packers Limited, Tanzania Breweries Limited, 
Tanzania Cigarette Company, TOL Limited (formerly Tanzania Oxygen Limited 
(TOL)) and Tanzania Portland Cement Limited; which are locally listed at the Dar es 
salaam stock exchange (DSE).  
 
Companies that are cross-listed are: African Barrick Gold, Kenya Airways and 
National Media Group. The EGM had listed a total of 3 companies namely: 
Mwalimu Commercial Bank, Maendeleo Bank and Mkombozi Commercial Bank. 
Both segments are composed as follows; 15 local companies from Tanzania and 7 
cross-listed companies (6 from Kenya and 1 from United Kingdom) (Dar es Salaam 
Stock Exchange, 2015, “Listed companies”, para.1-2). 
 
3.4 Sampling Procedures and Sample Size 
The sampling frame for the study was all 23 local and cross-listed companies. This 
population was selected because these companies have homogeneous characteristics; 
first, they are subjected under similar conditions such as similar stock market 
regulations; second, they are all subject under same financial reporting standards and 
requirements which makes availability of data for research accessible; and third, this 
study chose listed firms following the approach of other studies as indicated in Table 
8.1. The study sample was drawn from these local and cross-listed companies in the 
Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange, for the years 1997-2014.  
 
The study observes variables across years for the past maximum 17 years, thus 
maximizing on the number of observations (firm-years) from the population, which 
  
 
 
47 
is arrived at by adding the total number of years in operation for each firm since first 
listing or cross listing at DSE. The 23 companies in the study population were 
subjected to different exclusion and inclusion criteria. The following companies 
were excluded. Eight highly regulated companies namely: Dar es salaam Community 
Bank, National Microfinance Bank, Jubilee Holdings Limited, Kenya Commercial 
Bank, CRDB Bank, Mwalimu Commercial Bank, Maendeleo Bank and Mkombozi 
Commercial Bank. These were banks and insurance companies which are normally 
highly regulated, their regulators normally imposes maximum gearing ratios which 
they are not supposed to violate, such an effect cannot easily be isolated when these 
companies are combined with companies that do not have such restrictions.  
 
A company must have been consistently listed. This criterion excluded one company 
namely National Investment Company Limited which was delisted in 2011. 
Availability of data was another criterion which eliminated three companies, data for 
which were not available. These companies were namely: East African Breweries 
Limited, Swala Gas & Oil and Uchumi Supermarket. It was difficult to find the 
required data from these companies. Their prospectus did not give details of 
financial statements that could provide the needed data. A total of 11 companies 
were excluded leaving a sample size of 11 companies which were finally included in 
the study. Thus, the maximum number of sample observations (firm-years) was 128, 
constructed from 11 companies that meet the above inclusion criteria. Some 
comparable study samples are as indicated in Table 8.1 of Appendix I. 
 
3.5 Data Sources and Collection Techniques 
Data came from the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange database and sampled 
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companies’ databases. The data was extracted from companies’ annual reports, 
which normally include the following statements; the statements of financial 
position, the income statements, the cash flow statements and the statements of 
change in equity. These statements provided data for the calculation of the ratios and 
indices which were used in measuring capital structure ratios and the various factors 
that were predicted to affect capital structure. The notes to these statements, 
management reports on the operations of the companies and DSE market reports 
provided qualitative information of the nature and operations of the companies under 
study. 
 
3.6 Reliability and Validity of Measurements 
Reliability and validity are the benchmarks against which the adequacy and accuracy 
of the measurement procedures are evaluated in research. It was crucial to ensure 
that variable measurements were meeting the acknowledged standards 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
 
3.6.1 Reliability of Measurements 
Reliability is the level at which the measure of a variable or construct is consistent or 
dependable. In other words, the same measurement results are expected for a 
particular variable over time using the same scale assuming that the phenomenon is 
not changing. Reliability implies consistency but not accuracy. It is measuring the 
intended variable consistently and precisely (Bhattacherjee, 2012).  Following the 
advice of Bhattacherjee (2012) reliability was improved by using quantitative 
measures. Quantitative measures are objective; they are more reliable than subjective 
measures. The use of statistical packages such as excel for data cleaning, control and 
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organization was used to avoid human errors and data loss before entering data in 
STATA for analysis was ensure. 
 
3.6.2 Validity of Measurements 
Validity refers to the degree to which a measure sufficiently represents and measures 
the underlying variable or construct that it is intended to measure. Theoretical 
assessment of validity focuses on how well the idea of a theoretical variable or 
construct is translated into or represented in an operational measure. Translational 
validity (or representational validity) examines whether a measure is a good 
reflection of its variable or construct. It consists of two subtypes: face and content 
validity (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Face validity relates to whether an indicator seems to 
be a reasonable measure of its variable or construct. Content validity relates to how 
well the indicators and attributes, such as profit, assets, years, sales, debt and equity 
that went into the calculations or measurements of the variables ratios or indices 
relationally represent the variable  (ratio) intended. It tries to assess whether the 
content of the measurement technique is in consonance with the known literature on 
the topic. 
 
Translational validity is typically assessed using a panel of expert who are 
conversant with the area of study. This was taken care of by a review of researchers’ 
works that used similar measurements for the variables used in this study. But also 
experts in this field were consulted to make sure that the measures used sufficiently 
capture the variable intended. The study used attributes in the calculation of 
variables’ ratios that related to the variables that they were measuring. For instance, 
the use of profit and assets figures in calculating profitability. Profit figures directly 
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relate to profitability while assets figures represent the drive for such profitability 
thus a ratio of profit over assets has more face validity than if it were constructed 
using other attributes. As suggested by Bhattacherjee (2012) content validity was 
easily estimated from a review of the literature on the concept/construct topic and 
through consultation with experts. 
 
Criterion-related validity examines whether a given measure behaves the manner it 
should, given the theory of that variable or construct. It includes two sub-types: 
convergent and discriminant validities. Convergent validity refers to the closeness 
with which a measure relates to (or converges on) the construct that it is purported to 
measure, and discriminant validity refers to the degree to which a measure does not 
measure (or discriminates from) other constructs that it is not supposed to measure. 
Usually, convergent validity and discriminant validity are assessed jointly for a set of 
related constructs (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
 
Convergent validity was established by comparing the observed values of one 
attribute (indicator) of one variable (construct) with another attribute (indicator) of 
the same construct and demonstrating similarity (or high correlation) between values 
of these attributes (indicators). It was demonstrated that the attributes (indicators) 
that were used in constructing variables (constructs) were highly correlated; for 
instance, profitability as a variable (construct) had attributes (indicators) namely; 
profit and assets. Because these two attributes (indicators) are closely related they 
indicated high correlation. The same procedure was maintained for the rest of the 
other variables to ensure convergent validity of the measurements. 
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Discriminant validity is established by demonstrating that attributes or indicators of 
one variable or construct are dissimilar from (i.e., have low correlation with) other 
variable constructs. For instance, the following variables were included in the study; 
profitability (attributes were profit and assets), growth opportunity (attributes were 
percentage changes in sales) and capital structure (attributes were debt and equity). 
Thus, the ratios from profitability, growth opportunity and capital structure are not 
correlated because, the variables do not share the same data in their construction, 
attributes across variables are not correlated and at least one of their attribute is not 
directly related to the rest of the attributes (indicators).  
 
In these attributes (indicators) where there were close correlations the indicators or 
variables were transformed using mathematical procedures such as logarithm 
transformation for instance natural logarithms were used in calculation of firm size 
based on total sales. All the transformations were based on theory and other 
researchers’ empirical practices. Thus correlation between attributes within the same 
variable indicated high convergent validity while lack of correlation between 
attributes from different variables indicated high discriminant validity. 
 
3.7 Operational Definitions and Variables Measurements 
Operational definition refers to the process of developing indicators or items for 
measuring constructs or variables. This process allows for an examination of the 
proximity amongst these indicators as an assessment of their accuracy technically 
referred to as reliability.  Indicators operate at the empirical level, in contrast to 
constructs, which are conceptualized at the theoretical level.  
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The combination of indicators at the empirical level representing a given construct is 
called a construct or variable. This combination technically refers to operational 
definitions of the variables. Each indicator may have numerous attributes (or levels) 
and each attribute represent a value. An index is a composite score derived from 
aggregating measures of multiple constructs or components using a set of rules and 
formulae (Bhattacherjee, 2012). The procedures described below were used to come 
up with the variables that were used in this study. 
 
3.7.1 Dependent Variable: Capital Structure 
Due to data limitations many studies measure capital structure in book values rather 
than in market values. The ratio of total debt to total capital (defined as total debt 
plus equity or only equity) is considered to best represent the effects of past 
financing decisions. Thus, the study involved debt ratio to capture capital structure 
measure. Debt ratio was computed as the ratio of book value of debt to the sum of 
total equity value and total debt values as used by Apostu (2010).  
 
The capital structure measure (ratio) was categorised into three primary types of 
capital structure ratios; total capital structure ratio or total gearing (TGEAR), long 
term capital structure ratio (LGEAR) and short term capital structure ratio (SGEAR). 
These are respectively referred to as total debt ratio, long term debt ratio and short 
term debt ratio. The dynamic regression analysis further developed these ratios into 
lagged total capital structure ratio (L.TGEAR), lagged long term capital structure 
ratio (L.LGEAR) and lagged short term capital structure ratio (L.SGEAR) 
respectively. 
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3.7.2 Independent Variable: Product Diversification 
The first set of independent variables included related product diversification, 
unrelated product diversification and total product diversification. There are several 
ways to measure diversifications, some of them are; Entropy Index, Modified Barry-
Herfindal Index, Efficient Diversification Measure and the Two-dimensional 
Categorical Measure. The study differentiates between related product 
diversification and unrelated product diversification, based on Standard Industrial 
Code (SIC). 
 
3.7.2.1 SIC Categorical Classification 
The simplest measure of product diversification is business segments count measure. 
It is the number of industry groups in which a firm operates based on Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. SIC data is comprised of a four-digit scheme 
that can be used to define increasingly more refined measures of business or industry 
affiliation (i.e., with a single digit code being the least refined measure and the four-
digit code representing the most refined measure of a firm business or products or 
segments (Martin & Sayrak, 2001). 
 
3.7.2.2 Entropy Index 
La Rocca et al., (2009) define the entropy index a product diversification measure 
that uses data from sales segments by taking into account concurrently the number of 
business segments in which a firm operates, the allocation of a firm total sales across 
industry segments, and the various degrees of relatedness among the industries.  In 
this study it is represented by the following symbols; TDIVEi,t which is total product 
diversification entropy indicator of firm i in time t. Constructed as; 
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; where Pj is the proportion of business sales of business 
segment j defined by the 4 digit SIC codes (standard industrial classification codes) 
(Prosser, 2009). Thus, the higher the TDIVEi,t ratio is the more product diversified a 
firm is in all of its’ products. Hoskisson et al., (1993) argued that, the entropy index 
indicates a high level of validity on several dimensions including face, content, 
convergence, divergent and prediction validities. The component of the entropy 
index can be derived by a separation of total entropy into its related and unrelated 
parts. It weighs the segments by the relative size of their sales. It is readily derived 
from secondary data and can be measured at a ratio scale. This measure has been 
widely used in measuring product diversification in the literature (La Rocca et al., 
2009). Refer to Table 8.2 of Appendix I. 
 
SIC codes represent business segments classification for all economic activities. The 
business segments are used as proxies for products. Sales for a particular product 
represent sales for that particular business segment. For example, in this study 
Tanzania Breweries (TBL) is involved in the following business segments 
represented by SIC class codes; 11.01, 11.02, 11.04 and 11.05. The following is a 
sample of SIC classes representing different business segments: - 11.01: Distilling, 
rectifying and blending of spirits, 11.02: Manufacture of wine from grape, 11.03: 
Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines, 11.04: Manufacture of other non-distilled 
fermented beverages, 11.05: Manufacture of beer, 11.06: Manufacture of malt, 
11.07. These (SIC class codes:- 11.01, 11.02, 11.04 and 11.05) represent some of 
business segments in which TBL is involved in, while 11.03 and 11.06 and 11.07 are 
examples in which TBL is not involved in. 
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Similarly, Tanzania Tea Packers (TATEPA) is involved in the following business 
segments represented by SIC codes; 01.27, 10.83 and 82.92. These SIC classes are:-  
01.27: Growing of beverage crops, this class includes: growing of beverage crops: 
such as coffee, tea, mate, cocoa and other beverage crops. SIC class 10.83: 
Processing of tea and coffee which includes tea processing, blending of tea and mate, 
manufacture of extracts and preparations based on tea or mate, manufacture of herb 
infusions (mint, vervain and chamomile). SIC class 82.92: Packaging activities, this 
class includes: packaging activities on a fee or contractual basis, whether or not these 
involve an automated process: bottling of liquids, including beverages and food, 
packaging of solids (blister packaging, foil-covered etc.), security packaging of 
pharmaceutical preparations, labeling, stamping and imprinting and parcel-packing 
and gift-wrapping.  
 
The products sales from these business segments are used as proxies for product 
sales diversification. The entropy index is derived from summation of all individual 
products sales (based on SIC codes) each weighted by their respective logarithms of 
the inverse of individual products sales (based on SIC codes) for each firm and year. 
That single formula and calculation result (  represents only one single 
observation for entropy, which is observed for a single firm at a single time period. 
This is a single firm-year entropy for total product diversification. Thus, the 
calculations were made for all firms and all years under study to arrive at complete 
data for total product diversification. 
 
UDIVEi,t is unrelated product diversification entropy indicator of firm i in time t, 
constructed as;  ; where Sj is the proportion of business 
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(sales) of segment j defined according to the first 2 digits of the SIC code. The 
higher the UDIVEi,t the more a firm is diversified in unrelated products. While 
TDIVEi,t considers all business segments that the company is involved in as 
demonstrated in the preceding paragraph, UDIVEi,t considers only business segments 
(based on SIC codes) which are different by the first two digits. For instance, in the 
TATEPA example, the company operates in business segments represented by SIC 
codes 01.27, 10.83 and 82.92. It operates in three unrelated business segments. Thus, 
it is involved in unrelated product diversification. 
 
RDIVEi,t is related product diversification entropy indicator of firm i in time t, given 
by; . Thus, a group of products using respective SIC 
classes business segments sales as their proxies is defined as a set of related 
segments, such that RDIVEi,t is the related diversification of several segments within 
an industry group i in time t (Palepu, 1985). Diversity is therefore measured within 
industry groups at a time. The higher RDIVEi,t index is, the more diversified the firm 
is in its related products (García et al., 2013). Using the TBL example, the SIC codes 
11.01, 11.02, 11.04 and 11.05 are considered RDIVEi,t since they only vary by the 
last two digits, and are within the major class 11.00. Thus, TBL is involved in four 
related business segments. It is following a related product diversification strategy. 
Thus, TDIVEi,t is the summation of both RDIVEi,t and UDIVEi,t. 
 
3.7.3 Conventional Determinants of Capital Structure 
Consistent with previous studies such as; Mayer and Whittington (2003), Alonso 
(2003), La Rocca et al., (2009) and Qian et al., (2010), the present study used several 
firm specific characteristics as conventional variables in order to address alternative 
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explanations for the expected results as well as to clearly determine the effect of 
product diversification types on capital structure ratios by isolating other factors 
influences.  
 
The choice of conventional variables was led by the theories and review of variables 
that explain corporate capital structure and which were briefly described in chapter 
two. As noted earlier on, theoretical and empirical studies have shown that firm 
profitability, asset tangibility, firm size, bankruptcy risk, going concern, growth 
opportunities and non-debt tax shields affect capital structure (Oh et al., 2014). The 
definition and measurements are indicated in Table 8.2 in the Appendix I. Further, 
following Rajan and Zingales (1995), the study used firm and time dummies to 
control for firm-specific and time-specific effects. Further, capital structure ratios 
levels have year specific effects caused by different macroeconomic conditions 
across time, affecting all firms at a particular point in time. 
 
The conventional determinants or conventional variables used in this study are based 
on a ratio scale coding (refer to Table 8.2 of Appendix I) as follows; Tangibility: 
Non-current assets (NCA) to the book value of total assets (TA) that is (NCA/TA) 
and this was symbolised by TANGi,t  for firm i at time t. (La Rocca, et al. 2009;  
Apostu, 2010). Firm size: natural logarithms of total sales, that is ln(Sales) and this 
was symbolised by SIZEi,t  for firm i at time t. (Alonso, 2003; La Rocca, et al. 2009). 
Profitability: the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of total asset ratio i.e. EBITDA/TA. This 
was symbolised by PROFi,t for firm i at time t (Apostu, 2010; Vries, 2010; Oh, et al. 
2014). 
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Growth opportunities: sales annual growth, Sales annual growth and was symbolized 
by GROPi,t for firm i at time t (Apostu, 2010;Oh et al. 2014). Going concern: Age of 
the company that is the number of years in operations symbolized by GOCOi,t for 
firm i at time t (Alonso, 2003; La Rocca, et al. 2009; Apostu, 2010). Non-debt Tax 
Shield: depreciation and amortization (DA) divided by total assets (TA) that is 
DA/TA and is symbolised as NDTSi,t for firm i at time t. (Booth, et al. 2001; Alonso, 
2003; La Rocca, et al. 2009; Apostu, 2010). Bankruptcy risk/Financial distress: 
Earnings volatility as a percentage change of earnings (operating incomes) or 
earnings change as percentage, that is %∆ (EBITDA), and is symbolised by RISKi,t 
for firm i at time t (Alonso, 2003; La Rocca et al. 2009; Apostu, 2010). 
 
3.8 Data Analysis 
The analysis of data was quantitatively done using the STATA software version 12 
was used. Both descriptive and multivariate analysis techniques were used and 
reported. 
 
3.8.1 Descriptive Statistics 
A variety of measures for the dependent, independent and conventional variables 
were calculated. This was done for measurement purposes, comparison purposes and 
robustness checks and assessment of the best measures given the data characteristics. 
In order to partly address objectives one and two of this study, that is to assess the 
level of capital structure variability (objective one) and assess the level of product 
diversification variability (objective two) descriptive analysis on these variables was 
executed to produce means, medians, maximums, minimums and standard deviations 
in the sample of firms.  
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3.8.2 Univariate Analysis 
Univariate analysis was done to facilitate group wise analysis. Parametric test (T-
test) was done to compare firms means based on type of product diversifications 
used by firms. Related and unrelated product diversified groups were compared. The 
test compared these two groups by testing differences of the firms’ characteristics. 
Particularly the use of the regression variables was employed. These variables were 
TGEAR, LGEAR, SGEAR, RDIVE, UDIVE, TDIVE, TANG, SIZE, PROF, GROP, 
GOCO, RISK and NDTS. This prepared the ground for regression analysis based on 
the two groups’ characteristics, which is related and unrelated product diversified 
groups. 
 
Secondly, two sample T-test was done to assess if the types of capital structure 
ratios, that is long term and short term capital structure ratios were statistically 
different. This was done to ascertain validity of analysing capital structure based on 
types of capital structure ratios. Thus long term capital structure ratio was compared 
with short term capital structure ratio. This assisted in knowing if companies are 
making distinction between the two types of capital gearing and thus evaluate if 
capital structure determinants exhibit differentiated capital structure profiles based 
on types of capital structure ratio used. Thus warrant regression analysis based on 
types of gearing, that is short and long term gearings groups. Thirdly, two sample T-
test was used to assess if the variability of product diversification based on its types 
was statistically different. This helped to identify if two types of product 
diversification were empirically different from each other as proposed by co-
insurance hypothesis based on cash flow volatility. 
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3.8.3 Multivariate Analysis  
Correlation analysis was done to assess the relationship between the variables that 
were used in the study. It helped to determine the extent to which various pairs of 
variables used were related. It simply established association of these variables. It 
also helped to identify directions of relationship between the variables. The low 
correlations exhibited help to indicate absence of multicollinearity in the data set; to 
confirm both divergent and convergent validity of variables and prove exogeneity of 
the independent variables in the regression model. Since low correlations of residual 
and independent variables implies that independent variables are not related to each 
other and therefore independent or self-determining. 
 
The study used the following regression equations; the static and dynamic regression 
equations. The dynamic regression equation was introduced to capture the effect of 
prior years’ debt on current years’ debt levels and be able to measure the speed of 
adjustment of capital structure ratios over time. 
Regression Models 
(1) 
 
Where;  
 Constant term of firm i in year t, 
: The capital structure {GEAR} of firm i in year t, 
A lagged capital structure {L.GEAR} variable  
: Diversification variables {DIVE}, decomposed into; (related diversification 
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{RDIVEit}, unrelated diversification {UDIVEi,t}, or total diversification {TDIVEi,t}) 
: Conventional variables (TANGi,t, SIZEi,t, PROFi,t, GROPi,t, GOCOi,t RISKi,t, 
NDTSi,t,) 
: A vector of constants for all diversification strategies 
 A vector of constants for conventional variables 
A constant for lagged dependent variable 
Time-effect dummies 
 Firm-effect dummies 
The error term for unobserved heterogeneity conditions 
Model (1) is a static regression model while Model (2) is a dynamic regression 
model. 
 
3.8.4 Regressions Assumptions and Diagnostics 
The basic regression equation takes into account the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression assumptions. In order to achieve the analysis objectives, the necessary 
assumptions that need to be met and/or controlled for our data to qualify for the 
analysis were reviewed and tested. OLS consists of the following five major 
assumptions (Green, 2008:11-19; Park, 2011:7). 
(a) Linearity: the assumption that the dependent variable is formulated as a linear 
function of a set of independent variable and the error (disturbance) term. 
(b) Exogeneity the assumption that the expected value of disturbances is zero or 
disturbances are not correlated with any regressors. 
(c) Disturbances (i) have the same variance (homoscedasticity) and (ii) are not 
related with one another (non-autocorrelation) 
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(d) The observations on the independent variable are not stochastic but fixed in 
repeated samples without measurement errors. 
(e) Full rank assumption says that there is no exact linear relationship among 
independent variables (no multicollinearity). 
 
If individual effects ui are not zero in panel data, heterogeneity (individual specific 
characteristics like company and time specific effects, such as company policies and 
size effects that are not captured in regressors) may influence assumption (b) and (c). 
In particular, disturbances may not have same variance but vary across individuals 
(heteroscedasticity, violation of assumption (c)(i) and/or are related with each other 
(autocorrelation, violation of assumption (c)(ii) This is an issue of non-spherical 
variance-covariance matrix of disturbances. The violation of assumption (b) renders 
random effect estimators biased. Hence, the OLS estimator is no longer best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE). Then panel data models provide a way to deal with 
these problems (Park, 2011). Such ways are the different regression strategies that 
depend on the characteristics exhibited by the panel data or sample under analysis. 
Thus, regression diagnostics were run to help control for violations of these 
regression assumptions. 
 
3.8.4.1 Linearity and Normality 
To achieve best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) first diagnostic tests are run to 
assess if the data meet those OLS regression assumptions. The analysis of residuals 
is normally very useful in this regard. To test for linearity, the STATA 12 command 
acprplot (augmented component-plus-residual plot) was employed which provides a 
graphical way to examine the relationship between variables. It does provide a good 
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testing for linearity. This command was run after running a regression as 
recommended in (Torres-Reyna, 2007). The STATA command option lowess 
(locally weighted scatter plot smoothing) draws the observed residual pattern in the 
data to help identify nonlinearities (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Refer to Appendix V. All 
of the variables were linear as expected. The three graphs in (Appendix VI) indicate 
that the data used in the present study were normally distributed. 
 
3.8.4.2 Exogeneity 
The data indicated presence of endogeneity problems (refer to Appendix VII), as 
indicated in the residual plots. These are company and time specific effects that are 
correlated with regressors, these problems were fixed by running particularly 
dynamic regression models i.e. the general methods of moments (GMM). La Rocca 
et al (2009), argue that the use of the GMM technique to control for the endogeneity 
problem, the importance of which has been demonstrated by extensive literature. 
Some robustness checks were applied as in their study. 
 
3.8.4.3 Homoscedasticity and Non-autocorrelation 
If the model data is heteroscedastic, it is possible to have the wrong estimates of the 
standard errors for the coefficients and their t-values. Thus, it was important to test 
for presence or absence of heteroscedasticity. The following test was done. Breusch-
Pagan test which indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity. Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroscedasticity was: - Ho: Constant variance; Variables: fitted values of TGEAR; 
chi2 (1) = 12.81, Prob.> chi2 = 0.0003. Based on the test of homoscedasticity, the 
null hypothesis (variances are not constant) was rejected. Thus the data was not 
homoscedastic. That is, the Breush-Pagan test suggested the possible presence of 
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heteroscedasticity in the data.  
 
The Wooldridge test for serial autocorrelation indicated the presence of 
autocorrelations: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data; Ho: no first-order 
autocorrelation F (1, 10) = 25.489 Prob.> F = 0.0005. First order autocorrelation on 
the other hand may be a problem. Second order autocorrelation is considered a 
problem in macro panels with long time series over 20-30 years. This study’s data 
has only a maximum range of 17 years, thus the later problem was not an issue in the 
panel (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Advanced techniques to control for these two problems 
were applied. These are the least square dummy variable one (LSDV1) with 
clustered standard errors (CSE) and Prais-Winsten adjusted clustered standard errors 
(PCSE) fixed effects regression techniques and the General Method of Moments 
(GMM) regression techniques. 
 
3.8.4.4 Non-stochastic Independent Variable 
The observations on the independent variable are not stochastic but fixed in repeated 
samples without measurement errors. This was ensured during data preparation and 
cleaning process and by developing reliable and valid measurements. 
 
3.8.4.5 Full Rank or Lack of Multicollinearity 
An important assumption for the multiple regression models is that independent 
variables are not perfectly multicollinear. One regressor should not be a linear 
function of another. When multicollinearity is present standard errors may be 
inflated. The test of multicollinearity indicated some high values for some variables. 
These were total and related product diversification variables which had VIFs of 
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16.56 and 19.46. But these are readily justifiable because RDIVE and TDIVE are 
related in their construction, since RDIVE is derived from TDIVE and both share 
most data in their construction so they were having multicollinearity problems. Other 
variables satisfied the assumption. The mean VIF is within the threshold of 5 (Table 
3.1) (Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
 
Table 3.1 Variance inflation factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF  
RDIVE 19.54  0.051165 
TDIVE  16.57 0.060335 
UDIVE 2.86  0.350073 
PROF 2.01 0.498745 
SIZE  1.60 0.625107 
TANG 1.42 0.704517 
GOCO 1.32 0.756417 
NDTS 1.21 0.825521 
GROP 1.09 0.917389 
RISK 1.09 0.919984 
Mean VIF 4.87  
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
3.8.5 Panel Data Modelling Strategy 
The study adopted the following regression procedures as proposed by Park (2011), 
which ensures a selection of a regression strategy that fits well the data. If individual 
effect ui (cross-sectional or time specific effect) does not exist (ui = 0), ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is considered to have both efficient and consistent parameter 
estimates. But if fixed effects exist then the fixed effects model is chosen, but if 
random effects exist then the random effect model is selected (Table 3.2). But if both 
fixed and random effects exist then the Hausman test is used to make a choice 
between the models. This ensured that bias in the estimations were controlled and 
taken care off. 
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In the analysis the tests (see the proceeding sections) indicated that the fixed effects 
models were the best models for the analysis. The analysis was done through all the 
process and indicated all the steps which were involved in the analysis. 
 
Table 3.2 Panel data modelling 
Fixed effect 
(F test) 
Random effect 
(B-P LM test) 
Selection  
H0 is not rejected 
(No fixed effect) 
H0 is not rejected 
(No fixed effect) 
Pooled OLS 
H0 is rejected 
(fixed effects) 
H0 is not rejected 
(No random effect) 
Fixed effect model 
H0 is not rejected 
(No fixed effect) 
H0 is rejected  
(random effect) 
Random effect model 
H0 is rejected 
(fixed effect) 
H0 is rejected 
(random effect) 
Choose a fixed effect model if the null 
hypothesis of a Hausman test is rejected; 
otherwise, fit a random effect model. 
Source: Park (2011). 
 
The analysis was based on a comparison of models’ specifications and performance 
to meet the assumptions of regression modelling. It conducted two tests; the F-test to 
test for individual effect ui (cross-sectional (in our case company specific effects)) or 
time specific effect) to verify if they do not exist (ui =0). That is, the null hypothesis 
H0 : both firm specific and time fixed effects are zero. The test result was (F (10, 
101)) = 12.87 and Prob.> F = 0.0000), the null was rejected, thus there were both 
firm specific (companies) and time (Years) fixed effects. The Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test was conducted to examines if any random effects 
existed (var(u)=0). The null hypothesis H0: variance across entities was zero. The 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test result was (Chi2(1) =0.00 and 
Prob.>1.0000). The null hypothesis: no random effects; was not rejected. Thus there 
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were no random effects. Thus based on this diagnostic, the fixed effect model was 
selected over the random effect model. 
 
Earlier studies (Kremp et al. 1999; Ozkan 2001; LaRocca et al, 2009; Apostu, 2010) 
have laid emphasis on the dynamic adjustment process involved in capital structures 
of companies and the adjustment process involved in attaining to a target debt-to-
equity ratio that has to be considered when analysing capital structure determinants 
of companies (Apostu, 2010). In this analysis as suggested by La Rocca et al (2009) 
the dynamic analysis of the model was incorporated to capture effects of prior years’ 
debts on proceeding years’ debts. Since it has been evidenced that companies present 
years’ debt ratios are influenced by prior years’ debt ratios, it was more realistic to 
check the contribution of such lagged debt ratio values on proceeding years’ debt 
ratios.  
 
The dynamic model was estimated using five different techniques: Fixed effects 
model estimated by the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV1), Fixed effects 
model estimated by the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV1) with clustered 
standard errors (CSE), Prais-Winsten regression with Panel Correlated Clustered 
Standard Errors (PCSE) approach and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
approaches using the Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel-data estimation as used 
by La Rocca et al (2009) and Apostu (2010).  
 
The GMM estimators are considered to be robust because: (1) they eliminate the 
companies’ non-observable individual specific effects given the estimate in first 
differences, (2) they control for the possible endogeneity as the lagged values of the 
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endogenous explanatory variables are used as instruments, and (3) they eliminate the 
problem of correlation between the lags of the dependent variable and the error term. 
The validity of the instruments was tested using Sargan’s statistic that tests for over 
identifying restrictions. This helped to satisfy assumption (b) which control for 
endogeneity problems and ensure consistent, reliable and unbiased results. La Rocca 
et al particularly insists that the panel-data methodology and estimation by the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) together for studies of the dynamic nature 
of capital-structure decisions at the firm level help to eliminate unobservable 
heterogeneity and controlling for the endogeneity problem. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the research findings based on the four objectives presented in 
the introduction. From objective one; the study assessed the level of variability of 
companies’ capital structure. From objective two; it assessed level of variability of 
companies’ product diversification while, from objective three; it assessed the effects 
of the conventional capital structure determinants on capital structure. Finally, from 
objective four; it assessed the effects of product diversification on capital structure.  
 
To address objectives one and two, descriptive and univariate analysis statistics were 
employed. Furthermore, the speed of capital structure adjustments was evaluated 
through the dynamic regression models. To address objectives three and four both 
univariate and multivariate analysis were employed to inspect and justify group 
analysis and assess suitability of treating the different types of capital structure and 
product diversification separately. Regression techniques were employed to fit our 
data in quest of finding suitable and efficient regression models that can yield 
unbiased results. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Analysis 
The analysis was based on 128 observations.  A panel of a total of 17 years from 
1997 to 2014 was constructed. The panel was unbalanced as the availability of a 
sizable balanced panel was difficult to obtain. It was constructed from a total of 11 
companies; 8 local companies and 3 cross-listed companies. These companies were; 
Precision Air Limited (PAL), Tanga Cement Limited (SIMBA), Swissport Tanzania 
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Public Limited Company (SWISSPORT), Tanzania Tea Packers Limited 
(TATEPA), Tanzania Breweries Limited (TBL), Tanzania Cigarette Company 
(TCC), TOL Limited (formerly Tanzania Oxygen Limited (TOL)) and Tanzania 
Portland Cement Limited (TWIGA); which are locally listed at the Dar es salaam 
stock exchange (DSE). Companies that are cross-listed are: African Barrick Gold 
(X_ACACIA), Kenya Airways (X_KQ) and National Media Group (X_NMG). 
 
The analysis used the following ratios and indices to measure and represent the 
various factors involved. The dependent variable was TGEAR measured as the ratio 
of total debt over total asset. Other dependent variables symbols that were used and 
derived from this TGEAR, were LGEAR i.e. long term debt over total assets and 
SGEAR i.e. short-term debt over total assets. The independent variables included 
lagged variables in the dynamic model, viz. are L.TGEAR, L.LGEAR and L.SGEAR 
i.e. lagged dependent variables for total, long term and short term capital structure 
ratios respectively. Other independent variables were TDIVE, UDIVE and RDIVE 
i.e. total, unrelated and related product diversifications indices respectively. These 
were based on the entropy index discussed at length in section 3.6.2.2 of chapter 
three. Other independent variables were asset tangibility (TANG), firm size (SIZE), 
firm profitability (PROF), non-debt tax shields (NDTS), going concern (GOCO), 
growth opportunity (GROP) and risk of bankruptcy (RISK). 
 
The analysis was based on these ratios and indices and the following were the results 
are presented in Table 4.1. The mean total capital structure ratio for the sample was 
47%, long term capital structure ratio was at a mean of 19% while short term capital 
structure ratio was 28%. This indicates that companies were employing more of 
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short terms debts than long term debts, but the companies on average were 
moderately geared. The analysis mainly used total debts, long term debts and short-
term debts because they were more reasonable in distributions. 
 
Unrelated product diversification (UDIVE), related product diversification (RDIVE) 
and total product diversification (TDIVE) had means that were high i.e. 0.11, 0.45 
and 0.52 respectively, indicating on average the companies at DSE were highly 
diversified into related and unrelated products. The product diversification trend has 
been increasing over time as depicted in figures (Figures 8.5 to 8.8 of Appendix III). 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 Count Mean Std. Dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
TGEAR 128 0.4690 0.2494 0.1312 1.0884 0.8157 2.4204 
LGEAR 128 0.1865 0.1757 0.0000 0.6633 1.0249 2.8929 
SGEAR 128 0.2826 0.1484 0.0443 0.8948 1.4372 5.7090 
RDIVE 128 0.4580 0.3328 0.0000 1.6321 0.9951 4.1455 
UDIVE 128 0.1148 0.2227 0.0000 0.6919 1.8074 4.7005 
TDIVE 128 0.5289 0.3076 0.0000 1.6321 0.7505 4.4787 
TANG 128 0.5449 0.1657 0.1953 0.8786 0.0472 2.1704 
SIZE 128 24.3900 1.6830 20.6496 27.6105 -0.3940 2.3328 
PROF 126 0.2884 0.2329 -0.3206 1.0910 0.2380 3.2216 
GROP 116 0.1490 0.1979 -0.6870 1.1140 0.6547 9.5163 
GOCO 128 39.8750 20.4104 1.0000 84.0000 0.3290 2.3327 
RISK 114 -
6799.2433 
68998.0390 -
736113.1875 
10875.3662 -10.4964 111.4449 
NDTS 123 0.0625 0.0530 0.0064 0.3954 4.3510 23.8608 
N 128       
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
 
4.3 Univariate Analysis 
The univariate analysis was conducted through parametric test (t-tests). In this 
analysis observations across levels of diversifications were compared. Especially 
related product diversification was compared against unrelated product 
diversification, the latter being grouped as “unrelated” indicating that these are 
companies that did not follow related product diversification. Related product 
diversification was isolated from the rest to assess its dimensionality separately.  
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The results in Table 4.2 indicate that the two groups were significantly different in 
most of the variables’ means. Theoretical arguments predict that unrelated product-
diversified firms should be more geared, more profitable, have more growth 
opportunities, more tangible assets and lower risk (Apostu, 2010). 
 
Table: 4.2 Test Using Parametric Method 
 
 
              Means for each variable Test statistics  
 
    T-test 
Variables Count Related [means] Unrelated [means] Mean [diff.]  [T] 
TGEAR 128 0.383607 0.650314 -0.26671 -6.4972*** 
LGEAR 128 0.142385 0.279958 -0.13757 -4.4266*** 
SGEAR 128 0.241221 0.370355 -0.12913 -5.0102*** 
RDIVE 128 0.575717 0.208224 0.36749 6.7843*** 
UDIVE 128 0.003582 0.350849 -0.34727 -12.004*** 
TDIVE 128 0.579300 0.421912 0.15739 2.7708** 
TANG 128 0.501945 0.635923 -0 .13398 -4.5948*** 
SIZE 128 24.79804 23.52403 1.27401 4.2568*** 
PROF 126 0.362085 0.130005 0.23208 5.8598*** 
GROP 116 0.152251 0.142046 0.01021 0.2577 
GOCO 128 39.41379 40.85366 -1.43987 -0.3711 
RISK 114 -9472.69 -1006.76 -8465.94 -0.6073 
NDTS 123 0.059138 0.070455 -0 .01132 -1.0872 
N 128 87 41    
 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
 
 
The results indicated that related product diversified firms are significantly less 
geared, more related diversified; more profitable and riskier (Table 4.2). However, 
they are significantly less geared than the not related diversified, the “unrelated 
group”. This analysis helps to have an insight into the structure of related and 
unrelated diversified groups, which indicated that product diversification type 
differentiated firms with respect to their capital structure ratio, profitability growth 
opportunity and bankruptcy risk. 
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Table 4.3 Two sample t-test for long and short term capital structure ratios 
Two-sample t-test with unequal variances 
Variable      Obs. Mean     Std. Err.    Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval] 
LGEAR 128     0.1864517     0.0155267     0.1756648 0.1458479     0.2270556 
SGEAR 128     0.2825846     0.0131176     0.1484092 0.2482807     0.3168885 
Combined 256     0.2345181     0.0105803     0.1692851 0.2070596     0.2619767 
Diff  -0.0961328     0.0203261  -0.1488937    -0.0433719 
Diff = mean(LGEAR) - mean(SGEAR)                 t =  -4.7295 
Ho: diff = 0                             Welch's degrees of freedom =  248.998 
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
 
The variability of capital structure across companies was assessed. It was found that 
long term capital structure ratio has more variability as compared to short term 
capital structure ratio with 0.17 and 0.14 standard deviations respectively (Tables 
4.1, & 4.3). The level of variability is high for total capital structure ratio (Table 4.2 
and Appendix II) indicating a standard deviation of 0.249. But more importantly is 
the fact that long term capital structure mean (0.18) was significantly lower than the 
short term capital structure mean (Tables 4.1, & 4.3). These findings help to warrant 
separate analyses based on the two capital structure ratios that is long term and short 
term capital structure ratios.  
 
In appendix 8.2, the variability of capital structure ratios by types was depicted, all 
short term capital structure ratio, long term capital structure ratio and total capital 
structure ratio have been increasing over time and by companies across respective 
years. In Table 4.3 it can be concluded that the two types of capital structure ratios; 
that is long term and short term capital structure ratios means are statistically 
significantly different from each other, this clear distinction justify a separate 
analysis of the two types of capital structure ratios. 
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Table 4.4: Two Sample T-Test for Related and Unrelated Product 
Diversifications 
Two-sample t-test with unequal variances 
Variable       Obs. Mean     Std. Err.    Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval] 
UDIVE 128 0.1148156      0.019685     0.2227106 0.0633374     0.1662939 
RDIVE       128 0.4580047      0.029416     0.3328039 0.381079     0.5349303 
Combined 256 0.2864102     0.0206747     0.3307944 0.2327543      0.340066 
Diff              -0.3431891     0.0353949  -0.4351462    -0.2512319 
Diff = mean(UDIVE) - mean(RDIVE)                 t =  -9.6960 
Ho: diff = 0                             Welch's degrees of freedom =  223.238 
 Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
 
The variability of product diversification across companies was assessed. It was 
found that related product diversification (RDIVE) has more variability compared to 
unrelated product diversification with 0.33 and 0.22 standard deviations respectively 
(Table 4.4). Based on the t-test in Table 4.4 results, unrelated product diversification 
mean (0.11) was significantly lower compared to related product diversification 
mean (0.45).  This finding help to warrant a separate analysis based on whether firms 
are following related or unrelated product diversification. The level of variability is 
high for total product diversification (Table 4.1 and Appendix III) indicating a 
standard deviation of 0.307.  
 
In Appendix III, the variability of product diversification by types is depicted; all 
related product diversification, unrelated product diversification and total product 
diversification have been episodically increasing over time and by companies across 
respective years. In table 4.4 it was shown statistically that the two types of product 
diversifications, that is unrelated product diversification and related product 
diversification were statistically and significantly different from each other’s for the 
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companies under study, thus warranting a separate treatment in the analysis. 
 
4.4 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation analysis indicates that all types of capital structure ratios are 
positively related to unrelated diversification and negatively related to related 
product diversification as expected in the hypotheses and model. The results were 
significant for unrelated and related product diversification. Total product 
diversification is positively related to all three types of capital structure ratios but the 
results were not statistically significant (Table 4.5). 
 
Tangibility (TANG) is significantly and positively related to capital structure ratio as 
expected in the postulated hypothesis. Profitability (PROF) is also significantly and 
negatively related to capital structure ratio as expected. Size of the firm (SIZE) in 
this case is consistently negatively related to all capital structure ratios, but only 
significantly related with total capital structure and, short term capital structure 
ratios. Age of the company (GOCO) is negatively related to total (TGEAR) and long 
term (LGEAR) capital structure ratio but only significantly related with LGEAR, 
and significantly positively related to short term capital structure ratio (SGEAR). 
Growth opportunity (GROP) is insignificantly positively related to TGEAR, and 
LGEAR and insignificantly negatively related to SGEAR.  
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Table 4.5: Correlations Analysis 
              
 TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS 
TGEAR 1             
 
LGEAR 
 
0.811*** 
 
1 
           
 
SGEAR 
 
0.721*** 
 
0.179* 
 
1 
          
 
RDIVE 
 
-0.225* 
 
-0.184* 
 
-0.160 
 
1 
         
 
UDIVE 
 
0.525*** 
 
0.534*** 
 
0.250** 
 
-0.377*** 
 
1 
        
 
TDIVE 
 
0.00869 
 
0.00914 
 
0.00378 
 
0.910*** 
 
-0.0374 
 
1 
       
 
TANG 
 
0.484*** 
 
0.437*** 
 
0.296*** 
 
-0.327*** 
 
0.322*** 
 
-0.180* 
 
1 
      
 
SIZE 
 
-0.203* 
 
-0.141 
 
-0.174* 
 
0.0212 
 
-0.152 
 
-0.0819 
 
-0.0570 
 
1 
     
 
PROF 
 
-0.596*** 
 
-0.570*** 
 
-0.328*** 
 
0.297*** 
 
-0.479*** 
 
0.112 
 
-0.397*** 
 
0.429*** 
 
1 
    
 
GROP 
 
0.0266 
 
0.0997 
 
-0.0739 
 
-0.0483 
 
-0.0597 
 
-0.0885 
 
-0.0217 
 
0.115 
 
0.213* 
 
1 
   
 
GOCO 
 
-0.0983 
 
-0.376*** 
 
0.280** 
 
-0.0862 
 
-0.0344 
 
-0.0702 
 
0.154 
 
0.401*** 
 
0.229** 
 
-0.0316 
 
1 
  
 
RISK 
 
0.0896 
 
0.0254 
 
0.120 
 
-0.0948 
 
0.0435 
 
-0.0821 
 
-0.00462 
 
0.219* 
 
0.0783 
 
0.0739 
 
0.167 
 
1 
 
 
NDTS 
 
0.138 
 
-0.0597 
 
0.295*** 
 
0.160 
 
0.0287 
 
0.204* 
 
0.0569 
 
-0.156 
 
0.130 
 
-0.0283 
 
0.0610 
 
0.0107 
 
1 
N 128             
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
  
 
 
77 
4.5 Multivariate Analysis 
4.5.1 Static Regression Analysis 
Since the data exhibited presence of fixed effects, the regression analysis started by 
considering the fixed effect model (FEM) which employs least square dummy 
variable one approach (LSDV1), its name underscores its methods, in that it uses 
dummy variables and drops one first dummy variable in its calculations. It provides 
a good way to understand fixed effects (Park, 2011). The effects of the dependent 
variable were mediated by the differences across companies. By adding the dummy 
for each company, it was possible to estimate the pure effects of independent 
variables by controlling for the unobservable heterogeneity. Each dummy is 
absorbing the effects particular to each company.  In Table 4.6 Model (1) accounts 
only for the time (year-specific) effects, model (2) accounts for the company (firm-
specific) effects and model (3) accounts for both.  
 
The perfomance of the models improved from an r2 of 0.618, 0.806 to 0.868 as one 
progressively controlled for fixed effects. Thus, model (3) fitted the data more 
efficiently than the previous two models. The residual sum of squares errors (rmse) 
did as well decline progressively from 0.177, 0.122 to 0.111, because the more this 
ratio approaches to zero the better. The F statistic did as well improve after 
controlling for fixed effects, both indicating more significance of the models as one 
moves towards the third model. The variables’ significance and directions in the 
three models did not differ very much.  
 
Most of the company dummies ( _ICompanyID_2  to _ICompanyID_11) in model 2 
were statistically significant indicating a better fit unlike in model 1 where the year 
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dummies ( _ITimeYear_1998  to _ITimeYear_2014) were not statistically significant 
(Table 4.6). Normally when dummies are statistically significant it implies that they 
are effectively absorbing the fixed effects. 
  
Table 4.6 FEM Regressions Using LSDV1 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 LSDV1_t  LSDV1_c  LSDV1_b  
RDIVE -0.4827 (0.2323) -0.2854 (0.1681) -0.3230 (0.1577) 
UDIVE 0.0908 (0.1429) 0.0279 (0.1384) 0.0228 (0.1331) 
TDIVE 0.4961 (0.2334) 0.4476* (0.1688) 0.4720* (0.1682) 
TANG 0.1458 (0.1278) 0.1310 (0.1495) 0.0355 (0.1601) 
SIZE 0.1505 (0.0136) -0.1800 (0.0721) -0.5459 (0.0742) 
PROF -0.4533*** (0.1097) -0.3479*** (0.0963) -0.1700 (0.1083) 
GROP 0.1625* (0.0968) 0.0947 (0.0731) 0.0949 (0.0758) 
GOCO -0.1367 (0.0010) 0.2505 (0.0098) -9.9548 (0.1249) 
RISK 0.1145 (0.0000) -0.0330 (0.0000) -0.0194 (0.0000) 
NDTS 0.2589** (0.3903) 0.0985 (0.2466) 0.1613** (0.2552) 
_ITimeYear_1998 -0.0264 (0.2196)   -0.1234 (0.1876) 
_ITimeYear_1999 0.0000 (.)   0.0000 (.) 
_ITimeYear_2000 0.0205 (0.2508)   0.0552 (0.2010) 
_ITimeYear_2001 -0.2934 (0.2053)   -0.1543 (0.2827) 
_ITimeYear_2002 -0.3179 (0.2087)   -0.0143 (0.3997) 
_ITimeYear_2003 -0.2510 (0.2070)   0.1480 (0.5178) 
_ITimeYear_2004 -0.2899 (0.2105)   0.1664 (0.6391) 
_ITimeYear_2005 -0.2768 (0.2027)   0.3249 (0.7583) 
_ITimeYear_2006 -0.3001 (0.2034)   0.4977 (0.8829) 
_ITimeYear_2007 -0.3493 (0.2005)   0.6820 (1.0050) 
_ITimeYear_2008 -0.3037 (0.1994)   0.9208 (1.1291) 
_ITimeYear_2009 -0.3392 (0.1965)   1.1336 (1.2510) 
_ITimeYear_2010 -0.3171 (0.1964)   1.3107 (1.3749) 
_ITimeYear_2011 -0.3750 (0.1969)   1.5280 (1.5007) 
_ITimeYear_2012 -0.3476 (0.1955)   1.7031 (1.6235) 
_ITimeYear_2013 -0.3889 (0.1943)   1.8472 (1.7590) 
_ITimeYear_2014 -0.2467 (0.2012)   1.7400 (1.8742) 
_ICompanyID_2   -0.5607*** (0.1005) 1.1710 (1.3840) 
_ICompanyID_3   -0.3961* (0.1748) 0.1637 (0.7766) 
_ICompanyID_4   -0.3800* (0.1441) -0.3426 (0.1972) 
_ICompanyID_5   -0.6488 (0.4744) 9.6751 (7.6103) 
_ICompanyID_6   -0.7682* (0.2772) 4.2160 (3.7557) 
_ICompanyID_7   -0.7117 (0.5647) 6.5427 (5.1496) 
_ICompanyID_8   -0.6160** (0.2076) 2.8314 (3.1198) 
_ICompanyID_9   -0.6198*** (0.2139) -2.5244 (2.2386) 
_ICompanyID_10   -0.3109 (0.1564) 1.5159 (1.7583) 
_ICompanyID_11   -0.4602 (0.4612) 2.7106 (4.0246) 
N 112  112  112  
r2 0.618  0.806  0.868  
r2_a 0.501  0.764  0.804  
rmse 0.177  0.122  0.111  
mss 4.299  5.612  6.042  
rss 2.662  1.350  0.920  
F 5.279  18.92  13.69  
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Since the results are sensitive to the way of computing robust standard errors, two 
different methods were used: clustered standard errors (CSE) by firm and panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSE) after applying the Prais-Winsten transformation for 
autocorrelation. The Prais-Winsten regression with PCSE accounts for both time and 
individual fixed effects in the observations as well as for heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation in the error term (Apostu, 2010). 
 
Table 4.7: CSE and PSCE LSDV1 FEM Compared 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 LSDV1_b  CSE  PCSE  
RDIVE -0.3230 (0.1577) -0.3230* (0.0798) -0.2450* (0.0717) 
UDIVE 0.0228 (0.1331) 0.0228 (0.2879) 0.0599 (0.0861) 
TDIVE 0.4720* (0.1682) 0.4720* (0.1440) 0.4023*** (0.0735) 
TANG 0.0355 (0.1601) 0.0355 (0.1958) 0.0693 (0.0692) 
SIZE -0.5459 (0.0742) -0.5459 (0.1364) -0.5075 (0.0429) 
PROF -0.1700 (0.1083) -0.1700** (0.0546) -0.2483*** (0.0623) 
GROP 0.0949 (0.0758) 0.0949* (0.0415) 0.0960*** (0.0350) 
GOCO -9.9548 (0.1249) -9.9548* (0.0408) -7.4895* (0.0436) 
RISK -0.0194 (0.0000) -0.0194 (0.0000) -0.0307 (0.0000) 
NDTS 0.1613** (0.2552) 0.1613* (0.2663) 0.1062* (0.2055) 
N 112  112  112  
r2 0.868  0.868  0.825  
r2_a 0.804  0.804    
Rmse 0.111  0.111  0.0957  
Mss 6.042  6.042  3.235  
Rss 0.920  0.920  0.686  
F 13.69  .    
Standardized beta coefficients; *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation indicated the presence of autocorrelations; 
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation F (1, 10) = 25.489 Prob.> F = 0.0005. Also the 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity; Ho: Constant variance; 
Variables: fitted values of TGEAR; chi2 (1) =12.81, Prob.> chi2 = 0.0003. After 
applying the CSE and PCSE treatments the fixed effect regression analysis improved 
a lot.  More variables became significant, thus increasing the statistical evidence for 
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the variables and it was possible to eliminate biases that emanate from 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, thus assumptions 3a-b in subsection 3.8.4 
were satisfied. 
 
4.5.2 Dynamic Regression Analysis 
In table 4.8 the previous static fixed effects models (that used LSDV1, CSE and 
PCSE strategies) were compared to the dynamic fixed effects models with as well 
their respective robust option and find that the dynamic models have more 
explanatory power as compared to the static ones, for instance the r2 changed from 
0.868 to 0.937 and 0.943 for the dynamic LSDV1 (model 2) and dynamic Prais-
Winsten PCSE (model 6) which is more than almost a 10% increase. The residuals 
sum of squares (rss) as well decreased from 0.920 to 0.442, while the F statistic 
increased from 13.69 to 29.50, the model sum of square (mss) have as well increased 
from 6.042 to 6.519 and the root mean squared error (rmse) has declined from 0.111 
to 0.0773, because the more this statistic approaches to zero the better the model fit 
(Torres-Reyna, 2007). Such improvements in the model indicated that prior years’ 
debt decisions have consequential effects to the proceeding years’ debt.  
 
Tests for joint significance of the variables were run for the fixed effects dynamic 
model. The F tests for the joint significance of company dummies, time dummies, 
combined company and time dummies and independent variables under the null 
hypotheses of no joint relationships were: for company dummies was statistically 
significant F(10, 74) = 3.90 with Prob.>F = 0.0003, F test for time dummies was not 
statistically significant = F(16, 74) = 1.65 with Prob.>F = 0.0768, F test for both 
company and time dummies  was statistically significant F(26, 74) = 2.69 with 
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Prob.>F = 0.0005, and F test for the joint significant of the independent variables 
was statistically significant  F(11, 74) =   10.57 with Prob.> F = 0.0000. The F tests 
for company dummies, both company & time dummies and independent variables 
indicated that coefficients and dummies were jointly significant thus they were 
playing a statically significant role in absorbing fixed effects and explaining the 
dependent variable. 
 
Table 4.8 Dynamic and static fixed effect (FEM) models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 LS
D
V
1_
b 
dL
SD
V
1_
b 
CS
E 
dC
SE
 
PC
SE
 
dP
CS
E G
M
M
 
L.TGEAR  0.6424***  0.6424***  0.6631*** 0.6771*** 
  (0.0738)  (0.0912)  (0.0632) (0.0588) 
RDIVE -0.3230 -0.1587 -0.3230* -0.1587 -0.2450* -0.1588 -0.1506* 
 (0.1577) (0.1109) (0.0798) (0.0540) (0.0717) (0.0682) (0.0463) 
UDIVE 0.0228 0.1226 0.0228 0.1226 0.0599 0.1282** 0.1246*** 
 (0.1331) (0.0938) (0.2879) (0.0812) (0.0861) (0.0574) (0.0344) 
TDIVE 0.4720* 0.3215* 0.4720* 0.3215* 0.4023*** 0.3165*** 0.2553*** 
 (0.1682) (0.1182) (0.1440) (0.0809) (0.0735) (0.0723) (0.0311) 
TANG 0.0355 0.0678 0.0355 0.0678 0.0693 0.0581 0.0806 
 (0.1601) (0.1119) (0.1958) (0.1487) (0.0692) (0.0638) (0.0945) 
SIZE -0.5459 -0.8429* -0.5459 -0.8429 -0.5075 -0.827*** -0.6151* 
 (0.0742) (0.0520) (0.1364) (0.0782) (0.0429) (0.0350) (0.0398) 
PROF -0.1700 -0.3471*** -0.170** -0.3471* -0.248*** -0.338*** -0.3833** 
 (0.1083) (0.0784) (0.0546) (0.1284) (0.0623) (0.0664) (0.1459) 
GROP 0.0949 0.1489*** 0.0949* 0.1489** 0.0960*** 0.1496*** 0.1634*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0534) (0.0415) (0.0534) (0.0350) (0.0356) (0.0387) 
GOCO -9.9548 -3.3308 -9.9548* -3.3308 -7.4895* -3.3381 0.8520* 
 (0.1249) (0.0877) (0.0408) (0.0287) (0.0436) (0.0287) (0.0045) 
RISK -0.0194 -0.0129 -0.0194 -0.0129 -0.0307 -0.0088 -0.0086 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
NDTS 0.1613** 0.1533*** 0.1613* 0.1533*** 0.1062* 0.1556*** 0.0974*** 
 (0.2552) (0.1782) (0.2663) (0.1223) (0.2055) (0.1516) (0.1117) 
N 112 112 112 112 112 112 100 
r2 0.868 0.937 0.868 0.937 0.825 0.943  
r2_a 0.804 0.905 0.804 0.905    
rmse 0.111 0.0773 0.111 0.0773 0.0957 0.0773  
mss 6.042 6.519 6.042 6.519 3.235 7.375  
rss 0.920 0.442 0.920 0.442 0.686 0.443 1.098 
F 13.69 29.50 . .    
chi2     110621.8 962815.3 251985.6 
Standardized beta coefficients *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
Specification diagnostics for the GMM model was done. The Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions: H0 over-identifying restrictions are valid, for Arellano-Bond 
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1991 GMM methods, was chi2 (89) = 95.91445 with Prob. > chi2 = 0.2894. The 
Arellano-Bond test: H0 zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors for first order 
autocorrelation was ar(1) z = -3.6609 with Prob. > z = 0.0003 and second order 
autocorrelation was ar(2) z = -1.7217 with Prob. > z = 0.0851. Thus the data had 
only first order serial correlation which was controlled for through the use of GMM 
model. 
 
Thus, the dynamic fixed effect models could explain and fit the data much better and 
more efficiently than the static fixed effect models. The robust option in models 
(CSE and PCSE) was maintained which controlled for any heteroscedasticity and 
first order autocorrelation (ar(1)).The results improved in terms of level of 
significance. Additionally, the GMM model was run which control for exogeneity to 
satisfy assumption (b).  
 
The dynamic regression analysis has another important advantage; it can depict the 
speed of capital structure ratio adjustment. Appendix VIII, explains the direction of 
the sign of the target-adjustment model in order to better interpret the resulting 
coefficients of the regressions. If the coefficient (1 - α) is close to 1, the adjustment 
process is slow; if it is close to 0, then adjustment occurs rapidly (LaRocca et al, 
2009). The lagged total debt variable coefficient (L.TGEAR) was 0.6424 and 
significant at 0.001, for models 2 and 4, indicating that for a 1 unit increase in prior 
year’s capital structure ratio there is a 0.6424 increase on proceeding years’ capital 
structure ratio. Models 6, 7 and 8 had 0.6631, 0.6771 and 0.6465 lagged coefficients 
respectively. According to Moyo et al (2013) this indicates that firms have target 
leverages towards which they adjust over time.  
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Based on the procedure suggested by La Rocca et al, (2009) and Apostu (2010) 
(Appendix VIII) for extracting the alpha (α) which measures the speed of adjustment 
or transaction costs of debt, it was found to be 0.3576 (i.e. 1- α = lagged debt 
coefficient) thus 1-lagged debt coefficient= alpha (α) (i.e. 1-0.6424 = 0.3576). Thus 
based on this finding by considering the lowest and the highest alpha values in the 
models, alpha is in the range 0.3229-3576, below 0.5 and is approaching 0, it is 
evident that companies at DSE do not adjust their total debt automatically, debt also 
seems to stay at their precious years’ values, there are high transaction costs 
associated with increasing total debt, the costs associated with being in 
disequilibrium are low and thus companies slowly adjust their total debts. 
 
The findings indicated that total product diversification (TDIVE) was positively 
related to total capital structure ratio and was significant at 0.001 in the PCSE, 
dPCSE and GMM models. This is consistent with theory as when the two types of 
product diversification are combined uncorrelated cash flows reduce business risk 
and thereby attract lenders. Thus, a positive relationship is justifiable. Unrelated 
product diversification (UDIVE) was positively related to total capital structure ratio, 
but became significant in the dPCSE and GMM models. For the related product 
diversification (RDIVE) the relationship was consistently negative, but significant in 
some models (3, 5 &7) only.  
 
The directions of relationships for UDIVE, RDIVE and TDIVE are all consistent 
with co-insurance hypothesis and transaction costs theory. The rest of the 
conventional variables were the same as in the static model, but some of the 
coefficients became significant or more so in the dynamic model (TDIVE, UDIVE, 
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SIZE, PROF, NDTS, and GROP) offering support to the previous analysis and 
theoretical postulations. The levels of significance have improved as one move 
toward more sophisticated models which are dynamic i.e. dLSDV1, dCSE, dPCSE 
and GMM. For tangibility (TANG), the findings indicated a positive but 
insignificant relation to total capital structure ratio. The direction of the variable is 
consistent with transaction cost theory, because presence of tangible assets such as 
plants, property and equipment make a company a good candidate for debt. Thus, 
more tangibility would increase debt qualification and consequently more debt 
financing. 
 
Size of the firm (SIZE) was found to be negatively related to capital structure ratio in 
the models. Size as a variable has mixed results, a positive sign supports the position 
that large firms easily qualify for debt because of large assets that can cover debt 
obligations during bankruptcy, and on the other hand a negative relationship can be 
supported based on the idea that large firms may opt not to borrow due to stable 
profitability ensuring internal financing. Thus, it seems instead of resorting 
exclusively to debt for financing, firms at DSE are more using internal financing and 
equity as compared to debt. This is evidenced by low capital structure ratio (47%) 
against equity (53%), please refer to Table 4.1. 
 
Profitability (PROF) was found to be negatively related to total capital structure ratio 
at 0.001 levels of significance in most models. Theoretically there are two 
possibilities: - firstly, if past profitability is considered a good proxy for future 
profitability then profitability would be positively related to capital structure ratio. 
But if, on the other hand firms are capable of generating sufficient profits firms may 
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resort to internal financing against debt, profitability would be negatively related to 
capital structure ratios. This later position seems to be the case in this study’s 
sample. Thus, a one-unit increase in profitability would results in a 0.078 unit 
decrease in capital structure ratio. This is evidenced by the high mean profitability of 
28.84%, with a minimum of -32.06% and maximum of 109.10% in Table 4.1, 
evidencing availability of high profits that can be used internally to finance the 
companies. 
 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) was found to be positively related to total capital 
structure ratio. The result was significant at 0.001 levels in most models. If firms are 
capable of gaining from non-debt tax shields, they may shy away from debt. Firms 
that are capable of decreasing taxes by means other than interest deductions such as 
depreciation will employ less debt in their financing structures. Thus, one would 
expect a negative relationship. The findings however indicate that firms are not 
capable of decreasing taxes by other means (such as depreciation) than interest 
deductions. The positive relationship helps to highlight this fact, in Table 4.1 the 
non-debt tax shield (calculated as total depreciation and amortization over total 
assets) was very low at a mean of 0.06, such a low amount of non-debt tax shield 
could not guarantee a large enough reduction of taxes by means of depreciation and 
amortization. 
 
Going concern (GOCO) was found to be negatively related to total capital structure 
ratio, but it was not significant in most models. However, it became significant in 
some models. Theoretically age accounts for company reputation, however the kind 
of reputation contained in the age of the company will depend on other factors as 
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well. Some companies such as TOL are very old but are loss making companies, that 
would be a bad reputation, while other companies such as TBL are old and profit 
making. The mean age in our sample (Table 4.1) was 39 years, indicating the 
dominance of moderately experienced companies. However, a negative relationship 
between age and total capital structure ratio can be due to information asymmetry, 
DSE being a market in a less developed economy would imply a high degree of 
information asymmetry in the market. 
 
Growth opportunity (GROP) was found to be positively related to total capital 
structure ratio, the variable was statistically significant in most models. The 
companies in our sample have a mean of 14.9% growth opportunity, which is high, 
indicating that our sample is made of high growth opportunity firms. Such firms are 
characterised by high needs of funds. Risk of bankruptcy (RISK) was found to be 
negatively related to total capital structure ratio, but the result was not statistically 
significant. Theoretically a negative relationship is expected.  
 
4.5.3 Total, Long-term and Short-term Debt Ratios Regressions Analysis 
In this section, different types of capital structure ratios were regressed separately. 
The analysis used the dynamic Prais-Winsten regression with PCSE approach. This 
approach yielded better performance compared to other models. It was used to 
compare effects of capital structure determinants on total debt ratios, long-term debt 
ratios and short-term debt ratios. The sample in Table 4.3 indicated that short-term 
debts were significantly (at 0.001) different from long term debt in the univariate 
analysis. Also all total, long term and short terms debt ratios were statistically 
different for related and unrelated firms.  
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The result in the regression analysis (Table 4.9) indicates that long-term debt ratio 
had a better model fit performance followed by total gear and short-term gear models 
(rmse: 0.0604, 0.0773 and 0.0883 respectively). But, also total debt gearing had 
more explanatory power than long-term debt model and short term debt model (r2: 
0.94, 0.92 and 0.78) respectively (Table 4.9). All of the three models have lagged 
capital structure ratios that were significant at 0. 001. This offers support to the 
previous analysis, which indicated that prior years’ capital structure ratios have 
effects on the proceeding years’ ratios. However, long term debt seems to have a 
relatively high adjustment speed α=0.4926 (1-0.5049) compared to short term debt 
ratio α=0.3369 (1-0.6631), but when compared to a 0.5 benchmark both ratios 
generally indicate that firms are slowly adjusting their target ratios. 
 
Table 4.9 Comparative debt types dynamic FEM using PCSE 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 TotalD  longD  shortD  
L.TGEAR 0.6631*** (0.0632)     
L.LGEAR   0.5049*** (0.1002)   
L.SGEAR     0.6032*** (0.0934) 
RDIVE -0.1588 (0.0682) -0.0506 (0.0922) -0.2102 (0.0723) 
UDIVE 0.1282** (0.0574) 0.0270 (0.0759) 0.1612 (0.0680) 
TDIVE 0.3165*** (0.0723) 0.1014 (0.1030) 0.3977* (0.0753) 
TANG 0.0581 (0.0638) 0.0502 (0.0631) 0.0467 (0.0686) 
SIZE -0.8273*** (0.0350) -0.0601 (0.0395) -1.0661* (0.0409) 
PROF -0.3384*** (0.0664) -0.0856 (0.0588) -0.4540*** (0.0788) 
GROP 0.1496*** (0.0356) 0.1232** (0.0349) 0.0840 (0.0429) 
GOCO -3.3381 (0.0287) 5.0122 (0.0233) -13.7743** (0.0390) 
RISK -0.0088 (0.0000) -0.0089 (0.0000) -0.0166 (0.0000) 
NDTS 0.1556*** (0.1516) -0.0621 (0.1597) 0.3328*** (0.2081) 
N 112  112  112  
r2 0.943  0.922  0.783  
rmse 0.0773  0.0604  0.0882  
mss 7.375  3.213  2.073  
rss 0.443  0.270  0.576  
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
This indicates that companies tend to adjust long-term capital structure ratio and 
short-term capital structure ratio less automatically. It also implies that there are 
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relatively low transaction (adjustment) costs in using long-term debt than in using 
short-term debt. It also implies that the cost of being in disequilibrium for long-term 
debts is comparatively high as compared to short term debt. Thus, companies at DSE 
relatively quickly adjust their long-term debt and slowly adjust their short-term debt 
(Table 4.9 & Appendix VIII). This is as well supported by the high standard 
deviation for long term capital structure ratio (0.175) compared to that of short-term 
capital structure ratio (0.148) (Table 4.1) (Appendix II). 
 
Except for NDTS in the long term capital structure ratio (model 2 (longD)), the rest 
of the variables in the long term and short-term capital structure ratios corroborated 
the relationships depicted by the total gearing model. Most of the variables in the 
long term gearing model were not significant, but some of the significant variables in 
the total gearing model were also significant in the short term gearing model. 
 
4.5.4 Groups Regression Analysis 
In this section, dynamic FEM analyses were compared using clustered standard 
errors (CSE) when total, unrelated and related product diversification variables are 
considered. Thus it was explored if there were differences in performance of these 
three models and helped to better understand the data. The unrelated and related 
product diversification groups in models 2 and 3 performed better as compared to the 
total product diversification group in model 1 (rmse: 0.0789, 0.0460 and 0.0583), 
this is as well supported by a higher explanatory power, because r2 for the unrelated 
and related groups models (r2: 0.998 and 0.954), is higher than for total groups 
models (r2: 0.901) respectively, Table 4.10. Additionally, DIVE became significant 
at 0.05. 
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Table 4.10: Total, Unrelated and Related Product Diversification Groups Using 
Dynamic FEM (LSDV1 with CSE) analysis 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Total  Unrelated  Related  
L.TGEAR 0.6359*** (0.0647) 1.4481* (0.2179) 0.3020* (0.1195) 
UDIVE   0.4233* (0.0918)   
RDIVE     -0.0400 (0.0645) 
TDIVE 0.1861 (0.0933)     
TANG 0.0540 (0.1458) 1.0299** (0.1201) 0.0845 (0.1299) 
SIZE -1.0018 (0.0707) -1.7986 (0.4189) 0.4901 (0.0335) 
PROF -0.3826** (0.1238) -1.1444 (0.5536) -0.2570** (0.0677) 
GROP 0.1543* (0.0702) 0.1516 (0.3138) 0.1081 (0.0610) 
GOCO -4.2333 (0.0337) -1.0401 (0.0097) -5.2249 (0.0448) 
RISK -0.0083 (0.0000) -0.0636 (0.0000) -0.0284 (0.0000) 
NDTS 0.1627*** (0.1269) 1.2001 (2.5773) 0.1370** (0.1614) 
N 112  28  78  
r2 0.932  0.998  0.954  
r2_a 0.901  0.951  0.923  
rmse 0.0789  0.0460  0.0583  
mss 6.488  1.164  3.261  
rss 0.473  0.00211  0.156  
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
 
The analysis indicated that related product diversification group prior years’ debts 
were positively affecting proceeding years’ capital structure ratios. The coefficient 
was significant in both models. Related product diversification group had a higher 
adjustment speed 0.6980 (1-0.3020) since it approaches 1 (Appendix VIII). The 
related product diversified companies’ variables exhibit a differentiated relationship 
when compared to the total product diversified companies.  The coefficient for the 
unrelated product diversification group became significant at 0.05. This help to point 
to the fact that a choice between related and unrelated product diversification is 
dictated by the kind of resources the companies have. However, the RDIVE and 
TDIVE variables became more significant in the related product model. The rest of 
the results coefficient directions were consistent with the total product diversification 
model. 
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Table 4.11 Both, local and cross listed groups using dynamic FEM (LSDV1 with 
CSE) Analysis 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 both_listed  local_listed  cross_listed  
L.TGEAR 0.6424*** (0.0912) 0.7461*** (0.0577) -0.3312 (0.4559) 
UDIVE 0.1226 (0.0812) 0.0612 (0.0703) 2.4575* (0.2998) 
RDIVE -0.1587 (0.0540) -0.0343 (0.0854) 0.0373 (0.6764) 
TDIVE 0.3215* (0.0809) 0.0666 (0.0884) 1.2830 (1.3795) 
TANG 0.0678 (0.1487) -0.0093 (0.0805) 0.6842 (1.5481) 
SIZE -0.8429 (0.0782) 0.1094 (0.0104) -1.9480 (0.0746) 
PROF -0.3471* (0.1284) -0.3089* (0.1378) -0.2233 (0.4328) 
GROP 0.1489** (0.0534) 0.0923* (0.0405) 0.0607 (0.0480) 
GOCO -3.3308 (0.0287) -0.0730 (0.0009) 3.0603 (0.0328) 
RISK -0.0129 (0.0000) 0.1089*** (0.0000) -0.0142 (0.0000) 
NDTS 0.1533*** (0.1223) 0.1359* (0.2173) 0.1310 (1.4744) 
N 112  95  17  
r2 0.937  0.879  0.993  
r2_a 0.905  0.863  0.978  
Rmse 0.0773  0.0931  0.0377  
Mss 6.519  5.211  1.024  
Rss 0.442  0.719  0.00709  
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
Further data analyse were done by considering two groups based on listing type. The 
analysis used the Prais-Winsten with PCSE approach for both listings, and the 
locally listed companies. The analysis indicated that the both listing group better 
fitted the data as compared to the locally listed firms. The cross-listed group fitted 
the data better than the other two groups. Both models fairly performed better with 
small variations (Table 4.11). 
 
The locally listed companies seem to have a low adjustment speed 0.2669 (1-0.7331) 
on their total debt. Thus, their costs of being in disequilibrium are low, they adjust 
their debt ratio slowly, because of high transaction costs and therefore their debts 
tend to stay close at their previous years’ levels. Most of the rest of the other 
coefficients for the locally listed model behaved as in the total product 
diversification model in terms of relationships and significance level. 
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4.5.5 Comparisons of Findings among Models and Groups 
In this sub-section the results of all models in the analysis are compared (Table 
4.12). It serves as a summary of the multivariate findings in the study and provides a 
condensed summary reference for inference from this chapter in the next fifth and 
sixth chapters. The analysis indicates that level of capital structure variability is high 
among listed companies at DSE. Long-term capital structure ratio is significantly 
different from short term capital structure ratio. The level of product diversification 
variability is high and there is a significant difference between related and unrelated 
product diversification for the companies. The static fixed effect model (FEM) that 
employed least square dummy variable one (LSDV1) technique was used to fitted 
the data. The FEM with clustered standard errors (CSE) and FEM Prais-Winsten 
with PCSE were introduced to further control for firms-specific effects, time-specific 
effects, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation in the 
error term.  
 
The dynamic FE and GMM models outperformed the static FE models yielding 
superior results and efficient estimates due to the dynamic nature of the data as 
proposed in theory and empirical evidences. Thus it was found that related product 
diversification was negatively related to capital structure ratios, while unrelated and 
total product diversifications were positively related to capital structure ratios. 
Profitability, firms’ size, and going concern were negatively related to capital 
structure ratios while growth opportunity and non-debt tax shield were positively 
related to capital structure ratios. It was also found that the speed of adjustment for 
debt is high in long term debt compared to short term debt, high for related product 
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diversified companies and low for locally listed companies. 
Table 4.12 Comparisons of Analysis among the Models and Groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
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L.TGEAR    0.642*** 0.642*** 0.663*** 0.677*** 0.232 1.448* 0.746*** -0.331   
L.LGEAR            0.505***  
L.SGEAR             0.603*** 
RDIVE -0.323 -0.323* -0.245* -0.159 -0.159 -0.159 -0.151* -1.95***  -0.034 0.037 -0.051 -0.210 
UDIVE 0.023 0.023 0.060 0.123 0.123 0.128** 0.125***  0.423* 0.061 2.458* 0.027 0.161 
TDIVE 0.472* 0.472* 0.402*** 0.321* 0.321* 0.317*** 0.255*** 1.976***  0.067 1.283 0.101 0.398* 
TANG 0.035 0.035 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.058 0.081 0.035 1.030** -0.009 0.684 0.050 0.047 
SIZE -0.546 -0.546 -0.507 -0.843* -0.843 -0.83*** -0.615* 0.362 -1.799 0.109 -1.948 -0.060 -1.066* 
PROF -0.170 -0.170** -0.25*** -0.35*** -0.347* -0.34*** -0.383** -0.283** -1.144 -0.309* -0.223 -0.086 -0.45*** 
GROP 0.095 0.095* 0.096*** 0.149*** 0.149** 0.150*** 0.163*** 0.142** 0.152 0.092* 0.061 0.123** 0.084 
GOCO -9.955 -9.955* -7.489* -3.331 -3.331 -3.338 0.852* -1.809 -1.040 -0.073 3.060 5.012 -13.77** 
RISK -0.019 -0.019 -0.031 -0.013 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.048* -0.064 0.109*** -0.014 -0.009 -0.017 
NDTS 0.161** 0.161* 0.106* 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.156*** 0.097*** 0.145** 1.200 0.136* 0.131 -0.062 0.333*** 
N 112 112 112 112 112 112 100 78 28 95 17 112 112 
r2 0.868 0.868 0.825 0.937 0.937 0.943  0.964 0.998 0.879 0.993 0.922 0.783 
r2_a 0.804 0.804  0.905 0.905   0.939 0.951 0.863 0.978   
rmse 0.111 0.111 0.0957 0.0773 0.0773 0.0773  0.0521 0.0460 0.0931 0.0377 0.0604 0.0882 
mss 6.042 6.042 3.235 6.519 6.519 7.375  3.296 1.164 5.211 1.024 3.213 2.073 
rss 0.920 0.920 0.686 0.442 0.442 0.443 1.098 0.122 0.00211 0.719 0.00709 0.270 0.576 
F 13.69 .  29.50 .   . . . .   
chi2   126207.   962815 251985     1521143 2272609 
Standardized beta coefficients *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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4.6 Prediction and Fitted Values 
In this section actual values for the different levels of capital structure ratio were 
compared to their respective predicted values or fitted values. In Table 4.13 
summary statistics of the actual values versus the predicted values for capital 
structure ratios are provided. The means are not very different for the paired values 
between the actual and predicted values. Thus, for instance the TGEAR is expected 
to be a bit lower compared to the previous, the LGEAR is expected to be a bit higher 
compared to the previous and SGEAR is expected to be a bit lower compared to the 
previous. 
 
Table 4.13 Descriptive Statistics for Actual and Predicted Values for Capital 
Structure Ratios 
      
 Count Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
TGEAR 128 0.4690 0.2494 0.1312 1.0884 
TGEAR_predict 112 0.4699 0.2427 0.1060 1.0326 
LGEAR 128 0.1865 0.1757 0.0000 0.6633 
LGEAR_predict 112 0.1878 0.1667 -0.0263 0.6784 
SGEAR 128 0.2826 0.1484 0.0443 0.8948 
SGEAR_predict 112 0.2822 0.1336 -0.0382 0.7202 
N 128     
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
 
How good the model is depends on how well it predicts Y (in our case gearing), the 
linearity of the model and the behaviour of the residuals. One needs to expect a 45 
degrees pattern in the data on the graphs. Y-axis is the observed (actual) data and x-
axis the predicted data (Yhat) (Torres-Reyna, 2007). From the graphs below the 
TGEAR of our sample has the best prediction as compared to the other models in 
Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.1 Predicted values for TGEAR 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
Table 4.14 T-Test for Total Capital Structure Ratio and Predicted Total Capital 
Structure Ratio 
Two-sample t-test with unequal variances  
Variable       Obs. Mean     Std. Err.    Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval] 
TGEAR 128     0.4690363     0.0220435     0.2493936     0.4113904     0.5266821 
TGEAR_~t 112     0.4699461     0.0229316     0.2426852     0.4098458     0.5300463 
Combined      240    0.4694608     0.0158645     0.2457723    0.4282677      0.510654 
Diff              -0.0009098     0.0318084                -0.0835068     0.0816872 
Diff = mean(TGEAR) - mean(TGEAR_predict)                 t =  -0.0286 
Ho: diff = 0                                                              Welch's degrees of freedom =  237.32  
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4886         Pr(T > t) = 0.9772           Pr(T > t) = 0.5114 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
Table 4.14 summarizes the T-test for the two unpaired groups. If the test turns out to 
be insignificant as it is in this result’s case then that would indicate that the two 
groups are not statistically different, thus the results help to confirm the fact that our 
observed (actual) values are excellent predictors, therefore the model is an efficient 
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predictor of capital structure ratio. 
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
lo
n
g 
te
rm
 
ge
ar
in
g
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
LGEAR predict
 
Figure 4.2 Predicted values for LGEAR 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
Table 4.15 T-Test For Long Term Capital Structure Ratio and Predicted Long 
Term Capital Structure Ratio 
Two-sample t-test with unequal variances 
Variable       Obs. Mean     Std. Err.    Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval] 
LGEAR 128 0.1864517     0.0155267     0.1756648     0.1458479 0.2270556 
LGEAR_~t 112 0.1878075     0.0157504     0.1666861     0.1465282     0.2290868 
Combined      240 0.1870844     0.0110495     0.1711779     0.1583938      0.215775 
Diff              -0.0013557     0.0221168                -0.0587843     0.0560729 
Diff = mean(LGEAR) - mean(LGEAR_predict)                 t = -0.0613  
Ho: diff = 0                                                              Welch's degrees of freedom = 238.438 
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4756         Pr(T > t) = 0.9512           Pr(T > t) = 0.5244 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
The values in Figure 4.2 indicate that long term gearing model was a good predictor 
as confirmed by the T-test in Table 4.15, where the T-test was not significant. The 
values in Figure 4.3 indicate that the short term gearing model was also a good 
predictor as confirmed by the T-test in Table 4.16, where the T-test was not 
significant. But this model did not perform very well as compared to the previous 
models. 
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Figure 4.3 Predicted values for SGEAR 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
 
 
Table 4.16 T-Test for Short Term Capital Structure Ratio and Predicted Short 
Term Capital Structure Ratio 
Two-sample t-test with unequal variances 
Variable       Obs. Mean     Std. Err.    Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval] 
SGEAR 128 0.2825846     0.0131176     0.1484092     0.2482807     0.3168885 
SGEAR_~t 112 0.2821877     0.0126238     0.1335972     0.2491028     0.3152727 
Combined      240 0.2823994    0.0091272     0.1413973    0.2587002     0.3060985 
Diff              0.0003968     0.0182053                -0.0468729     0.0476665 
Diff = mean(SGEAR) - mean(SGEAR_predict)       t = 0.0218 
Ho: diff = 0                                                              Welch's degrees of freedom = 239.813 
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5087         Pr(T > t) = 0.9826           Pr(T > t) = 0.4913 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter discusses the research findings. It compares and contrasts theoretical 
postulations to findings presented in chapter four. It further compares and contrasts 
findings in chapter four to other related empirical findings found by other 
researchers. It offers rationales for consistence and deviations of findings from 
theory and other empirical findings. It also confirms the hypotheses used in this 
study and suggests improvements for the model used in this study to reflect the 
current findings. 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Univariate Results 
The descriptive results were comparable to other studies. The mean total capital 
structure ratio for the panel was 47%, long-term capital structure ratio was at a mean 
of 19% while short-term capital structure ratio was 28%. This indicates that 
companies were employing more of short terms debts than long term debts, but the 
companies on average were moderately geared (Table 4.1). The panel for capital 
structure ratio is comparable to that of La Rocca et al. (2009) and Bundala (2012) 
who found that companies were moderately geared with means of 44.5% and 55.1% 
respectively, but the findings of Bundala indicated a wider deviation from the current 
study’s findings. It indicated a shift in leverage by almost 10% lesser from the 
findings of Bundala who drew sample from the same stock market. 
 
The correlation analysis indicates that capital structure ratio is positively related to 
unrelated diversification and negatively related to related diversification as expected 
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in the hypotheses and model and the results were significant. Total diversification is 
positively related to capital structure ratio (Table 4.5). Tangibility is significantly 
and positively related to capital structure ratio as expected in the hypothesis since the 
more tangible the assets are the more lenders are willing to offer debts. It is evident 
that firms with large amounts of tangible assets (as also manifested in the panel in 
Table 4.1, tangibility is 0.54) already have assets which can be used as collaterals 
that push them to resort to debt financing rather than equity financing, thus this 
theoretical underpinning supports the positive relationship manifested between firm 
tangibility and capital structure ratio (Table 4.5).  
 
Profitability is also significantly and negatively related to capital structure ratios, 
indicating that firms are trying to obtain financing through internally generated funds 
(Apostu, 2010) which means firms shy away from debt if they can gain from tax 
shields (NDTS) Table 4.5. Size of the firm in this case is consistently negatively 
related to total, long-term and short-term capital structure ratios. Most studies report 
a positive relationship between size and capital structure ratio for instance (Abor, 
2008), but this study’s results are consistent with a few exceptions such as the study 
of Vries (2010) in which the negative relationship between size and capital structure 
ratio was reported. The reasoning behind it was that equity seems to be more 
attractive to investors than it is to debt due to low information asymmetry in the 
market. Age of the company (GOCO) is negatively related to capital structure ratio. 
Growth opportunity is positively related to capital structure ratio.  
 
5.3 Capital Structure Ratios 
Whenever panel data are available, various scholars, practitioners, and students have 
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been fascinated by panel data modelling for the reason that these longitudinal data 
have more variability and allow to investigate more issues than do cross-sectional or 
time-series data alone (Park, 2011). In this study’s analysis the level of capital 
structure is evidently variable. The standard deviation of 0.249 for total capital 
structure ratio (TGEAR) indicates that there are variation both across companies and 
across years. Short term capital structure ratio (SGEAR) as well as long term capital 
structure ratio (LGEAR) were as well varying over companies and years (0.148 and 
0.175 respectively) (See Table 4.1).  
 
The t-test with unequal variance conducted indicated that the two types of capital 
structure ratios were statistically significantly different from each other indicating 
that the two types of capital structure ratios varied independently from each other 
(Table 4.3). This variability is supported by Park (2011). Baltagi (2001) specifically 
argues that “Panel data give more informative data, more variability, less co-linearity 
among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” (p.6). The 
variability of 0.249 from 128 observations is close to that of La Rocca et al (2009) 
who found a standard deviation of 0.235 from 2085 observations. Latridis and 
Zaghmour (2013) based on a comparative study for Moroccan and Turkish firms 
find the standard deviations to be 0.1693 and 0.1741 respectively.  
 
The findings of the present study, TGEAR was at the mean of 47% compare to the 
means of 9.19% reported in Latridis and Zaghmour (2013) study.  Akinyomi and 
Olagunju (2013) based on a sample of 240 observations found a mean capital 
structure ratio of 57.6% and standard deviation of 0.074 for firms listed in Nigeria. 
Kodongo et al. (2014) based on Kenyan listed firms found the mean for capital 
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structure ratio was 57% with a standard deviation of 0.233. Similarly Hove and 
Chidodo (2012) employing 84 observations from listed companies in Zimbabwe 
found comparable results, where total capital structure ratio was at the mean of 
23.8% with a standard deviation of 0.2187.  
 
Thus, Tanzanian listed firms are in range with other comparable countries in terms 
of variability and level of capital structure ratio. This help to point to the fact that 
this variability in capital structure ratio is not unplanned. There are factors that can 
be attributed to it. 
 
5.4 Capital Structure Ratios Speed of Adjustments 
Further aspects of capital structure or gearing variability are tapped by considering 
the speed of adjustment of capital structure ratio across time and companies 
simultaneously as suggested by Abor (2007; 2008), La Rocca et al (2009) and 
Apostu (2010). This was done by introducing lagged capital structure ratio variable 
to take advantage of the fixed effects dynamic regression models. La Rocca et al 
(2009) particularly argue that capital structure theories are considered to have 
diverse implications on a firm adjustment process toward its target capital structure 
ratio level.  
 
When they deviate from equilibrium level, firms normally rebalance their capital 
structure ratios towards the target levels. If firms follow a target optimal level of debt 
in their capital structure, deviations from the equilibrium level are expected to be 
temporary and therefore the speed of adjustment will be relatively high. On the 
contrary, if firms do not attribute great importance to their target leverage ratios (or 
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if the transaction costs are high), then an adjustment of capital structure toward the 
optimal level, for example in response to a shock, will be slow or even non-existent 
in a given year. 
 
In findings of the present study, prior years’ total capital structure ratio levels tended 
to influence current years’ total capital structure ratio levels by between 0.6424 and 
0.6771 units for each unit. Thus based on this finding by considering the lowest and 
the highest alpha values in the models, alpha (α) was in the range of 0.3229 - 0.3576 
for whole sample analyses (Table 4.12). This is below 0.5 (Refers to Appendix VIII, 
Table 8.3). The speed of adjustment alpha (α) is arrived at by the following formula 
δ + α = 1, (i.e. α = 1 - δ) where δ= lagged debt coefficients (Refer Appendix VIII, 
Table 8.3).  
 
The implications are that firms at DSE do not adjust their total debt more 
automatically. Capital structure levels seem to be more close to their previous years’ 
debt levels. This is due to high transaction costs associated with increasing total debt. 
The costs associated with being in disequilibrium are low and thus firms tend to 
adjust their total debts slowly. It is possible therefore that, companies in DSE are 
generally slowly following their target total debt levels. It also can be argued that 
they are rather are faced with high transactions costs that prevent them from 
adjusting more easily and quickly.  
 
When long term and short term capital structure ratios were considered separately, 
short-term capital structure ratios have a relatively less adjustment speed (α = 
0.3369) compared to long-term capital structure ratio (α =   0.4926). This indicates 
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that companies adjust short-term capital structure ratio less automatically compared 
to long-term capital structure ratio. There are relatively more transaction 
(adjustment) costs in using short-term debt compared to using long-term debt. It also 
implies that the cost of being in disequilibrium for long-term debts is high as 
compared to short-term debt. Thus, companies at DSE relatively quickly adjust their 
long-term debt and slowly adjust their short term debt. This is as well supported by 
the high standard deviation for long term capital structure ratio (0.175) compared to 
that of short term capital structure ratio (0.148) (Table 4.1) (Appendix II). 
 
The findings (α = 0.4926) for long-term capital structure ratio are comparable to 
those of Apostu (2010) who found the adjustment coefficient (in range of α = 0.53 to 
0.61) to be relatively large (greater than 0.5) in various analyses for European 
companies. The findings are also comparable to the ones found by Kremp et al. 
(1999) for German (α =0.47) and Ozkan (2001) for British (α =0.43). One possible 
explanation for this adjustment speed could be that the costs of adjustment and the 
costs of being away from their target ratios are both important for firms. However, 
since the adjustment coefficient is about 0.5, it is hard to conclude on the adjustment 
behaviour for these long-term debt ratios. 
 
Furthermore, for related product diversified group the adjustment speed was α = 
0.7684, this indicates that related product diversified firms adjust their debt level 
more quickly. Their costs of being in disequilibrium are high. The locally listed 
companies seem to have a low adjustment speed α = 0.2669 on their total capital 
structure ratio. Thus, their costs of being in disequilibrium are low; they adjust their 
debt ratios slowly because of high transaction costs and therefore their debts tend to 
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stay close at their previous years’ levels. Conversely, La Rocca et al (2009) found 
that firms pursuing related product diversification had low adjustment speed (α = 
0.352) and firms that are undiversified had a comparatively high adjustment speed (α 
= 0.488). They move toward their optimum capital structure ratios more slowly 
while firms pursuing unrelated product diversification (α =0.706) move toward their 
optimum capital structure ratios more quickly. However, when total lagged values 
for total capital structure ratios were considered, the speed of adjustment was in the 
range below 0.5 (α= 0.3229 to 0.3576). This indicates that the costs of being in 
disequilibrium are lower than the costs of adjustment. This suggests that firms in 
DSE face relatively high transaction costs when they borrow loans from banks or 
issues bonds. 
 
Moyo et al (2013) argue that if the speed of adjustment is zero, firms have no 
leverage targets and therefore do not follow an adjustment process. But in cases 
where speed of adjustment is greater than zero, then firms have capital structure ratio 
target levels that they adjust to. Companies listed in DSE seem to have target debt 
levels to which they strive to adjust to. These firms seem to slowly adjust to their 
total capital structure ratio due to their low adjustment coefficients (α= 0.3229 to 
0.3576 for whole sample analysis). Moyo et al (2013) maintains that, in a perfect 
market, firms always sustain their target or optimal ratio; but in an imperfect market, 
firms merely slowly adjust because of information asymmetries, transaction and 
adjustment costs. This later case seems to fit an explanation for the DSE locally 
listed firms, which indicated an adjustment speed of 0.2669. Similar conclusion can 
be drawn from whole sample analyses (Table 4.12) with speed of adjustment ranging 
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from α = 0.3229 to α = 0.3576. 
 
The DSE locally listed firms case depict the following facts which were corroborated 
the findings by Moyo et al (2013), that the speeds of target adjustment differ 
between countries, reflecting the disparity in these factors. Countries such as 
Tanzania, with low-quality firms, bad legal systems, unfavourable institutional 
features and unstable or stagnant or slowly growing economies will exhibit a low 
speed of adjustment. These characteristics increases adjustment costs and hence 
hinder faster and more frequent adjustments. 
 
5.5 Product Diversification 
From the 128 observations, findings indicated that total product diversification 
(TDIVE) in Table 4.1 was at a mean of 0.528 with standard deviations of 0.307 
indicating a greater degrees of variability over the years. Related product 
diversification (RDIVE) was at a mean of 0.458 while unrelated product 
diversification (UDIVE) was 0.114; their respective standard deviations were 0.332 
and 0.222, which indicate great variability in these types of diversification over time 
and between companies. La Rocca et al (2009) used 2085 observations and found 
that the mean for total product diversification was 0.391; related product 
diversification was 0.172 and for unrelated product diversification was 0.219. Their 
respective standard deviations were 0.445, 0.298 and 0.358 respectively.  
 
The variability was not very different from this study’s panel, indicating that product 
diversification has been changing over time and across companies. Such a variability 
helps to point to the fact that companies at DSE have been consciously choosing 
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product diversification strategies for various purposes and advantages which product 
diversification offers. These advantages are such as firm expansion, profit making, 
acquisitions, shareholders controlling the management, responding to market needs, 
reducing business risk, responding to the presence of unutilized resources in the 
firms, beating and timing the competition and the need to expand and grow. 
 
In the univariate analysis in Table 4.2, companies’ characteristics or factors indicated 
statistically significant differences. The treatment involved two groups i.e. 
companies that followed related product diversification and companies that followed 
unrelated product diversification. The differences were in terms of capital structure 
or capital structure ratios for total, long and short term gearing usages. The 
differences are in assets structures (tangibility), size of the firms and firms’ 
profitability. Such differences point to the fact that firms embarking on related 
product diversifications were constrained by presence of inflexible resources which 
can only be transferred across similar or related business lines. On the other hand, 
firms that adopted unrelated product diversification were few and were only 
probably able to do so, as the transaction theory proposes, due to the presence of 
flexible resources which could be transferred across unrelated business segments. 
 
In the multivariate analysis, the regression results indicated that total product 
diversification is positively related to total capital structure ratio, long term capital 
structure ratio and short term capital structure ratio in both the static and dynamic 
models. The same relationship was evidenced in the robust models and for all the 
groups analysed. The relationship was significant for most models (Table 4.12). This 
is consistent with most theoretical postulations, such as the Agency Cost Theory 
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(Apostu, 2010). Thus, for every one unit increase in total product diversification we 
would expect a 0.3215 increase in total capital structure ratio. This is contrary to the 
findings of La Rocca et al. (2009), Apostu (2010) and Quresh et al (2012) who found 
a negative and significant relationship. As noted earlier, the agency costs theory 
predicts that debt will be used to reduce the ability of a manager to undertake 
detrimental investments.  This theory predicts a positive relationship but most 
empirical studies report a negative relationship. This study, on the contrary has been 
able to support a positive relationship as predicted in theory. 
 
Consequently, shareholders will promote the use of debt through non-detrimental 
investments such as product diversification, as a device to discipline managerial 
behaviour up to the point when their objective is realised. Hence, we expect a 
positive relationship between total product diversification and capital structure ratios 
up to that realization. Thus, based on theoretical postulation and findings, it seems 
that shareholders for companies listed at DSE are not considering total 
diversification strategies employed as detrimental to the well-being of the firms. 
Similarly, based on co-insurance postulation total product diversification is a good 
example of investments that produce uncorrelated cash flows. Such types of cash 
flows reduce business risk and thereby making the firm more attractive to lenders. 
 
Furthermore, following the methods of La Rocca et al (2009) and Apostu (2010), the 
univariate analysis used t-test (Table 4.2) and t-test (Table 4.3) to test for differences 
between related product diversification strategies. These are total and unrelated 
product diversification. The results indicated a significant difference for the sub-
samples. The objective was to justify separate analysis for the two groups during the 
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regression analysis. Most of the other variables were statistically and significantly 
different indicating that the two sub-samples could be treated as unique groups for 
the analysis. 
 
Related product diversification was negatively related to total capital structure ratio, 
long term capital structure ratio and short term capital structure ratio. The results 
were significant for related product diversification group only (Table 4.12). This 
finding was consistent with that of La Rocca et al (2009) and Apostu (2010). The 
result was also consistent with, the co-insurance effects theory, which suggests that, 
product diversification in related business segments results into correlated returns, 
which do not lower returns volatility. This in turn discourages lenders from offering 
loans, and vice versa. Thus, internal financing, (retained earnings), is associated with 
related product diversification. On the other hand, external financing (debt), is 
associated with unrelated product diversification. A negative relationship between 
related product diversification and capital structure ratio or gearing was expected and 
consequently supported by the findings. Similarly, based on transaction costs theory 
or argument related product diversification is only possible in the presence of excess 
and flexible unutilized resources in the companies.  
 
Therefore, it was possible to demonstrate that related product diversification is based 
on business synergies and resource sharing. These are normally inflexible, highly 
specialised, excess and unutilised resources. These resources are assets, human skills 
and internal funds available to the companies. These are the basic reasons that reflect 
possibilities for these companies to invest in related product diversification. 
Characteristically, these assets and resources can only be transferred across similar 
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business products. Thus, related product diversification would be negatively related 
to external financing and consequently negatively related to capital structure ratios as 
postulated in the theory transaction cost theory. 
 
Unrelated product diversification was consistently positively related to total capital 
structure ratio, long-term capital structure ratio and short term capital structure ratio. 
The results were significant in some of the dynamic regression models. The positive 
relationship helps to highlight the fact that investment in unrelated products results 
into uncorrelated cash flows thus reducing risk of business, thus attracting more 
external financing particularly debt. This is consistent with the co-insurance theory. 
 
5.6 Capital Structure Determinants 
5.6.1 Asset Tangibility 
This study’s findings on asset tangibility (TANG), indicated that all models had 
positive but insignificant relationships to total capital structure ratio, long term 
capital structure ratio and short term capital structure ratio except for related product 
diversified group which was statistically significant (Table 4.12). The direction of 
the variable is consistent with theory, because presence of tangible assets such as 
plants, property and equipment makes a company a good candidate for debt. Thus, 
more tangibility would increase debt qualification and consequently more debt 
financing (Tables 4.8 & 4.10). The mean for asset tangibility was at 0.528 (Table 
4.1) indicating that more than half of the assets of the companies were properties, 
plant and equipment. Theoretically, tangible assets have less information asymmetry 
and have greater values than intangible assets during liquidation. Thus, they are 
capable of attracting more debt financing, thus tangibility would normally be 
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positively related to capital structure ratio. The finding is consistent with most 
empirical findings that confirm a positive relationship, for instance Titman and 
Wessels (1988) and Apostu (2010) in developed countries and Abor (2008), Khediri 
and Daadaa (2011), Hove and Chidoko (2012), Gweyi et al., (2013) and Umer 
(2014) in developing countries.  
 
5.6.2 Firm Size 
Size of the firm (SIZE) was found to be negatively related to capital structure ratio in 
all models; the dynamic models for total gearing were statistically significant. The 
locally listed firms indicated a positive but not statistically significant relationship to 
capital structure ratio (Table 4.12). Size is a controversial variable, a positive sign 
supports the position that large firms easily qualify for debt because of large assets 
that can cover debt obligations during bankruptcy. On the other hand, a negative 
relationship was supported based on the idea that large firms may opt not to borrow 
due to stable profitability, which is used as an internal financing substitute. Thus, it 
seems, instead of resorting exclusively to debt for financing, firms at DSE are using 
internal financing and equity more as compared to debt. This is evidenced by low 
capital structure ratio (47%), against equity (53%) (Table 4.1) coupled by high 
profitability with the mean of 28.84% with a max of 109.10%.  
 
The negative relationship is consistent with Achy (2009) who employed a panel of 
550 non-listed Moroccan firms, with 2,859 observations. He used natural logarithms 
of sales, natural logarithms of assets and natural logarithms of employment to 
measure size for a robust analysis. He observes that all three measures for firm size 
were negatively related to long-term capital structure ratios. Vries (2010) also found 
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a negative relationship, he particularly unlike other researchers used natural 
logarithms of sale. He concludes that firms with large amounts of tangible assets 
already have a stable income that pushes them to resort to internal financing rather 
than debt financing. Also, firm size is considered to be a sign of ability to reduce 
information asymmetry. Less information asymmetry attract equity than debt finance 
for the reason that, public investors are more informed about the firms. Therefore, 
chances that shares are undervalued are very low, and as such investors are more 
willing to buy equity. As a result, such firms, at time may prefer equity relative to 
borrowing; hence a negative relationship is justified. 
 
5.6.3 Firm Profitability 
Profitability of the firm (PROF) was found to be negatively related to total capital 
structure ratio, long term capital structure ratio and short term capital structure ratio, 
the results were statistically significant (Table 4.12). Theoretically there are two 
possibilities, which have also been supported empirically. Firstly, if past profitability 
is considered a good proxy for future profitability then profitability would be 
positively related to capital structure ratio. On the other hand, if firms are capable of 
generating sufficient profits and are following a pecking order financial behaviour, 
they will resort to internal financing against debt. Thus profitability would be 
negatively related to capital structure ratio.  
 
Evidences for a negative relationship to support this current study are extensive from 
other studies, such as Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth, et al. (2001), Fama and 
Frech  (2002), Abor (2008), Vries (2010), Khediri and Daadaa (2011), Hove and 
Chidoko (2012), Aremu et al. (2013), Latridis and Zaghmour (2013), Umer (2014), 
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Tarus et al. (2014). This later position seems to be the case in this present study’s 
sample. Thus a one unit increase in profitability would results in approximately 
0.3471 unit decreases in total capital structure ratio based on the dynamic model 
(Table 4.12). This is evidenced by the high mean profitability of 28.84% with a max 
of 109.10% in Table 4.1, evidencing availability of high profits that can be used 
internally to finance the companies.  
 
5.6.4 Growth Opportunity 
Growth opportunity (GROP) was found to be positively related to total capital 
structure ratio, long-term capital structure ratio and short term capital structure ratio, 
the results were significant (Table 4.12). The findings were consistent with many 
other studies in Africa. These studies indicated positive relationships of growth 
opportunity to capital structure ratio (Doku, et al., 2011; Hove & Chidoko, 2012; 
Nyamora, 2012; Ogbulu & Emeni, 2012; Bundala & Machogu, 2012; Latridis & 
Zaghmour, 2013; Gweyi et al., 2013; Nyanamba et al.,2013). The companies in the 
present study sample have a mean of 14.9% for growth opportunity (Table 4.1). This 
high mean indicates that the sample is made of high growth opportunity firms. High 
growth opportunity firms are characterised by high needs of funds.  
 
Therefore, internal financing may not suffice their financing needs as a result they 
would resort into external financing. These firms are further constrained by 
“ownership control rights” they want to maintain their ownership thus they would 
normally resort to external financing. These two rationales seem to paint the picture 
of companies at DSE. 
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5.6.5 Going Concern 
Going concern (GOCO) was found to be negatively related to total capital structure 
ratio and short term capital structure ratio, but positively related to long term capital 
structure ratio (Table 4.12). Theoretically, age accounts for company reputation. 
However, the kind of reputation contained in the age of the company will depend on 
other factors as well. Some companies such as TOL Limited are very old, but are 
loss making companies that would add to bad reputation. On the other hand, other 
companies such as TBL are old and profit making that would add to good reputation. 
Thus, a sound going concern is positively related to debt. The mean age in our 
sample was 39 years (Table 4.1). This indicates the dominance of experienced 
companies.  
 
The negative relationship between age and short term capital structure ratio and 
positive relationship between age and long-term capital structure ratio was consistent 
with the findings of Hall et al. (2004). He established that age was negatively related 
to short-term capital structure ratio but was positively related to long-term capital 
structure ratio. But, notably Esperança et al. (2003) found that age is negatively 
related to both long-term and short-term capital structure ratios. The reasons for this 
relationship were probably due to young age and information asymmetry presented 
by young firms. Thus, this trend can be attributed to information asymmetry, DSE 
being a market in a developing economy would imply a high degree of information 
asymmetry in the market. 
 
5.6.6 Bankruptcy Risk 
Risk of bankruptcy (RISK) was found to be negatively related to total capital 
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structure ratio, long term capital structure ratio and short term capital structure ratio, 
the results were not statistically significant, except for the related product 
diversification group which was negatively related to capital structure ratio and 
statistically significant, and locally listed group which was positively related to 
capital structure ratio and was statistically significant (Table 4.12). Firms with high 
debt levels have higher volatility of net profit and implicitly higher bankruptcy risk. 
Thus, one needs to expect a negative relationship between debt and risk (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Kremp et al., 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Alonso, 2003). The locally 
listed firms seem to have low levels of capital structure ratios that do not threaten 
their quest to continue borrowing that is why they have a positive relationship is 
evidenced. 
 
Research evidences indicate that firms tend to shy away from excessive debts in 
order to reduce their bankruptcy risk. This study’s findings are consistent with 
studies from both developed and developing economies. These studies indicate that 
bankruptcy risk is negatively related to capital structure ratios (Alonso, 2003; Abor, 
2008; Apostu (2010); Junior and Funchal (2013); Moyo, 2013; Umer, 2014; Gathogo 
& Ragui, 2014). Particularly Junior & Funchal (2013) found a negative and 
insignificant relationship for both the high and low risk groups in their panel. The 
rationalization put forward, which is adopted to support this relationship, is that 
bankruptcy risks emanate from both increases in direct and indirect financial distress 
costs. Firms with high profitability and risk averse tend to avoid debt usage by 
relying on internal financing in order to reduce bankruptcy risk (Vries, 2010; Abor, 
2007).  
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5.6.7 Non-debt Tax Shields 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) was found to be positively related to total capital 
structure ratio and short term capital structure ratio but negatively related to long 
term capital structure ratio (Table 4.12). The results were significant for total and 
short term gearing models. Theoretically, if firms are capable of gaining from non-
debt tax shields, they may shy away from debt. Firms that are capable of decreasing 
taxes by means other than interest deductions such as depreciation will employ less 
debt in their financing structures. Debt-tax shields unlike non-debt tax shields are 
positively related to capital structure ratio (Umer, 2014). Conversely, one would 
expect a negative relationship between non-debt tax shield and capital structure ratio. 
This is only consistent for our long term capital structure ratio. Total and short term 
capital structure ratios indicate the contrary, which is a firm is not capable of 
decreasing taxes by other means (such as depreciation) than interest deductions.  
 
The findings were consistent with that of Titman and Wessel (1988) and Umer 
(2014) except for long-term capital structure ratio. They found a positive relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and total capital structure ratio in developed economies 
and Ethiopian companies respectively. This current study adopts their explanation 
put forward that non-debt tax shields were not a substitute for total and short-term 
debt tax shields, except for long-term capital structure ratio. The rationalizations for 
a negative relationship for long term capital structure ratio are that; when corporate 
taxes increases are high, firms which are able to reduce taxes by means other than 
deducting interest will employ less debt in their capital structure (Vries, 2010). 
When non-debt tax shields are positively related to long-term capital structure ratio, 
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non-debt tax shields may be regarded as substitute for debt tax shields (La Rocca et 
al., 2009). 
 
5.7 Hypothesis Tests and Validation 
 In this section the findings are compared to the hypotheses. They are confirmed to 
conclude the findings and results in relation to the hypothetical predictions. Based on 
the results hypothesis one was supported. The findings were consistent with the 
postulations that there is a negative relationship between related product 
diversification and capital structures of listed companies in Tanzania. When the 
related product diversification group only was dealt with the results turned out to be 
significant at 0.001. The findings were thus consistent with both the transaction cost 
theory and co-insurance hypothesis. Thus first hypothesis was supported which 
stated; 
H1: Related product diversification negatively affects capital structure of 
companies listed in Tanzania 
 
The findings were consistent with the second hypothesis. The second hypothesis was 
supported, that unrelated product diversification is positively related to capital 
structure. The positive direction was consistent for all the models and became 
significant at 0.01 in the dynamic Prais-Winsten with PCSE. This offers support to 
the second hypothesis and is consistent with both the co-insurance hypothesis and 
transaction cost theory which postulated that; 
H2: Unrelated product diversification positively affects capital structure 
of companies listed in Tanzania 
 
The results supported a positive relationship between total product diversification 
and capital structure. The results were consistently significant with a few exceptions 
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in some models, such as the locally listed group, cross listed group and the long debt 
group. The findings were consistent with the agency theory, which imply that 
managements were endorsing product diversification projects to promote debt usage. 
This offered support to the third hypothesis, which stated thus; 
H3: Total product diversification positively affects capital structure of 
companies listed in Tanzania 
 
Asset tangibility was consistently shown to be positively related to capital structure 
ratio. The findings were not significant. This is consistent with other researchers’ 
findings and theoretical postulations. Thus we were able to confirm a positive 
relationship but unable to statistically support it. 
H4: Tangibility of the firm positively affects capital structure of companies 
listed in Tanzania. 
 
The fifth hypothesis dealt with size of the firm. It indicated two possibilities. The 
related product diversified group had a positive relationship with capital structure. 
The models except for related product diversification indicated a consistently 
negative relationship to capital structure. The findings were statistically significant in 
some models, thus lending support for our fifth hypothesis that; 
H5: Size of the firm negatively affects capital structure of companies listed in 
Tanzania 
 
For the sixth hypothesis, the results supported a negative relationship. The results 
were statistically significant in most models. This relationship is consistent with 
theories and empirical findings. Thus it was possible to support a negative 
relationship that; 
H6: Profitability of the firm negatively affects capital structure of companies 
listed in Tanzania 
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Growth opportunity is a contentious factor, which may indicate a positive or 
negative relationship. The results supported a positive relationship, which is 
consistent with both theory and other empirical findings. The relationship was 
statistically significant and thus it was possible to support a positive relationship 
thus; 
H7: Growth opportunity of the firm positively affects capital structure of 
companies listed in Tanzania 
 
 
In the eighth hypothesis, against the postulations, the results supported a negative 
relationship for the whole sample but a positive relationship for long-term gearing 
and the GMM model. Some of the models were statistically significant lending 
support to both other researchers’ empirical findings and theoretical postulations. 
Thus the eighth hypothesis was supported thus; 
H8: Going concern of the firm affects capital structure of companies listed 
in Tanzania 
 
 
For the ninth hypothesis, the findings supported a negative relationship between risk 
and capital structure for both listings group, but indicated a positive relationship for 
the locally listed firms. These findings are consistent with both empirical and 
theoretical postulations. They were also statistically significant for both related and 
locally listed firms. 
H9: Bankruptcy risk of the firm affect capital structure of companies listed 
in Tanzania  
 
 
In the tenth hypothesis, against the postulation, it was possible to support a positive 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and capital structure except for long term 
debt group where a negative relationship was found consistent with the postulation. 
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The findings were statistically significant for a positive relationship. Thus, it was 
possible to support a positive relationship that; 
H10: Tax shield of the firm positively affects capital structure of companies 
listed in Tanzania  
 
5.8 Model Improvements 
Based on the findings from data analysis output the hypotheses are restated and a 
new model’s variables relationships are depicted in Figure 5.1. In this model the 
dynamic nature of our findings was introduced and the lagged debt (GEAR(i,t-1)) 
effects on capital structure (GEAR(i,t)) were taken into account to reflect the dynamic 
nature of the model as proposed in theory and findings. 
 
Figure 5.1 Modified conceptual model 
Source: Researcher’s own Design (2016). 
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The findings indicated that capital structure ratios of firms are varying over time and 
across companies. Product diversification in its various types showed variability over 
time and across firms. The results are generally consistent with the three theories and 
tended to differ from some empirical results. Total product diversification and 
unrelated product diversification are positively related to capital structure ratios. 
Related product diversification was negatively related to capital structure ratios. The 
conventional variables; asset tangibility and growth opportunity are positively and 
significantly related to capital structure. Non-debt tax shield, risk of bankruptcy and 
going concern are either positively or negatively related to capital structure 
depending on the group of analysis involved. Profitability and size of the firm were 
negatively related to capital structure ratios. Firms follow dynamic adjustments in 
their capital structures. 
 
Thus based on these findings the following improvements in the previous model 
(Figure 2.1) are done and reflected in the new improved model (Figure 5.1). TDIVE 
postulated a general relationship on GEAR; but the results supported a positive 
relationship. RDIVE postulated a negative relationship; the results maintained the 
same negative relationship. UDIVE postulated a positive relationship; the results 
maintained the same positive relationship. TANG postulated a positive relationship; 
the results maintained the same positive relationship. SIZE postulated a general 
relationship; the results maintained a negative relationship.  
 
PROF postulated a general relationship; the results supported a negative relationship. 
GROP postulated a general relationship; the results supported a positive relationship. 
GOCO postulated a positive relationship; the results supported a general 
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relationship. RISK postulated a negative relationship; the results supported a general 
relationship. NDTS postulated a negative relationship; the results supported a 
positive relationship. These improvements are reflected fully in the model (Figure 
5.1). As it can be noticed, these variables affect both prior years capital structure 
ratios {GEAR(i, t-1)} and current years capital structure ratios {GEAR(i, t)} in the 
central box of the model. But, it is worth noting that GEAR(i, t-1) also affects GEAR(i, 
t) as indicated by the central arrow in the model’s central box. 
 
5.9 Summary of Discussion of Findings 
The results indicated that capital structures of firms at DSE are varying over time 
and across companies. Firms are slowly adjusting their capital structure ratios 
towards their targets. Product diversification in its various types indicated variability 
over time and across firms. The results are generally consistent with theory and 
partly consistent with other researchers’ empirical findings and partly differ from 
other researchers’ empirical findings. Both total product diversification and 
unrelated product diversification are positively and statistically significantly related 
to capital structure ratios. Related product diversification is statistically significantly 
negatively related to capital structure ratio.  
 
The conventional variables; asset tangibility and growth opportunity are positively 
and statistically significantly related to capital structure ratio. Non-debt tax shield, 
risk of bankruptcy and going concern are either positively or negatively related to 
capital structure depending on the group of analysis involved. Profitability and firm 
size were statistically significantly negatively related to capital structure ratio. These 
sets of factors account for a large share of these independent variables in explaining 
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the dependent variable capital structure ratio. It is also found that firms follow 
dynamic adjustments in their capital structure ratios in efforts to attain their target 
capital structure ratios. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter deals with the conclusions derived from the analysis and findings and 
guided by the research objectives. It also points out recommendations and 
implications from the study for the listed firms, investors, policy makers and the 
economy. 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
Specifically, the research objectives are addressed here in order to summarize and 
conclude the extent to which it was possible to attain them. A summary of the 
general objective is “to evaluate capital structure variability as influenced by product 
diversification amidst conventional factors for firms listed in Tanzania.” the 
conclusions of the study’s findings based on specific objectives follow below; The 
first objective was to assess capital structure variability of firms listed in Tanzania. 
In the results capital structure is manifestly variable. The standard deviation of 0.249 
for total capital structure ratio (TGEAR), 0.148 for short term capital structure ratio 
(SGEAR) and 0.175 for long term capital structure ratio (LGEAR) indicate that there 
are variations across companies and across years for all types of capital structure 
ratios. 
 
Further, based on adjustment speeds by considering the lowest and the highest alpha 
values in the models, alpha (α) is in the range 0.3229-0.3576 indicating that firms at 
DSE do not adjust their total debt more automatically. Capital structure levels seems 
to be more close to their previous years’ debt levels because of high transaction costs 
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associated with increasing total debt. The costs associated with being in 
disequilibrium are low and thus firms tend to adjust their total debts slowly.  
 
The second objective was to assess product diversification variability of firms listed 
in Tanzania. After isolating related and unrelated product diversifications, it was 
found that total, related and unrelated product diversifications are varying over time 
and across firms. Findings indicated that total product diversification (TDIVE), 
related product diversification (RDIVE) and unrelated product diversification 
(UDIVE) had standard deviations of 0.307, 0.332 and 0.222 respectively indicating 
greater degrees of variability over the years and across firms.  
 
Such degrees of variability help to point to the fact that companies at DSE have been 
consciously choosing product diversification strategies. This is for various purposes 
and advantages which product diversification offers. Such purposes and advantages 
are firm expansion, profit making, acquisitions, shareholders controlling the 
management, responding to market needs, reducing business risk, responding to the 
presence of unutilised resources in the firms, beating and timing the competition and 
the need to expand and grow. 
 
The third objective was to assess effects of conventional factors such as assets 
tangibility, firm size, firm profitability, growth opportunity, going concern, 
bankruptcy risk and non-debt tax shields on capital structure variability of firms 
listed in Tanzania. The results indicated that conventional factors; asset tangibility, 
growth opportunity and non-debt tax shield are positively related to capital structure 
ratio, while size, profitability and going concern are negatively related to capital 
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structure ratio, while risk of bankruptcy was negatively related to total capital 
structure ratio and positively related to long term capital structure ratio.  
 
The fourth objective was to analyse the effects of product diversification on capital 
structure variability of firms listed in Tanzania. The results indicated that both total 
product diversification and unrelated product diversification were positively related 
to capital structure ratio while related product diversification was negatively related 
to capital structure ratio.  
 
6.3 Implications and Recommendations 
This sub-section points out implications and recommendations of our study. It helps 
to link findings to practical usefulness of the study. 
 
6.3.1 Implications 
The findings point to the importance of product diversification in its various types in 
influencing financing choices of firms at DSE. Accordingly, it contributes to the 
understanding of rationales behind firms financing. The difference in the directions 
of effects for related and unrelated product diversification helps to points to the fact 
that the type of product diversification adopted by the firm matters in capital 
structure choices. 
 
The differentiated effects of related and unrelated product diversification on capital 
structure help to point to the facts that the nature of resources available to a firm 
dictates the kind of diversification adopted by a particular firm. Thus, it was possible 
to establish and substantiate that related product diversification is mostly possible in 
companies with excess, unutilised, inflexible resources available to the firm and 
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internal financing. This was due to a statistically significant negative relationship 
between related product diversification and capital structure ratios. On the other 
hand, unrelated product diversification is mostly possible in companies with excess, 
unutilised, flexible resources and external financing. This was due to a statistically 
significant positive relationship between unrelated product diversification and capital 
structure ratios. These relationships are in line with Transaction Cost Theory and Co-
insurance Effect Hypothesis. Further it points to the fact that product diversification 
is possible due to the presence of business synergy and resources sharing in these 
companies. 
 
The negative relationship between related product diversification and capital 
structure indicate that related product diversification is related to internal financing; 
such as retained earnings. Firms are forced to use internal financing to finance 
related product diversification investments. Such investments do not attract lenders 
due to high risks resulting from highly correlated returns. These investments 
discourage managers to borrow due to high debt transaction costs reflected by debt 
markets. The high costs are due to high risks from such correlated investments. 
Conversely, the positive relationship between unrelated product diversification and 
capital structure helps to point to the fact that, the presence of uncorrelated cash 
flows projected by unrelated product diversification investments reduces a firm risk 
profile thus attracting more debt financing among such firms. 
 
The varying and increasing levels of product diversification over time and across 
firms help to point to the presence of conscious diversification strategies employed 
by firms to take advantages of various benefits that diversification entails, such as 
  
 
 
126 
business risk reduction, staying competitive, expansion motives and trying to grow 
big among others.  
 
Capital structure ratios variability points to the fact that firms are trying to adjust 
their capital structure to reflect the costs, risks and advantages of each financing 
choice. The speed of adjustment helps to depict the fact that firms are trying to move 
their capital structures towards optimum or target capital structure ratios. The low 
speed of adjustment of capital structure ratios indicates that the cost of adjustment is 
rather high among DSE firms. Thus, transaction costs (such as legal, litigation, 
interests, listing and information) both direct and indirect seem to be high among 
DSE companies. Prior years’ capital structure ratios are closely predicting 
proceeding years’ debt levels. As noted previously firms are cautiously adjusting 
their debt levels, keeping them in line with prior years’ levels. Such capital structure 
ratios are adjusted so cautiously towards optimum ones due to the risk eminent from 
debt usage. 
 
Total, long term and short term capital structure ratios display differentiated profiles. 
This indicates that the type of gearing matters in capital structure choices in relation 
to capital structure determinants. Particularly companies seem to favour more short 
term debt over long term debt. But also the levels of debt or capital structure ratios 
have been increasing over time. This indicates that firms are consciously adjusting 
their capital structures over time. Further, prior years’ debt levels are good predictors 
of proceeding years’ debts. Thus, firms at DSE closely regulated their proceeding 
years’ debt levels in line with their prior year’s debt levels. These reflect the facts 
that capital structure ratios adjustment speeds are slow. This is due to high 
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transaction costs associated with debt financing in Tanzania. 
 
Presence of tangible assets such as plants, property and equipment dictate the ability 
for a firm to borrow and hence adjust its capital structure both in the short run and 
long run. Presence of large amounts of retained profits facilitated by big firm size 
and high growth opportunities as supported by the results help firms at DSE resort to 
internal financing. This is evidenced by the negative relationship for size and 
profitability and positive relationship for growth opportunity to capital structure. 
Firms at DSE are capable of decreasing taxes by means other than interest 
deductions such as depreciation as a result they employ less debt in their financing 
structures as indicated by the modest long term debt levels in the panel.  
 
The reputation of firms at DSE did not account for positive effects on capital 
structure ratios. This indicates as suggested by other researchers, the presence of 
information asymmetry at DSE that makes lenders ignore age in screening 
candidates for debts. Bankruptcy risks emanate from both increases in direct and 
indirect financial distress costs. Firms at DSE with high profitability and risk averse 
tend to avoid debt usage by relying on internal financing in order to reduce 
bankruptcy risk. 
 
The large r2 in the range of 0.825—0.964 and the adjusted r2 in the range of 0.804—
0.939 (Table 4.12) account for a very large and substantial effects of these factors 
under study on capital structure ratios. So far this is a large amount of contribution 
that can be attributed to a combination of these factors at DSE. This evidences the 
importance of these factors during capital structure decisions. Thus, managements, 
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policy makers, regulators and investors need to account for these factors when 
making policy, regulating the financial markets, and investing in these listed 
companies. 
 
6.3.2 Policy Makers, Regulators and DSE 
Due to high transaction costs that are indicative from the dynamic adjustment 
analysis, it is important that transaction cost resulting from information asymmetry, 
listing requirements, information flow, legal litigation and interests’ obligations be 
studied and monitored to reduce transaction costs, to improve transparency, to 
improve flow of correct and reliable information to investors and lenders. This will 
help firms easily adjust their capital structure ratios to maximize from their financing 
choices. 
 
6.3.3 Investors 
Companies at DSE are evidently product diversified. Specifically, they are following 
both related and unrelated product diversification strategies. Thus, investors need to 
invest among firms that are embarking on unrelated product diversification due to 
reduced business risk from uncorrelated cash flows. But, similarly when constructing 
their investment portfolios, it is significant that they choose firms according to a 
combination of related and unrelated product diversification, rather than investing 
only on companies with only related product diversified firms, because that would 
indicate high risk in their investments portfolios. 
 
Companies that are well diversified in unrelated products normally exhibit 
uncorrelated cash flows, which normally result into low business risk and high 
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profitability. Thus, banks and lenders need to consider product diversification as a 
criterion for screening debt candidates. 
 
6.3.4 Companies 
Investments through product diversifications have both implicit and explicit effects 
on capital structure of firms. Therefore, the management needs to undertake such 
investments with informed practices on how product diversification and its types 
affect their companies’ capital structure and consequently cash flow, profitability 
and value. Consequently, the types of product diversification adopted by the 
management matters in capital structure choices. 
 
Presence of excess, unutilised and inflexible resources can best be employed in 
advancing related product diversification. Thus firms may opt for such a strategy if 
they have more of these types of resources. On the other hand, firms with presence 
of excess, unutilised flexible resources should resort on unrelated product 
diversification, since that would help to produce uncorrelated cash flows resulting in 
reduced business risk. The study recommends that companies should diversify across 
projects as a way to make cash flows more predictable thereby decreasing the agency 
costs of decision-making prudence. 
 
Further, possibility of business synergies and resources sharing in the presence of 
resources such as skills, machineries, equipment and finance; companies should not 
hesitate to diversify their business as that would mean more returns to their firms. 
But, equally important is the fact that related product diversification is more related 
to internal financing while unrelated product diversification in more related to 
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external financing. Thus it is prudent to finance related product diversification with 
internal financing and finance unrelated product diversification with external 
financing. 
 
Firm-specific factors, such as product diversification, tangibility, size, profitability, 
non-debt tax shield, going concern, growth opportunity and business risk seem to 
account for a large share for variability on capital structures of these firms. Thus, 
these factors need to be taken into serious account when considering capital structure 
decisions. 
 
6.4 Areas for Future Studies 
 The following are recommendations for future research in this area. These are areas 
in which the study was not able to cover due to limitations of time, resources and 
they were out of scope of this study, but these are areas that emanated from our 
study’s research process. 
i. Studies need to focus on companies that are not listed in the Dar es salaam 
stock exchange and assess the effects of product diversification on capital 
structure 
ii. Researches need to focus on SMEs, and assess the role of product 
diversification on capital structures 
iii. Researches need to focus on how product diversification influence 
profitability of companies listed at DSE 
iv. Researches need to focus on the effects of product diversification on firm 
value; cases may be drawn from listed companies, unlisted companies and or 
SMEs. 
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v. Comparative studies by sectors such as SMEs, telecommunication, 
beverages, agricultural and mining may be conducted to compare the role of 
product diversification on capital structure, profitability, cash flows and 
firms’ value. 
vi. Comparative studies need to focus on the roles of product diversification and 
international diversification on capital structure, profitability, liquidity and 
firm value 
vii. Since there are several measures of diversification, comparative studies on 
measures of diversification could be done to compare results statistically. 
viii. More advanced methods of measurements and regression could be used such 
as structural equation modelling (SEM) to assess effects of product 
diversification on capital structure, profitability, cash flows and firm value. 
ix. Since this study focused on firm-specific variables, other studies need to 
incorporate industry-specific and macro-economic variables effects on capital 
structures, profitability, cash flows and firm value of listed companies at 
DSE, unlisted companies and among SMEs. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I Comparable samples and model specification 
Table 8.1 Comparable studies sampling 
Researcher  
[a] 
Location 
/area 
[b] 
Nature of 
populatio
n [c] 
populat
ion  
under 
study 
[d] 
Inclusion 
criteria into 
sample 
[e] 
Sampled 
number 
firms [f] 
Numbe
r of 
sample
d years 
[g]  
Numbe
r of 
Observ
ation: 
firm-
years[h
] 
% 
of 
sam
ple 
[i]=[
f/d] 
Method
ology [j] 
Barine 
(2012) 
Nigeria  214 Listed  18   Financial firms 
excluded 
18 2008-
2010 
[3 
years] 
54 100
% 
Panel 
data, 9 
IV, OLS 
regressio
n 
Gweyi et 
al. (2013) 
Kenya Non-listed 40 Only SACCOs 
included  
40 2010-
2012 
[3 
years] 
120 100
% 
Panel 
data, 5 
IV, OLS 
regressio
n 
Tarus et al. 
(2014) 
Kenya  238 Listed 
& unlisted 
60  Financial firms, 
missing data 
firms excluded 
60 2006-
2012 
[7 
years] 
420 100
% 
Panel 
data, 3 
IV, OLS 
regressio
n 
Chechet et 
al. (2013) 
Nigeria  214 Listed  19  chemical and 
paints only 
included, firms 
with  missing 
data excluded 
12 2005-
2009 
[5 
years] 
60 63% Panel 
data, 5 
IV, OLS 
regressio
n  
Akinyomi 
& Olagunju 
(2013) 
Nigeria 214 Listed  86   Manufacturing 
firms included, 
excluding firms 
with missing data 
24 2003-
2012 
[10 
years] 
240 28% Panel 
data, 5 
IV, OLS 
regressio
n 
Aremu et 
al. (2013) 
Nigeria 214 Listed  5  Banks only are 
included 
5 2006-
2010 
[5 
years] 
25 100
% 
Panel 
data, 7 
IV 
pooled 
OLS  
regressio
n,  
Hassan 
(2011) 
Nigeria 214 Listed  32   Insurance firms 
only are included 
15 2001-
2010 
[10 
years] 
150 47% Panel 
data, 5 
IV, FE 
regressio
n 
Muritala 
(2012) 
Nigeria  214 Listed  86   Manufacturing 
firms only, 
financials and 
missing data 
firms excluded  
10 2006-
2010 
[5 
years] 
50 12% Panel 
data, 6 
IV, PLS 
(OLS) 
Regressi
on 
Jambawo 
(2014) 
 
 
Zimbabwe 71 Listed  71 Financial firms 
excluded, missing 
data firms 
excluded 
24 2009-
2012 
[4 
years] 
96 34% Panel 
data, 4 
IV, OLS, 
regressio
n  
Researcher  
[a] 
Location 
/area 
Nature of 
populatio
populat
ion  
Inclusion 
criteria into 
Sampled 
number 
Numbe
r of 
Numbe
r of 
% 
of 
Method
ology [j] 
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[b] n [c] under 
study 
[d] 
sample 
[e] 
firms [f] sample
d years 
[g]  
Observ
ation: 
firm-
years[h
] 
sam
ple 
[i]=[
f/d] 
Hove & 
Chidodo 
(2012) 
Zimbabwe 71 Listed 23 Highly regulated 
and financial 
firms excluded 
21 2000-
2008 
[9 
years] 
189 91% Panel 
data, 8 
IV, OLS, 
pooled 
sample 
Umer 
(2014) 
Ethiopia  76 Listed 
& unlisted  
76 Large taxpayer 
companies, 
excluded banks 
and  insurance 
firms 
37  2006-
2010  
[6 
Years] 
222 49% Panel 
data, 9 
IV, RE 
regressio
n,  
Doku, et al. 
(2011) 
Ghana  Listed  21 All firms and 
sectors were 
included 
21 1995-
2005 
[11 
Years] 
231` 100
% 
Panel 
data, 12 
IV, 
pooling 
regressio
n, lagged 
DV 
Khediri & 
Daadaa 
(2011) 
Tunisia  Listed  44 All financials 
were excluded  
23 2000-
2009 
[10 
years]  
230 52% Panel 
data, 9 
IV, 
pooling, 
RE and 
FE 
regressio
n,  
Marobhe 
(2014) 
Tanzania 
and 
Kenya 
253 Listed 
& unlisted 
15 Manufacturing 
firms only, 
excluded 
financials, 
missing data 
firms 
12 2005-
2012 [7 
years] 
84 80% Panel 
data, 7 
IV, OLS 
regressio
n,  
Bundala & 
Machogu 
(2012) 
Tanzania  15 Listed  8 All 
manufacturing 
firms, exclude 
financials and 
cross listed 
8 2011 
[1 
year] 
8 100
% 
Cross 
sectional 
data, 7 
IV, 
Multiple 
regressio
n,  
The 
current 
Study 
Tanzania 22 listed, 1 
delisted 
23 Exclude all 
financials, 
delisted, missing 
data 
firms.Include 
only that have 
been listed. 
11 1997-
2014 
[17 
years] 
128 50% Panel 
data, 8 
IV, 
Pooling, 
OLS, 
FE, RE, 
lagged 
DV, 
GMM, 
CSE, 
PCSE, 
LSDV1 
regressi
ons. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation (2015). 
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Key: IV independent variable, DV dependent variable, FE fixed effect regression 
model, RE rundom effect regression model, OLS ordinary least square regression 
model. 
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Table 8.2: Models specifications and construction 
 
Variables for the Regression Model 
Variables Definitions  Measurement Symbols Researchers 
who used the 
variables and 
measures  
Dependent variable: 
Capital Structure 
(ALTENATIVE 
MEASURES) 
Capital structure ratio, the ratio 
of book value of  total debt (D) 
to total assets (TA)  
D/TA (1) 
GEARi,t  
Kochhar & 
Hitt (1998), 
Alonso (2003), 
La Rocca et al. 
(2009). 
  
Capital structure ratio, the ratio 
of book value of total debt (D) 
to market value of equity (E) 
D/E (2) 
GEARi,t  
Kochhar & 
Hitt (1998), 
Alonso (2003), 
La Rocca et al. 
(2009), 
Apostu, 
(2010). 
Independent variables: 
Product 
Diversification 
 
(ALTENATIVE 
MEASURES) 
Commercial/Product 
diversification may be 
measured by BARRY-
HERFINDAL index for firm i 
in year t 
HIi,t=1-∑(S/∑S)2  
Where:  
 
HI i,t: sales revenue according to 
BARRY-HERFINDAL indicator for 
firm i in year t. 
 
S: sell a certain portion of the 
company to define a product  
 
∑S: The total sales (ie, the total sales 
of parts/products) 
TDIVEi,t Markowitz 
(1952), Sharpe 
(1964), Barnea 
& Logue 
(1973), 
Jacquemin & 
Berry (1979), 
Palepu (1985), 
Varadarajan 
and 
Ramanujam 
(1987), 
Kochhar & 
Hitt (1998), 
Chatterjee 
&Wemerfelt 
(1991), 
Hendrikse & 
Oijen (2002), 
Alonso (2003), 
Singh et al. 
(2003), 
Kranenburg et 
al. (2004),La 
Rocca et al. 
(2009), Apostu  
(2010), García 
et al. (2013), 
Oh et al. 
(2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Or may be measured by; 
Categorical Measure, as 
developed specifically by 
Varadarajan and Ramanujam 
Broad spectrum Diversification 
(BSD) as number of 2-digit SIC 
codes a firms operates, 
Mean Narrow Spectrum 
Diversification (MNSD) as number 
of 4-digit SIC codes a firm operates 
divided by BSD  
TDIVEi,t 
Or  
Efficient diversification 
measure,  
Which uses the following 
proxies; 
standard deviation of the 
residuals σ(ε) 
and determination coefficient 
R² 
to measure product 
diversification 
 
 
Where Ritis the profitability of firm i 
in period t, Rm,tis the market 
profitability in period t, βiis the 
systematic risk and εi,tis the random 
disturbance. 
TDIVEi,t 
Independent variables: 
 Or may be measured by; Calculated as ∑Pj * ln(1/Pj), where P TDIVEi,t  
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Variables for the Regression Model 
Variables Definitions  Measurement Symbols Researchers 
who used the 
variables and 
measures  
Entropy measure, which is  
weighted number of business 
segments/products to control 
refers to the proportion of sales in 
business segment j and ln(1/Pj) is the 
weight for that segment. Total 
diversification in this measure is 
capable of being decomposed into 
related and unrelated product 
diversification as under. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Unrelated diversification 
measure is involvement of a 
firm concurrently in more than 
one business segment within 
the first 2 digits of SIC codes 
or first 3 digits NAICS codes. 
; 
Where Sj is the proportion of 
business (sales) of segment j defined 
according to the first 2 digits of the 
SIC code or 3 digit of the NAICS 
codes 
UDIVEi,t 
 
 Related product diversification 
measure is involvement of a 
firm concurrently in more than 
one business segment within 
the first 4 digits of SIC codes 
or first 6 digits NAICS codes. 
 
RDIVEi,t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tangibility The ratio of total non-current 
assets (NCA ot PPE) to the 
book value of total assets (TA) 
(NCA/TA)  
Or 
(PPE/TA) 
TANGi,t Jensen and 
Meckling 
(1976), Titman 
and Wessels 
(1988); Rajan 
and Zingales 
(1995), 
Kochhar and 
Hitt (1998), 
Alonso (2003), 
La Rocca et al. 
(2009), 
Apostu, 2010). 
Size 
 
 
natural logarithms of  sales 
revenue 
Or natural logarithms of total 
assests 
In natural logarithms (ln) of total 
assets values  
Or ln(Sales) 
Or ln(TA) 
SIZEi,t Titman and 
Wessels 
(1988); Rajan 
and Zingales 
(1995), 
Kochhar and 
Hitt (1998), 
Alonso (2003), 
La Rocca et al. 
(2009) 
Profitability The ratio of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to the 
book value of total asset ratio 
 
EBITDA/TA 
Or EBIT/TA 
 
 
 
PROFi,t Titman and 
Wessels 
(1988), Harris 
& Raviv 
(1991), Rajan 
& Zingales 
(1995), 
Kochhar & 
Hitt (1998), La 
Frank & Goyal 
(2002), Alonso 
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Variables for the Regression Model 
Variables Definitions  Measurement Symbols Researchers 
who used the 
variables and 
measures  
(2003), Rocca 
et al. (2009), 
Frank & Goyal 
(2004), 
Apostu, 
(2010), Vries 
(2010), Oh et 
al. (2014). 
Growth 
Opportunities 
 
 
 
Research and development 
(R&D)to sales ratio (S) 
Or sales annual growth  
R&D/S or Sales annual growth 
(%∆Sales) 
(1) 
GROPi,t 
Kochhar & 
Hitt (1998), 
Alonso (2003), 
La Rocca et al. 
(2009), 
Apostu, 
(2010). 
Market value of Equity /Book 
value of Equity  
Or 
Equity Market Timing 
MVE / BE 
 
(2) 
GROPi,t 
Rajan & 
Zingales 
(1995), Alonso 
(2003), La 
Rocca et al. 
(2009), Jairo 
(2006),Apostu 
(2010),Oh et 
al. (2014). 
Going Concern Age of the company 
 
The number of years in operations GOCOi,t Kochhar & 
Hitt (1998), 
Alonso (2003), 
La Rocca et al. 
(2009), Apostu 
(2010). 
Non-debt Tax 
Shield 
 Depreciation and Amortization 
(DA) divided by total assets 
(TA) 
 DA/TA NDTSi,t Myers (1984), 
Titman & 
Wessels 
(1988), Kremp 
et al. (1999), 
Booth et al. 
(2001), Alonso 
(2003), La 
Rocca et al. 
(2009), Apostu 
(2010). 
Bankruptcy 
Risk/Financial 
Distress 
Earnings volatility as a 
percentage change of earnings 
(operating incomes) 
Or Earnings change as 
percentage 
%∆(EBITDA) or 
∆EBITDA/%∆Sales 
RISKi,t Alonso (2003), 
La Rocca et al. 
(2009), Apostu 
(2010). 
Source: Researcher’s own design (2015).
 
153 
 
 
 
Appendix II: Comparable capital structure capital structure levels 
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Figure 8.1Capital structure ratio: means for capital structure ratios by years 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.2 Capital structure ratio: sum for capital structure ratios by years 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.3:Capital structure ratio: means for capital structure ratios by 
companies 
 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.4 Capital structure ratio: sum for capital structure ratios by 
companies 
 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Appendix III: Comparable product diversification levels 
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Figure 8.5: Product diversification: means for product diversification by years 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.6 Product diversification: sums for product diversification by years 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.7: Product diversification: means for product diversification by 
companies 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.8 Product diversification: sums for product diversification by 
companies 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Appendix IV: Comparable capital structure conventional factors levels 
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Figure 8.9 Conventional factors: means for conventional by years 
 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.10: Conventional factors: means for conventionals by companies 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Appendix V: Variables’ linearity assumptions checks 
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Figure 8.11 Linearity: unrelated diversification 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.12 Linearity: related diversification 
 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.13 Linearity: total diversification 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.14 Linearity: asset tangibility 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.15 Linearity: firm size 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.16 Linearity: firm profitability 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.17 Linearity: non-tax depreciation shield 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.18: Linearity: going concern 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.19: Linearity: growth opportunity 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.20 Linearity: risk of bankruptcy 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Appendix VI Various normality graphs checks 
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Figure 8.21 Normality check: kernel density estimate 
 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
A kernel density plot produces a kind of histogram for the residuals, the option 
normal overlays a normal distribution to compare. Here residuals seem to follow a 
normal distribution.  
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Figure 8.22 Normality check: normal residuals 
 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
 
  
 
 
164 
Standardize normal probability plot (pnorm) checks for non-normality in the middle 
range of residuals. Again, slightly off the line but looks ok. 
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Figure 8.23 Normality check: standardize normal probability plot (pnorm) 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Figure 8.24 Normality check: quintile-normal plots (qnorm) 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Quintile-normal plots (qnorm) check for non-normality in the extremes of the data 
(tails). It plots quintiles of residuals vs. quintiles of a normal distribution. Tails are a 
bit off the normal. 
 
Appendix VII: Assessment of heterogeneity 
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Figure 8.25 Fixed effects: assessing heterogeneity across companies 
Source: Data analysis (2016). 
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Appendix VIII: Guide for target adjustment coefficients models interpretations 
Table 8.3 Interpretations of the coefficients of the target adjustment models 
 
 
Source: La Rocca (2009). 
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Appendix IX: List of Stata commands used and notes 
 
//panel data exploration// 
xtline y 
xtline y, overlay 
//FEM:Heterogeneity accross companies/entities// 
bysort CompanyID:egen y_mean=mean(y) 
twoway scatter y* CompanyID, msymbol (circle_hollow)||connected y_mean 
CompanyID,msymbol(diamond)||, xlabel(1 "PAL" 2 "SIMBA" 3 "SWISS" 4 
"TATEPA" 5 "TBL" 6 "TCC" 7 "TOL" 8 "TWIGA" 9 "ACACIA" 10 "KQ" 11 
"NMG") 
//FEM:Heterogeneity accross years/time// 
bysort TimeYear:egen y_mean1=mean(y) 
twoway scatter y* TimeYear,  msymbol (circle_hollow)||connected y_mean1 
TimeYear,msymbol(diamond)||, xlabel(1997(2)2014) 
//OLS Regression//variables to be discarded because they were not projecting the 
expected signs or were not significant(size_2 prof_2 grop 1 RISK risk_3 risk_4)// 
regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS 
twoway scatter y* UDIVE, ||lfit y* UDIVE, clstyle(p.5) //not rondom enough 
twoway scatter y* RDIVE, ||lfit y* RDIVE, clstyle(p.5)//rondom 
twoway scatter y* TDIVE, ||lfit y* TDIVE, clstyle(p.5) //rondom 
twoway scatter y* TANG, ||lfit y* TANG, clstyle(p.5) //rondom 
twoway scatter y* SIZE, ||lfit y* SIZE, clstyle(p.5) //both not very rondom 
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twoway scatter y* PROF, ||lfit y* PROF, clstyle(p.5) //both rondom 
twoway scatter y* NDTS, ||lfit y* NDTS, clstyle(p.5) //not rondom 
twoway scatter y* GOCO, ||lfit y* GOCO, clstyle(p.5) //all goco variables are 
problematic they lack rondomness 
twoway scatter y* GROP, ||lfit y* GROP, clstyle(p.5) 
twoway scatter y* RISK, ||lfit y* RISK, clstyle(p.5) 
 
//FE ==> LSDV1 without a dummy// 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS  
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID 
predict TGEARhat 
separate TGEARhat, by(CompanyID) 
twoway connected TGEARhat1-TGEARhat11 UDIVE, msymbol(none 
diamond_hollow+circle_hollow x)msize(medium) mcolor(black black black black 
black black black black black black black)||lfit TGEAR UDIVE, 
clwidth(thick)clcolor(black) 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID, robust //to control for homoskedasticity we add robust) 
 
//FE ==> LSDV2 includes all dummies but without the intercept// 
regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS _ICompanyID_1-_ICompanyID_11, noconstant 
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//FE ==> LSDV3 includes all dummies and the intercept with a restriction// 
constraint define 1 
_ICompanyID_1+_ICompanyID_2+_ICompanyID_3+_ICompanyID_4+_ICompany
ID_5+_ICompanyID_6+_ICompanyID_7+_ICompanyID_8+_ICompanyID_9+_ICo
mpanyID_10+_ICompanyID_11=0 
cnsreg TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS _ICompanyID_1-_ICompanyID_11, constraint(1) 
 
//outreg2 command for publication tables// 
outreg2 [model1 model2] TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF 
GROP GOCO RISK NDTS _ICompanyID_1-_ICompanyID_11 using 
"C:\Documents and Settings\User\Desktop\PhD Analaysis and Strategy\MERGE 
2016 Analysis.dta" , append ctitle(Odds ratio) eform 
 
///******************************************************************
*/// 
///analysis for the final results/// 
//descriptive analsis/// 
estpost summarize TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE 
PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS 
esttab, cell("count mean sd min max") 
esttab, cell("count mean(fmt(4)) sd (fmt(4)) min (fmt(4)) max (fmt(4))")  
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estpost summarize TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE 
PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS, detail 
esttab .,cell("count mean(fmt(4)) sd (fmt(4)) min (fmt(4)) max (fmt(4)) skewness 
(fmt(4)) kurtosis (fmt(4))")nonumbers   
esttab using TGEAR.rtf,cell("count mean(fmt(4)) sd (fmt(4)) min (fmt(4)) max 
(fmt(4)) skewness (fmt(4)) kurtosis (fmt(4))")nonumbers //to export table to word 
document  
 
graph hbar (mean) TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR,  over(TimeYear)    // graphs capital 
structure ratios 
graph hbar (sum) TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR,  over(TimeYear)    // graphs capital 
structure ratios 
graph hbar (mean) TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR,  over(CompanyID)    // graphs capital 
structure ratios 
graph hbar (sum) TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR,  over(CompanyID)    // graphs capital 
structure ratios 
 
graph hbar (mean) UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE,  over(TimeYear)    // graphs 
diversification 
graph hbar (sum) UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE,  over(TimeYear)    // graphs 
diversification 
graph hbar (mean) UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE, over(CompanyID)    // graphs 
diversification 
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graph hbar (sum) UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE, over(CompanyID)    // graphs 
diversification 
 
graph hbar (mean) TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO GROP, over(CompanyID)    // 
graphs controls 
graph hbar (mean) TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO GROP, over(TimeYear)    // 
graphs controls 
graph hbar (mean) RISK, over(CompanyID)    // graphs controls 
graph hbar (mean) RISK, over(TimeYear)    // graphs controls 
 
 
//Univariate analysis// for ==> TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR debtequity_ratio UDIVE 
RDIVE TDIVE TANG TANG_sq SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO GROP RISK 
 
estpost ttest TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF 
GROP GOCO RISK NDTS, by(r_u_g) 
 
ttest LGEAR== SGEAR, unpaired unequal welch level(99) //unpaired ttest for long 
term and short term capital structure ratios 
 
ttest UDIVE==RDIVE, unpaired unequal welch level(99) //unpaired ttest for 
unrelated and related  
 
//correlations// 
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pwcorr TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF 
NDTS GOCO GROP RISK, star(0.05) bonferroni 
corr TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR debtequity_ratio UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG 
TANG_sq SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO GROP RISK, wrap 
set linesize 255 
corr TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS 
 
estpost correlate TGEAR LGEAR SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE 
PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS, matrix 
 
set linesize 255 
 
esttab ., not unstack compress noobs nonumbers 
esttab using correlation.rtf, not unstack compress nonumbers 
//regression diagnostics and assumption test// 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS 
 
vif //variance infaltion factor 
 
//linearity check// 
acprplot UDIVE, lowess 
acprplot RDIVE, lowess 
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acprplot TDIVE, lowess 
acprplot TANG, lowess 
acprplot SIZE, lowess 
acprplot PROF, lowess 
acprplot NDTS, lowess 
acprplot GOCO, lowess 
acprplot GROP, lowess 
acprplot RISK, lowess 
 
//Outliers detections// 
hadimvo  TGEAR, generate(newvar1) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  LGEAR, generate(newvar2) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  SGEAR, generate(newvar3) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  TDIVE, generate(newvar4) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  UDIVE, generate(newvar5) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  RDIVE, generate(newvar6) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  TANG, generate(newvar7) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  SIZE, generate(newvar8) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  PROD, generate(newvar9) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  NDTS, generate(newvar10) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  GOCO, generate(newvar11) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  GROP, generate(newvar12) p(0.05) 
hadimvo  RISK, generate(newvar13) p(0.05) 
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//normality check// 
predict e, residual 
kdensity e, normal 
histogram e, kdensity normal 
pnorm e 
qnorm e 
 
//test of heteroskedasticity// 
regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS 
estat hettest 
 
//specification test// 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear,  robust  
ovtest  
linktest 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS 
 
//vif test// 
vif 
 
//autocorrelation test// 
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xtserial TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS 
xtregar TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS, fe 
xi:xtregar TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS, fe //autocorrelated with AR(1) ie first order autocorrelation 
 
//testing for serial autocorrelations// 
xtserial TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS 
 
//FEM using LSDV1 // 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.TimeYear //to control for homoskedasticity may add robust) 
estimate store LSDV1_t 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID  //to control for homoskedasticity  may add robust) 
estimate store LSDV1_c 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear //to control for homoskedasticity may add robust) 
estimate store LSDV1_b 
esttab LSDV1_t LSDV1_c LSDV1_b, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2 r2_a rmse 
mss rss F) order(_cons UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE) wide compress mtitles //GOOD 
FOR COMPREHENISVE TABLE 
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esttab LSDV1_t LSDV1_c LSDV1_b using FEM.rtf, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) 
scalars(r2 r2_a rmse mss rss F) order(_cons UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE) wide compress 
mtitles //EXPORTING THE TABLE TO MS-WORD 
 
//FEM using LSDV1 CSE and PCSE// 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear //to control for homoskedasticity may add robust) 
estimate store LSDV1_b 
xi:regress TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO 
GROP  RISK  i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, cluster(CompanyID) //Stata output for the 
static model, using LSDV with clustered standard errors// 
estimate store CSE 
xi: xtpcse TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO 
GROP  RISK i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, correlation(ar1) //Stata output for the static 
model estimated by Prais-Winsten regression with PCSE// 
estimate store PCSE 
esttab LSDV1_b CSE PCSE, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2 r2_a rmse mss rss F) 
order(_cons RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE) wide compress mtitles keep(RDIVE UDIVE 
TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS) //GOOD FOR 
COMPREHENISVE TABLE 
esttab LSDV1_b CSE PCSE using CSE_PCSE.rtf, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2 
r2_a rmse mss rss F) order(_cons RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE) wide compress mtitles 
keep(RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS) 
//EXPORTING TABLE TO MS-WORD 
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//F test// 
regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS 
test RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS //for 
the F test 
 
//REM using GLS// 
xtgls TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS //random model 
//OR 
xtreg  TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS, re robust //random model 
//or 
 
xtreg TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS, re i( CompanyID) robust //random model 
estimate store RE_GLS 
xttest0  //Testing the REM 
 
esttab RE_GLS LSDV1_b, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2_w r2_b r2_o r2 r2_a 
chi2 rmse mss rss) order(_cons RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE) wide mtitles keep(_cons 
RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS) 
//comparing the FE and  GLS 
 
//dynamic panel// the static and dynamic models are compared 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
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GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear //dynamic 
estimate store dLSDV1_b 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS 
GOCO GROP   RISK  i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, cluster(CompanyID) //Stata output 
for the dynamic model, using LSDV with clustered standard errors// 
estimate store dCSE 
xi:xtpcse TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, correlation(ar1) //Stata output for the 
dynamic model estimated by Prais-Winsten regression with PCSE// 
estimate store dPCSE 
xtabond TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO GROP   
RISK , noconstant lags(1) artests(2) vce(robust) //GMM arelano and bond (1991) 
estimations with exoginous regressors 
estimate store GMM_ab 
xtdpdsys TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO 
GROP   RISK, noconstant lags(1) artests(2) //Stata output for the dynamic model 
estimated by GMM(1998)with exogenous regressors 
estimate store GMM_bb 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear //to control for homoskedasticity may add robust) 
estimate store LSDV1_b 
xi:regress TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO 
GROP   RISK  i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, cluster(CompanyID) //Stata output for the 
static model, using LSDV with clustered standard errors// 
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estimate store CSE 
xi:xtpcse TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO 
GROP   RISK i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, correlation(ar1) //Stata output for the static 
model estimated by Prais-Winsten regression with PCSE// 
estimate store PCSE 
esttab LSDV1_b dLSDV1_b CSE dCSE PCSE dPCSE GMM_ab GMM_bb, 
beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2 r2_a rmse mss rss F chi2 sargan) addnotes("Sargan 
test of overidentifying restrictions; H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid, for 
GMM_ab(1991)" "chi2(89)= 95.91445; Prob > chi2=0.2894, Arellano-Bond test for 
zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors," "for GMM_ab(1991), ar(1) z=-
3.6609, Prob>z = 0.0003 and ar(2) z = -1.7217, Prob>z = 0.0851; H0:no 
autocorrelation" "Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, H0: overidentifying 
restrictions are valid was chi2(103)=105.7978," "Prob > chi2 = 0.4053. Wald tests 1, 
2, 3 and 4 test the joint significance of company dummies, time dummies," 
"combined company and time dummies under the null hypothesis of no relationship 
were wald 1*** = F(10, 74) = 3.90," "Prob > F = 0.0003, wald 2 not significant= 
F(16, 74)= 1.65,Prob > F = 0.0768, wald 3*** = F(26, 74)= 2.69," "Prob > F = 
0.0005, wald 4*** = F(10, 74) = 4.88,Prob > F = 0.0000. significance levels are 
interpreted as:")  compress mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE) 
keep(_cons L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO 
RISK NDTS) //table 
esttab LSDV1_b dLSDV1_b CSE dCSE PCSE dPCSE GMM_ab GMM_bb using 
static_dynamic.rtf, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2 r2_a rmse mss rss F chi2 
sargan) addnotes("Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions; H0: overidentifying 
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restrictions are valid, for GMM_ab(1991)" "chi2(89)= 95.91445; Prob > 
chi2=0.2894, Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors," 
"for GMM_ab(1991), ar(1) z=-3.6609, Prob>z = 0.0003 and ar(2) z = -1.7217, 
Prob>z = 0.0851; H0:no autocorrelation" "Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, 
H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid was chi2(103)=105.7978," "Prob > chi2 = 
0.4053. Wald tests 1, 2, 3 and 4 test the joint significance of company dummies, time 
dummies," "combined company and time dummies under the null hypothesis of no 
relationship were wald 1*** = F(10, 74) = 3.90," "Prob > F = 0.0003, wald 2 not 
significant= F(16, 74)= 1.65,Prob > F = 0.0768, wald 3*** = F(26, 74)= 2.69," 
"Prob > F = 0.0005, wald 4*** = F(10, 74) = 4.88,Prob > F = 0.0000. significance 
levels are interpreted as:")  compress mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE 
TDIVE) keep(_cons L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS) //EXPORT TO MS-WORD 
 
//sargan and wald1(chi2) tests// 
xtabond TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS , noconstant lags(1) artests(2)  //GMM arelano and bond (1991) estimations 
with exoginous regressors 
estat sargan //for overidentification 
estat abond //for serial correlation ar(1)and ar(2) 
xtdpdsys TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS, noconstant lags(1) artests(2) //Stata output for the dynamic model estimated 
by GMM(1998)with exogenous regressors 
estat sargan 
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xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear 
testparm _ICompanyID_2- _ICompanyID_11  //wald 1 
testparm _ITimeYear_1998- _ITimeYear_2014  //wald 2 
testparm _ICompanyID_2- _ITimeYear_2014 //wald 3 
testparm RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS 
//test for joint significant of independent variables wald 4 
 
//analsys based on long term short term and total capital structure ratios// 
xi:xtpcse TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, correlation(ar1) //tatal debt  
estimate store totalD 
xi:xtpcse LGEAR L.LGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear,correlation(ar1) //long debt 
estimate store longD 
xi:xtpcse SGEAR L.SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear,correlation(ar1)  //short debt  
estimate store shortD 
esttab totalD longD shortD, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2 rmse mss rss) wide 
compress mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR L.LGEAR L.SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE 
TDIVE)keep(_cons L.TGEAR L.LGEAR L.SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG 
SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS) //tables 
esttab totalD longD shortD using debt_types.rtf, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2 
rmse mss rss) wide compress mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR L.LGEAR L.SGEAR 
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RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE)keep(_cons L.TGEAR L.LGEAR L.SGEAR RDIVE 
UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS) //EXPORT 
TABLE TO MS-WORD 
 
//group analysis: related, unrelated and total// 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, cluster(CompanyID) //total model 
estimate store total 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR UDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear if dive_subsamples==1, cluster(CompanyID) 
//unrelated model 
estimate store unrelated 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO 
RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear if dive_subsamples==2, cluster(CompanyID) 
//related model 
estimate store related 
esttab total unrelated related , beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2 r2_a rmse mss 
rss)wide mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE)keep(_cons 
L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS) 
//tables 
esttab total unrelated related using productrelatedness.rtf, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) 
scalars(r2 r2_a rmse mss rss)wide mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE 
TDIVE)keep(_cons L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS) //EXPORT TABLE TO MS-WORD 
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//group analysis: cross listed vs locally listed// 0 if locally and 1 if cross listed 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR TDIVE RDIVE UDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, cluster(CompanyID)  //both listed  
estimate store both_listing 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR TDIVE RDIVE UDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS if listing_subsample==1, cluster(CompanyID) //cross listed  
estimate store cross_listed 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR TDIVE RDIVE UDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS if listing_subsample==0, cluster(CompanyID) //locally listed 
estimate store local_listed 
esttab both_listing local_listed cross_listed, beta(%8.4f) se (%8.4f) scalars(r2 r2_a 
rmse mss rss) wide mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE 
TDIVE)keep(_cons L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS) //tables 
esttab both_listing local_listed cross_listed using listing_all.rtf, beta(%8.4f) se 
(%8.4f) scalars(r2 r2_a rmse mss rss) wide mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR UDIVE 
RDIVE TDIVE)keep(_cons L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF 
GROP GOCO RISK NDTS) //EXPORT TABLE TO MS-WORD 
 
///PREDICTED MODEL: /// 
xi:xtpcse TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, correlation(ar1)  //prediction 
predict TGEAR_predict  
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label variable TGEAR_predict "TGEAR predict" 
scatter TGEAR TGEAR_predict 
 
xi:xtpcse LGEAR L.LGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG  SIZE  PROF NDTS 
GOCO GROP RISK i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, correlation(ar1)  //prediction 
predict LGEAR_predict  
label variable LGEAR_predict "LGEAR predict" 
scatter LGEAR LGEAR_predict 
 
xi:xtpcse SGEAR L.SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, correlation(ar1) //prediction 
predict SGEAR_predict  
label variable SGEAR_predict "SGEAR predict" 
scatter SGEAR SGEAR_predict 
 
estpost summarize TGEAR TGEAR_predict LGEAR LGEAR_predict SGEAR 
SGEAR_predict 
esttab, cell("count mean sd min max")no numbers label 
esttab ., cell("count mean(fmt(4)) sd (fmt(4)) min (fmt(4)) max (fmt(4))") 
esttab using TGEAR_predict.rtf, cell("count mean(fmt(4)) sd (fmt(4)) min (fmt(4)) 
max (fmt(4))")nonumbers 
 
ttest TGEAR== TGEAR_predict, unpaired unequal welch level(99) //unpaired ttest 
for total  and predicted values 
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ttest LGEAR== LGEAR_predict, unpaired unequal welch level(99) // unpaired ttest 
for long term and predicted values 
ttest SGEAR== SGEAR_predict, unpaired unequal welch level(99) //unpaired ttest 
for short term and predicted values 
 
//combined table// 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear //to control for homoskedasticity may add robust) 
estimate store LSDV1_b 
xi:regress TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS  i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, cluster(CompanyID) //Stata output for the static 
model, using LSDV with clustered standard errors// 
estimate store CSE 
xi: xtpcse TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, correlation(ar1) //Stata output for the static model 
estimated by Prais-Winsten regression with PCSE// 
estimate store PCSE 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear //dynamic 
estimate store dLSDV1_b 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS 
GOCO GROP   RISK  i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, cluster(CompanyID) //Stata output 
for the dynamic model, using LSDV with clustered standard errors// 
estimate store dCSE 
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xi: xtpcse TGEAR L.TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS 
GOCO GROP   RISK i.CompanyID i.TimeYear, correlation(ar1) //Stata output for 
the dynamic model estimated by Prais-Winsten regression with PCSE// 
estimate store dPCSE 
xtabond TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO GROP   
RISK , noconstant lags(1) artests(2) vce(robust) //GMM arelano and bond (1991) 
estimations with exoginous regressors 
estimate store GMM_ab 
xi:xtdpdsys TGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO 
GROP   RISK, noconstant lags(1) artests(2) vce(robust) //Stata output for the 
dynamic model estimated by GMM(1998)with exogenous regressors 
estimate store GMM_bb 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR RDIVE TDIVE TANG  SIZE  PROF NDTS GOCO 
GROP RISK i.CompanyID i.TimeYear if dive_subsamples==2, cluster(CompanyID) 
//related model 
estimate store related 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR UDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK 
NDTS i.CompanyID i.TimeYear if dive_subsamples==1, cluster(CompanyID) 
//unrelated model 
estimate store unrelated 
xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR TDIVE RDIVE UDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS if listing_subsample==0, cluster(CompanyID) //locally listed 
estimate store local_listed 
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xi:regress TGEAR L.TGEAR TDIVE RDIVE UDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP 
GOCO RISK NDTS if listing_subsample==1, cluster(CompanyID) //cross listed  
estimate store cross_listed 
xi:xtpcse LGEAR L.LGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG  SIZE  PROF NDTS 
GOCO GROP RISK i.CompanyID i.TimeYear,correlation(ar1) //long debt 
estimate store longD 
xi:xtpcse SGEAR L.SGEAR UDIVE RDIVE TDIVE TANG  SIZE  PROF NDTS 
GOCO GROP RISK i.CompanyID i.TimeYear,correlation(ar1)  //short debt  
estimate store shortD 
 
set linesize 255 
esttab LSDV1_b CSE PCSE dLSDV1_b dCSE dPCSE GMM_ab GMM_bb related 
unrelated local_listed cross_listed longD shortD, beta(%8.4f) se(%8.2f) scalars(r2 
r2_a rmse mss rss F chi2 sargan) compress  mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR 
L.LGEAR L.SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE)keep(_cons L.TGEAR L.LGEAR 
L.SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS) 
//tables 
esttab LSDV1_b CSE PCSE dLSDV1_b dCSE dPCSE GMM_ab GMM_bb related 
unrelated local_listed cross_listed longD shortD, beta(%8.4f) not scalars(r2 r2_a 
rmse mss rss F chi2) compress  mtitles order(_cons L.TGEAR L.LGEAR L.SGEAR 
RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE)keep(_cons L.TGEAR L.LGEAR L.SGEAR RDIVE 
UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO RISK NDTS) //tables 
 
esttab LSDV1_b CSE PCSE dLSDV1_b dCSE dPCSE GMM_ab GMM_bb related 
unrelated local_listed cross_listed longD shortD using combined_table3.rtf, 
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beta(%8.3f) not scalars(r2 r2_a rmse mss rss F chi2) compress  mtitles order(_cons 
L.TGEAR L.LGEAR L.SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE)keep(_cons L.TGEAR 
L.LGEAR L.SGEAR RDIVE UDIVE TDIVE TANG SIZE PROF GROP GOCO 
RISK NDTS) //EXPORT TABLE TO MS-WORD 
 
